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ABSTRACT  
 
Lack of access to credit is a key obstacle for economic development in poor countries. The 
underlying problem is related to information assymetry combined with the poor’s lack of 
collateral to pledge. New mechanisms in microfinance offer ways to deal with this problem 
without resorting to collateral requirements. The objective of this thesis is to examine the 
mechanisms of providing credit through microfinance and assess the long-run borrowing 
effects on household welfare in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian environment provides a suitable 
setting to examine these issues. To meet this objective, two uniqiue data sets - a five-wave 
panel data on 400 and a cross-sectional data on 201 households - from northern Ethiopia are 
used.  
Borrowing decision is first conceptualized using a dynamic stochastic theoretical 
framework. Two types of risks involved in joint liability lending are incorporated, i.e., risk of 
partner failure and risk of losing future access to credit. Empirical analysis using recent 
dynamic panel data probit techniques show that these contractual risks indeed impede 
participation in borrowing. The impediment is higher for the new than repeat participants. 
Second, group formation is analyzed within the framework of alternative microeconomic 
theories of joint liability where the commonly held hypothesis that groups formed are 
homogeneous in risk profiles is tested. Empirical results reject this hypothesis indicating that 
the formation of heterogeneous risk profiles is an inherent feature in group formation and 
repayment. In fact, there is evidence that borrowers take advantage of established informal 
credit and saving, and other social networks, which also suggests that group formation 
outcomes vary depending on underlying socioeconomic contexts.  
Third, the impact of long-term borrowing on household welfare is assessed from the 
dimension of intensity and timing of participation in borrowing. Panel data covering relatively 
long period enabled to account for duration and timing concerns in program evaluation. 
Recent parametric and semi-parametric panel data techniques are innovatively employed to 
mitigate participation selection biases. Results from both approaches indicate that borrowing 
has increased household welfare significantly: the earlier and more frequent the participation 
the higher the impact partly due to lasting effects of credit. This also suggests that impact 
studies that are based on a single-shot observation of outcomes and that do not account for the 
timing and duration of participation may underestimate microfinance credit impacts.  
 
Key words 
Microfinance, joint liability, contractual  risk, group formation, risk-matching, impact 
evaluation, Panel data econometrics, dynamic panel probit, trend models, fixed-effects, 
composite counterfactuals, propensity score matching, farm households, Ethiopia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The role of finance in economic development has got considerable attention in the last four 
decades. Significant progress is made both in understanding and designing sound financial 
policies in the context of developing economies’ financial markets following the seminal 
contributions by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973); and parallel developments in theories of 
incentives (Stiglitz, 1974) and information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970, Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). An important stride was the inclusion of (informal) rural financial markets, which were 
otherwise considered as fragmented and unbankable (Hoff et al., 1993), into the domain of 
formal financial intermediation (Dichter, 2007: 1-6). 
With the emphasis given to poverty alleviation in early 1970s, the overriding policy 
interest was to fill a presumed ‘gap’ between the demand for and supply of savings of the 
poor. Efforts were made to fill this gap by supplying subsidized credit to the ‘needy poor’, 
particularly small farmers, through specialized state-owned banks, which were later deemed 
as ‘disasters’ in the literature (e.g., Adams, Graham, and von Pischke, 1984; Morduch, 1999). 
The failure of these state-owned banks coupled with the implementation of the structural 
adjustment programs in many developing countries dramatically reduced state intervention in 
rural financial markets in the 1980s (Conning and Udry, 2005). These experiences and other 
parallel innovations, most notably the beginning of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have 
led to a paradigm shift in the organization of providing finance to the poor, eventually giving 
birth to microfinance institutions (MFIs), reminiscent of their predecessors of mid-19th 
century European credit cooperatives (Guinnane, 1994; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). The 
new paradigm focused on problems of high transaction costs and risks of administering small 
and fragmented loans for collateral poor borrowers living in environments that are 
characterized by information asymmetry and weak enforcement mechanisms (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). It also recognized the need to build institutions founded on three, sometimes 
conflicting, policy pillars of what is now termed the microfinance revolution, viz. financial 
sustainability, outreach and impact on poverty (Zeller and Meyer, 2002: 3). 
What is special in MFIs is that they use unconventional methods to deal with the 
problems of transaction costs, risk and loan enforcements. Particularly, by providing loans to 
groups in which all members are jointly liable, MFIs exploit social relationships and trust 
among local people to enforce repayments. Besides, the joint liability element generates 
individual incentives to screen (mitigating adverse selection) (e.g., Varian, 1990), monitor 
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each other (mitigating moral hazard) (e.g., Stiglitz, 1990), and enforce repayments. The 
‘stick’ of joint liability is often combined with a ‘carrot’ of repeat-loans, often termed 
dynamic incentives. MFIs therefore rely heavily on the promise of repeat-loans for those 
repaying and denying future access to those that do not (Besley, 1995: 2187; Morduch, 1999). 
The entire group, sometimes the entire village, is banned from future loans if one or more of 
group members fail to repay, although there is often a distinction between strategic (free-
riding) and non-strategic repayment failures. The use of social relationships and trust to 
mitigate information and cost problems without having to depend on collateral is considered a 
‘win-win’ solution to banking problems with welfare maximizing advantages over standard 
individual lending methods (e.g., Morduch, 1999; Ghatak, 2000)  
The microfinance revolution has thus come with a lot of enthusiasm among advocates 
from around the world. Optimists see innovations in microfinance as powerful tools to help 
eradicate poverty, without much dependence on subsidy. Considerable amounts of donors’, 
investors’, as well as governments’ resources are thus devoted to microfinance aiming at the 
broader objective of encouraging asset accumulation and reducing vulnerability of poor 
entrepreneurs, and eventually extricate them out of poverty. Skeptics are however wary of 
disincentive effects of risk and cost shifts onto poor clients; and see a trade-off between 
‘sustaining MFIs on business terms’ and ‘meeting the social objective of reducing poverty 
without subsidy’. Indeed, there are evidences of “mission drift” in microfinance due to the 
trade-off between profitability and serving the poorest population segments (Cull, Demirgúç-
Kunt, and Morduch, 2007). A recent theoretical paper by Armendáriz de Aghion and Szafarz 
(2009) argues that the increased focus on commercialization in microfinance tends to deviate 
it from the original poverty reduction and women-focused missions. 
MFIs have also attracted substantial academic interest on a wide range of issues. Most 
research focuses on theoretical explanations as to how microfinance innovations brought 
notable successes. There is indeed some evidence of success to celebrate (e.g. see Hermes and 
Lensink, 2007). However, more than three decades after MFIs came to being, there are still 
unresolved issues, mostly empirical. In general, while the debate on how to resolve conflicts 
among the pillar objectives remains unsettled, much effort is made on the theoretical fine-
tuning of the joint liability theory, with little or no attention to the contexts in which poor 
borrowers operate. Most theoretical propositions rely on anecdotes of particular MFIs and 
have not been established as empirical regularities (Morduch, 1999). Thus, whether or not 
microfinance programs meet the needs of its clients effectively is a central question yet 
addressed inadequately. Some MFIs have now run for decades. According to the latest 
microfinance summit report (Daley-Harris, 2009: 1), the number of ‘poorest’ families served 
by MFIs globally has reached one hundred million in 2007. If true, this is a commendable 
achievement with respect to global targets set in previous summits. Unfortunately, these 
figures tell little about real achievements of the presence of MFIs. MFIs therefore merit 
investigation given the amount of resources and enthusiasm devoted to them.  
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Of particular interest in this thesis is the long-term impact of microfinance credit on 
poverty reduction. Microfinance impact evaluations, like many other social programs, are 
subject to estimation biases due to inherent characteristics of borrowers’ self-selection and 
MFI program placement. Studies used different methods to overcome these problems and 
identify impacts attributable to credit (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Coleman, 1999; 
Copestake et al., 2005; Tedeschi, 2008). However, most studies focus on either short-duration 
exposure to programs and lack sufficient time to capture long-term effects, or even if they 
cover long periods, they are less focused to the dynamics of borrowing during exposure by 
simply dealing with before and after comparisons. As a result, as in many other social 
programs, there is a renewed emphasis for, particularly long-term, program impact 
evaluations (Savedoff et al., 2006; Karlan and Goldberg, 2007; King and Behrman, 2009). 
 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
MFIs in developing countries, particularly in rural areas, operate in risky environments where 
livelihood is subject to the vagaries of nature. A natural question is therefore whether or not 
innovations in microfinance can help expand access to finance in those environments without 
hampering the sustainability of these institutions and at the same time without deterring the 
participation of their target groups. A simplistic assumption implicit in microfinance is that 
borrowers demand credit at any cost. One crucial aspect of group lending is the transfer of 
borrowing risks and costs from lenders to borrowers. It involves the risk of having to repay 
for a failed partner depending on own success. Moreover, there is the risk of being banned 
from future borrowings after group repayment failure. This banning threat gives MFIs some 
leverage to enforce repayments. However, it does so at the cost of magnifying borrowing risks. 
On the other hand, while it is commonly held in theory that non-strategic failures are bailed 
out (limited liability), MFIs tend to punish non-repayments indiscriminately since sorting out 
strategic and non-strategic failure is costly in practice. Under these circumstances, joint 
liability fully transfers lending costs and risks to borrowers. It follows that depending on 
individual risk aversion, poor households in risky environments (e.g., rain dependent poor 
producers in Ethiopia) would think twice before they assume the risk and costs of 
participation in MFI borrowing. This may partly explain the low participation rate of 
households in those areas despite the enormous amount of finance channeled through MFIs. 
Morduch (2008) puts it “we see that even after decades of access to microfinance, loans are 
still only at 50 per cent in most villages - not anywhere close to the 100 per cent we would 
think they would be. There is still a lot to learn about why customers take or stay away from 
our products.”  
Given individual borrowers’ decision to participate in group loans, crucial issue in group 
lending is the group formation process itself and the type of groups that arise. By considering 
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differences in effective borrowing costs faced by risky and safe borrowers, a number of 
theoretical papers have shown groups formed are risk homogeneous (e.g., Ghatak, 2000). 
However, others (e.g., Guttman, 2008) have shown homogeneity is not always the case. This 
is an interesting, often context specific, question for MFIs. It is crucial because the types of 
groups that arise determine the risks of the borrower pool that emerge and subsequent intra-
group relationships. These relationships, which vary with local specificities in turn, determine 
the overall success of microfinance. Nevertheless, despite the specific complexities in which 
they operate, most MFIs often choose to replicate the methods experimented by the ‘first-
wave’ MFIs rather than innovating and adapting to their own conditions (Hulme and Mosley, 
1996:135). A typical example is the introduction of Grameen Bank style innovations, 
originally implemented in Bangladesh’s largely semi-urban petty sector, into rural settings in 
East Africa (e.g., the Ethiopian MFI where this thesis focuses).  
Although adapting MFI services to local needs is a first step towards realizing the 
intended goals (Zeller and Meyer, 2002:1-7), the bottom line is if access helps improve 
livelihoods of participants. Evaluating effects of access to microfinance, particularly long-
term, is however challenging. First, despite substantial similarities of the mechanisms used in 
most MFIs, outcomes vary with the diversity of contexts they operate in as well as due to 
specific features of program implementation. Second, empirical evaluations, particularly long-
term impact assessments, require rigorous follow-up of the programs and their clients over 
time, which is costly and burdens the day-to-day operations of the MFI. Third, even when 
follow-up data is available, disentangling the effects of microfinance, or specific mechanism 
from other simultaneous effects is complicated by selection and temporal heterogeneities, 
which require constructing credible counterfactuals: what would have happened without the 
program. As a result, despite efforts to quantify effects of programs and their specific 
mechanisms, empirical evidences are still far from conclusive and lagging behind theoretical 
understandings. Thus, today, several years after the introduction of the ‘new’ paradigm, there 
are still many questions regarding what microfinance does and what it does not.  
 
 
1.3 Objective of the thesis  
 
The general objective of this thesis is to examine the mechanisms of providing credit through 
microfinance, viz. group formation, dynamic incentives and effects on borrowing decisions; 
and assess the long-term borrowing effects on household welfare. The focus is on 
understanding and empirically investigating the behavioral responses of borrowers to some of 
the building blocks of the innovative methods in microfinance as well as assessing observed 
household welfare effects of accessing microfinance loans over a relatively longer period. 
Four specific objectives deduced from the general objective are to: 
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i. Examine effects of microfinance contractual risks, viz. risk of partner failure and the 
threat of being denied access to future loans on households’ borrowing decisions in 
the face of exogenous negative economic shocks that characterize the study area. 
ii. Analyze and empirically test the risk matching behavior of borrowers in 
microfinance group formation and investigate reasons behind this group behavior in 
the case of Ethiopia. 
iii. Estimate the impact of intensity (or number of times) of participation in 
microfinance credit on household welfare. 
iv. Evaluate the impact of timing of (first-time) participation in microfinance credit on 
household consumption measured at several intervals after the onset of participation 
(participation), regardless of number of times of participation.  
 
 
1.4 Methodological approaches and data 
 
Different theoretical and empirical methodologies are used to meet the specific objectives in 
this thesis. A panel data set that comes from rural households in Tigray, northern Ethiopia is 
used to meet the first, third and fourth objectives. Meeting the second objective requires more 
detailed data on groups and group formation processes which was not available in the panel 
dataset. A cross-sectional survey uniquely conducted for this purpose on households from the 
same study area is used. The methods used to meet each objective are described in this section. 
The first objective is about households’ demand for and decision to participate in 
borrowing. The household borrowing decision is conceptualized using a microeconomic 
stochastic dynamic framework where borrowing is one element of households’ intertemporal 
production and consumption decisions. This model takes two types of risks in joint liability 
borrowing into account: the risk of having to repay for a failing partner and the risk of being 
banned from future borrowings conditional on group failure. The five-wave panel data is used 
in the empirical analysis. Risk is first estimated from a hypothetical question included in the 
survey. A dynamic panel probit model is estimated using the Heckman (1981a) approach to 
account for initial individual heterogeneity and state-dependence. This method uses recent 
simulation techniques (i.e., Maximum Simulated Likelihood) to overcome previous 
computational difficulties of implementing the Heckman approach using standard ML 
estimation. 
 To meet the second objective, group formation is analyzed within the framework of 
alternative microeconomic theories of joint liability, which under static and dynamic 
household interactions predict different risk matching results. A structural risk model is 
specified incorporating the simultaneity between choices of own and partners’ risks, as well 
as problems of obtaining preferred partners. The unique data set from the specialized survey 
conducted in 2003 on a cross-section of 200 borrowing households is used. Risk is estimated 
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from observed indicators for each household, which in turn is used to estimate group risk 
heterogeneity for each group. The reduced form of the structural model is estimated using 
Tobit, ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares to account for endogeneity between 
own risk level and choice of group risk heterogeneity level. Explanations for the resulting 
group risk matching and implications for repayment are further investigated. 
 The third and fourth objectives focus on measuring the long-run benefits of 
participation in MFI credit from two important dimensions. Conceptually, in both objectives, 
repeated borrowings for production inputs and asset accumulation are assumed to eventually 
trickle down to improve household welfare over time. Impact is measured on two important 
household welfare indicators of rural households in Tigray, i.e. yearly consumption (in both 
objectives) and housing improvements (only in the third objective). In both objectives, recent 
developments in econometric techniques are employed to identify impact. In the third 
objective, impact is evaluated from variations in the level of participation over time. The four-
wave panel data spanning ten years is used to meet this objective1. Repeated observations in 
the long spanning panel enable us to identify impact from the intensity or degree of 
participation as opposed to common methods of comparing participants and non-participants. 
The standard fixed-effects model, which by default controls for time-invariant unobservables 
is innovatively modeled to account for time-varying, seasonal and individual trend 
unobservables. It is also modeled further to allow borrowing to depend on individual trends, 
and again more flexibly to account for the number of times a borrower participated over time. 
An advantage of these models is that they enable to identify impact from participation levels 
over time while controlling for both time-invariant and time-varying individual specific 
unobservables.   
The fourth objective is to evaluate impact of timing of (first-time) participation on 
consumption measured at several intervals after the onset of participation, regardless of 
number of times of participation. The aim is to evaluate differential impacts on batches of 
participants due to the timing of participation. Of particular interest is the effect of MFI credit 
on early versus late participants, particularly in the face of economic shock years such as 
droughts in 2000 and 2003 and the implications to reduce vulnerability after the shocks. 
Impact is thus assessed relative to onset of first-time participation, regardless of repeat-
participation thereafter. Identifying the causal impact in this setup requires a non-standard 
conceptualization of counterfactuals because the outcome (i.e., consumption) is measured in 
several periods subsequent to a single treatment (i.e., participation). To analyze this problem a 
recent semi-parametric approach is used that establishes counterfactuals by accounting for 
initial differences as well as ‘potential future paths of participants had they not participated at 
a particular time’. The propensity score matching method is used to construct a composite of 
these future counterfactuals for each participant batch from a set of nonparticipants up to the 
                                                 
1 Note that one of the available five-waves is not used in the last two objectives because it did not include 
welfare indicators needed in both studies. 
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onset of participation. This method is also compared against a simple pair wise effect of 
participation to get insight into the bias reduction due to the new method.  
 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
 
Together with this introductory chapter, this thesis contains seven chapters. Chapters 3 to 6 
were originally prepared as individual articles and are (to be) submitted to scientific journals. 
Chapter 4 is already published. As a result, some data description overlaps are possible. This 
section provides a brief outline of what is in each of the six chapters that follow.  
Chapter two provides the background for the rest of the chapters. It frames the setting of 
the study environment. It provides the reader background information regarding when, where 
and how the study is undertaken. The biophysical and socioeconomic environment of the 
study sites, the operational specifics of the microfinance studied, and the sampling and data 
collection procedures are briefly described. Chapter three extends the discussion on the theory 
of joint liability lending, mimicking the practice in Ethiopia, and examining it as one-decision 
component of a rural household unit rather than a single decision of a ‘profit-maximizing 
agent’. It thus provides first evidence as to what extent these new contractual methods limit 
borrowing.  
Chapter four is about the group formation processes in group lending. It explores what 
kind of group is expected out of a pool of people who voluntarily form borrowing groups and 
become jointly liable, and what comes out in practice and why. It also discusses the 
implications of the outcome for the success of group lending itself. Chapter five and six deal 
with the rather intriguing question of long-term impact evaluation in microfinance. Not many 
studies are done yet to evaluate long-term effects of MFI borrowings. The fifth chapter deals 
with this issue. Besides, classical impact evaluation methods have little to offer when the 
treatment is long lasting and non-reversible as in the case of credit. Under such conditions, 
selection bias problems are complicated with temporal effects and dynamics of borrowing 
behavior. Chapter six combines parametric and nonparametric methods to overcome these 
problems. Finally, chapter seven presents the key conclusions of this thesis and gives 
implications for the operation of microfinance in Ethiopia and other similar environments. 
Suggestions for future research are also outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE STUDY AREA, MICROFINANCE IN ETHIOPIA AND DATA USED  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
To give the reader an overview of the underlying socioeconomic and biophysical contexts in 
which microfinance operates, this chapter provides a brief description of the prevailing 
biophysical and socioeconomic conditions specific to the study region. It also describes the 
national policy environment, particularly, related to rural financial markets. Moreover, to put 
this study in the perspective of the emerging but delicate Ethiopian microfinance industry, a 
brief discussion on the evolution and present state of MFIs in Ethiopia is provided. With this 
background, the institutional structure and operational specifics of the microfinance on which 
this study focuses is discussed. Finally, in addition to the specific data set descriptions given 
in each chapter, a general description of the study villages, survey design, and data sets used 
is presented. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the socioeconomic and 
policy background; section 2.3 outlines the evolution and state of MFIs in Ethiopia, and the 
institutional and operational experience of DECSI. A brief description of the survey designs, 
study villages, and data sets is given in section 2.4. 
 
 
2.2 Socioeconomic and policy background 
 
This study focuses on the Tigray regional state of Ethiopia. Tigray is the most northern region 
of Ethiopia, bordered in the north with Eritrea, in the west with the Sudan and in the south and 
east, respectively, with the Amhara and Afar regional states of Ethiopian (Figure 2.1). 
Topographically, the region stretches from the flat lowlands in the northwest to the ragged 
and mountain plateaus of the northern highlands of Ethiopia (Woldehanna, 2000:14). It covers 
a total area of 80 thousand square kilometers with 4.314 million inhabitants, 80.5 per cent of 
them residing in rural areas (Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, 2007:19).  
Subsistence agriculture is the main stay of the rural population. It includes mainly crop, 
livestock and mixed farming. Farming systems are characterized by traditional ways of doing 
things. Labor and animal power is the main inputs in production. Irrigation is limited and 
production depends on short-season annual rainfall. With the exception of the southern 
plateau that enjoys additional short rainy season, the Belg (March-May), the principal rainy 
season in this region is the Kiremt (June-September) season. This season typically belongs to 
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the monsoon rainy season of the semi-arid, Sudano-Sahelian dryland belt of Africa that 
extends from the west (Atlantic Ocean) to east (Ethiopia and Eritrea), which is characterized 
by erratic rainfall and recurrent droughts (Segele and Lamb, 2005). Erratic and recurrent 
droughts mean that subsistence is subject to the variability of nature, which in turn defines the 
way of life and adaptation to such variability. 
Historically, this is one of hardest hit regions in Ethiopia by recurrent droughts. Of the 
39 major recorded droughts in the last 200 years in the country that are characterized by food 
shortages, famines and excess mortality, more than half of them occurred in parts of the 
country that include this region (Webb, et al., 1992). This was exacerbated by the non-
responsive and often discriminatory policies pursued in the country for several decades of the 
last century (Inquai, 2007: 15-24). Moreover, many of Ethiopia’s historical cross-boundary 
wars (e.g., the 1896 and 1935 Italian invasion), recent civil wars (e.g., the protracted civil war 
that ended in 1991) and border conflicts (e.g., the 1998-2000 with Eritrea) took place in this 
region. Coupled with decades of poor governance all of this resulted in environmental and 
ecological imbalances in the region, which are manifested in degraded lands, poor resource 
bases, and population pressure, which led to further land fragmentations and mismanagement 
and hence to an even poorer performance of agriculture, also relative to the national average 
(Woldehanna, 2000:17-19). Studies indicate that close to 50 per cent of households in the 
region produced less than their annual food requirements in 1997 and 2000 (Hagos, 2003). In 
2005, around 48 per cent of the population of Tigray was unable to meet the basic 
requirement of consumption (MoFED, 2006)1. 
These problems were further worsened by the unfavorable policy environment, 
particularly the command economic policy, the country followed in recent history before it 
shifted to the present market-led macroeconomic policy in 1991. The national policy before 
1991 completely neglected subsistence agriculture in favor of large scale urban 
industrialization. Efforts were hardly made to improve rural infrastructures and 
complementary inputs, and incentives to promote local innovations were rarely provided. In 
fact, on the contrary, the command economy followed conscious policy of serving the urban 
bias at the expense of the rural sector. E.g., farmers were forced to sell their produce at lower 
than market price levels to government marketing boards, which were responsible for 
supplying cheap food grains to urban residents (Woldehanna, 2000: 20). There was no room 
for the private sector to play a role. Critical inputs such as finance were provided by the 
public sector and were either focused on large scale irrigation projects or simply missing at all 
(more on this in section 2.3).  
For the vast majority of poor households, the main source of finance has been informal 
finance (Aredo, 1993:15), which includes (i) family and friends, (ii) moneylenders (iii) 
interest bearing informal micro credit and saving services often based on neighborhood and 
                                                 
1 MoFED stands for Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Ethiopia. 
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market relationships, (iv) non-interest bearing credit and saving associations, mainly Equb, a 
type of Rotating Saving and Credit Association (ROSCA) found in Ethiopia; and Iddir, a 
form of indigenous social insurance where a group of households in a neighborhood or people 
of similar social or ethnic background contribute money or other resources with the aim of 
providing assistance at times of difficulty, mainly, during funerals and mourning (Alula, 2000; 
Dercon et al, 2006). 
The shift in economic strategy following the change in government in 1991 brought 
about fundamental policy changes in the rural economy of the region. The most fundamental 
is the priority given to agriculture as an initiating engine for growth and development. A 
national strategy of Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) has been designed 
with broad objectives of increasing agricultural productivity, ensuring food security, 
promoting commercialization of agriculture and linkages to agro-industry (MEDaC, 1999; 
FDRE, 2000). Although ADLI has been adopted since 1994, a more comprehensive five-year 
national plan for Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) was 
implemented in the period 2002/03-2004/05 (MoFED, 2006: 1-2)2. The SDPRP was designed 
in consultation with donors’ process of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (PRSP) and 
took poverty reduction as core national development agenda. It was built on previous 
commitments and took ADLI as one of its policy pillars. Other pillars of the SDPRP were the 
justice system and civil service reforms, decentralization and empowerment, and capacity 
building in public and private sectors (MoFED, 2002). As in ADLI, SDPRP recognized the 
need to provide financial services mainly to support the extension program that has already 
been in progress. The second five-year plan (2005-2010) broadly focuses on Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), again with ADLI remaining one of the 
main pillars (MoFED, 2006). The PASDEP is the most pragmatic and detailed policy exercise 
the country has ever seen. It included a wide range of issues with clear milestones to achieve 
before the next five-year plan sets in (MoFED, 2006). In this second plan, microfinance has 
been identified as a key instrument to reduce poverty in both rural and urban areas, in 
response of which the MFI industry has grown fast in recent years (more on this in the next 
section). 
There has not been a comprehensive study that assesses the overall effects of the policy 
shift in recent years. There are some evidences from some specialized studies that indicate 
recent efforts have been able to reverse, or at best deter, the ever deteriorating environmental 
situation in the region (e.g., Nyssen et al, 2007). The evidence on poverty and growth effects 
has however been largely mixed, particularly within the period 1991-2003 (e.g., World Bank, 
2005: 21-32; MoFED, 2006: 3). It is only in the last five years that the country has seen a 
steady GDP growth rate of 11.8 per cent per year (FAO/WFP, 2008). One important outcome 
of the liberalization and shift to agriculture-led macroeconomic policy is the restructuring of 
                                                 
2 Discussions about SDPRP started since 2000 but was implemented in the last three years of its planned 
years.  
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the financial sector, particularly of the rural financial markets, which created a conducive 
environment to the emergence of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the country. Many MFIs 
have been established as a result, each of them operating in specific regions and targeting 
specific populations. According to a recent FAO/WFO report, one result of farmers’ increased 
access to MFI loans is that it created capacity to retain and stock their grains that would 
otherwise be dumped at lower post-harvest prices (FAO/WFP, 2008). Obviously, this has 
changed the landscape of rural financial markets significantly, which merits a discussion here. 
The following section discusses the state of MFIs in Ethiopia. 
 
 
2.3 DECSI and microfinance in Ethiopia 
 
Although lending to poor people through NGOs is not new, microfinance in its present form, 
i.e., providing financial services with business orientation, is a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia. 
The Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) is one of the pioneer MFIs in Ethiopia. 
Due to its contribution to the development of other MFIs in the country, the evolution and 
development of microfinancing in Ethiopia is closely linked to the development of DECSI in 
Tigray 3 . Understanding the evolution of DECSI therefore helps to understand the 
characteristics of MFIs in Ethiopia, which in turn is useful to put the present study in a 
broader national perspective. The following section briefly explains the evolution and state of 
MFIs in Ethiopia, with special focus to DECSI. 
 
 
2.3.1 The evolution of microfinance industry in Ethiopia 
 
The earliest microfinance activity in Ethiopia is the pilot Rural Credit Scheme of Tigray 
(RCST) that started in 1994 by a local NGO, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST)4. REST 
carried out a socio-economic study in 1993 in Tigray that indicated lack of access to credit 
was one of key obstacles to rehabilitate and develop the war torn region and this led to the 
establishment of RCST (Borchgrevink et al, 2005:1). Initially, interest was primarily focused 
on providing credit services to poor ‘credit constrained’ farmers. Soon, the need to provide 
other financial services (e.g., saving) was also recognized. Thus, following the legal 
framework provided by the national proclamation in 1996 (proclamation 40/96), RCST was 
transformed into a quasi-private ‘business oriented’ microfinance institution in 1997 and 
subsequently renamed Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI). Nevertheless, REST 
                                                 
3 For example, DECSI is the first to introduce group based loans to Ethiopia. 
4 Originally, REST is affiliated to the Tigray Peoples’Liberation Front (TPLF) and has been engaged in 
relief and rehabilitation      activities during and after the civil war that led to a regime change in the 
country in 1991. 
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remained its major stakeholder, with the rest of stakes held by the regional government, 
regional youth’s, women’s and farmer’s associations (SOS Faim, 2003). Like many MFIs, 
DECSI has benefited from international donor funding, particularly at early stages. Among its 
notable donors are NOVIB (the Netherlands), Norwegian People’s Aid (Norway), and SOS 
Faim (Belgium and Luxembourg). From the outset, DECSI’s operational role model was the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. No surprise, DECSI molded its contractual arrangements and 
day-to-day operations in Grameen style (more on this in next section). It is important to note 
from the outset that despite its general orientation towards providing financial services on 
business grounds, given its historical affiliations as well as vested interests of the stakeholders, 
DECSI remains with substantial ‘social’ orientation of reaching the poorest. 
In a similar fashion, a number of other microfinance programs which, among others, 
include the Sidama Microfinance Institution, the Oromia Credit and Saving share company, 
the Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) were soon established in other regions of 
the country most of which followed DECSI’s footsteps, replicating ownership structure, 
orientation and operational principles. For example, the group lending method is commonly 
instituted in most MFIs. Ever since, households that were previously ‘unbankable’ to 
conventional banks have become within the reach of banking. This is a historical leap, at least, 
in terms of creating a conducive situation to consider the provision of financial services to 
poor households within a national policy framework.  
As of 2005, about 1.2 million households, of which 38 per cent were women headed, 
participated in the 26 microfinance institutions operating in the country receiving about 1.5 
billion ETB credit. In the same period, they mobilized a total savings of half a billion ETB, a 
third of the loan amount extended (Wolday, 2006:18). In just a brief period (2001-2005), the 
industry grew by 263 per cent in terms of number of clients, 479 per cent in volume of loan 
portfolio and 206 per cent in savings (Wolday, 2006:18). Moreover, with the special focus 
recently given to the informal micro and small enterprise sector, MFIs mobilize a 
considerable amount of finance not just in rural but also in the urban and semi-urban areas of 
the country. Thus, the fast growing pace has been both in terms of number of MFIs and 
outreach (borrowers and savers). By the end of 2008, the number of registered MFIs has 
reached 28 and they mobilize a total outstanding loan of ETB 4.7 billion and savings of 1.7 
billion ETB. Of these, 12 of them operate in the capital and the rest are engaged in the 
regional states (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2008:33), five of the latter accounting for 90.5 per 
cent of total credits extended and 92.6 per cent of total savings mobilized.  
Thus, in terms of number of borrowers, despite its late entry, Ethiopia is home to two of 
largest MFIs in Africa, namely, DECSI and ACSI (Lafourcade et al, 2005). Yet, a vast 
majority of Ethiopian rural and semi-urban households remain unreached. In fact, according 
to a recent statistical map of microfinance users, existing rural microfinance institutions are 
much concentrated in the central highlands of the country (Central Statistical Agency and 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006:29). E.g., according to a national survey in 
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2005, only 26 per cent of farmers accessed credit nationally (MoFED, 2006: 36). There are 
hardly any comprehensive and rigorous studies to date on whether and to what extent those 
that accessed microfinance credit have benefited from the enormous amount of loans 
extended. The following section describes the operations of one of these MFI on which the 
present study focuses. 
 
 
2.3.2 The operations of DECSI in Tigray 
 
As discussed in the historical background, DECSI operates specifically in Tigray. For more 
than a decade, DECSI has been one of major development partners in the region. Building on 
its pilot experience and after its official launch in 1997, DECSI quickly expanded its network 
throughout the region. As an institution, DECSI has been able to build a strong staff and forge 
robust working relationships with partners at all levels, down to the lowest administration unit, 
the Tabia (Van Esbroeck, 2000:55). Its network of nine branches and 96 sub-branches, 
headquartered at Mekelle, the capital of the regional state, covers 91 per cent of the Tabias in 
the region (see Figure 2A). 
DECSI’s broader objectives include providing (i) credit services to enhance the 
productivity of small producers, start up capital for entrepreneurs and raise the standard of 
living of clients and their families; (ii) saving facilities and raise awareness on financial 
disciplining in the region; and (iii) employment opportunities by expanding DECSI’s 
networks throughout the region, thereby attain its financial as well as institutional 
sustainability as a microfinance. Despite these broader objectives, at early stages, DECSI was 
preoccupied with credit provision in rural areas (SOS Faim, 2000). Thus, for example, other 
financial services such as mobilizing savings were given less priority and limited to 
compulsory deposits linked to credit. Moreover, DECSI’s services were focused to rural areas 
and rural towns. Eligible to DECSI’s credit are poor households with ‘potential to use credit 
for production purposes’. There are no consumption loans and in principle loan diversion is 
not allowed. Since the aim is to help poor households to boost production and secure food, 
and step by step strengthen the marketability of production in the region, poor but credit 
constrained “productive” households are considered as main targets of the program. However, 
there is no mechanism by which these households are targeted; there is no clearly defined 
selection criterion (Borchgrevink et al, 2003). Women are however treated separately and 
given positive discrimination by allowing them to form women groups. In 2001, for example, 
39 per cent of loans were extended to women headed families (SOS Faim, 2003)  
Considering the difficulty for potential borrowers to secure collateral given the inherent 
poverty in the region and taking lessons from other institutions, mainly from the Grameen 
bank, DECSI designed group based loans. Potential borrowers are required to form groups of 
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3-7 members from which the screening committee selects 5 . Studies indicate that this 
committee appears very unlikely to reject a client and most screening takes place during 
group formation (e.g., Borchgrevink et al, 2003). Approved loans are given to individual 
members for which the group remains responsible. Failure to repay one or more of the group 
loans is punishable by denying future loans, which some times include the village. Partial 
repayment is not allowed and at times group members that can repay their individual share but 
unable to help their partners are forced to incur additional costs of keeping the principal. In 
fact, a special case in DECSI is that not only willingness but even inability to repay is harshly 
punishable. DECSI takes advantage of its historical affiliations and synergy with local 
administrators to implement a strict enforcement mechanism. This partly explains the 
exceptionally high repayment rates in the institution (Borchgrevink et al, 2003). Interest rate 
ranges between 12 and 15 per cent per year of outstanding loans. This is low compared to the 
ten times higher interest rate moneylenders ask in the area (Woldehanna and Oskam, 2002). 
Repayment periods vary between six to twelve months, depending on the type of activity for 
which a loan is extended. The maximum loan size for DECSI’s standard loan types reaches up 
to ETB 5000 and Average loan size ranges between ETB 500 to 1000, during the study 
periods (Woldehanna, 2005: 240).  
From the beginning, two types of loan products are provided, namely, the regular loans 
and agricultural input loans. Regular loans are targeted at income generating farm and off-
farm activities (e.g., agriculture, trade, handcrafts, and services). These are basically group 
based loans and accounted for the lion’s share of DECSI’s loan portfolio. Agricultural input 
loans are given synchronized with the extension program, mainly for fertilizer, pesticides, 
improved and selected seeds. Since they are packaged with inputs provided by the extension 
program, agricultural input loans are administered in coordination with the bureau of 
agriculture. Agricultural input loans often accounted for smaller share of DECSI’s loan 
portfolio (e.g., only 7 per cent in 2001) and declined over the years both in relative as well as 
absolute terms (Woldehanna, 2005:241).  
DECSI has introduced two other loan products, namely, Micro and Small Enterprise 
(MSE) and ‘household package’ loans in 2003. MSE loans target at small entrepreneurs in 
urban areas and are given individually with some collateral arrangements. Household package 
loans are also given individually but with some collateral arrangements from the government. 
Moreover, the selection and enforcement mechanism are hardly within the premises of DECSI 
(Borchgrevink et al, 2005:87) and are therefore totally different from standard individual 
loans6. Note that borrowers of the old programs are also allowed to shift to the package 
program but only after settling down all debts from old loans. 
                                                 
5 In later years the group size was lowered to 3-5. The screening committee consists of branch credit 
officers and a tabia or community leader. 
6 Package loans are tied to specific activities (mainly, dairy farming, poultry, horticulture, and beekeeping) 
aimed at achieving household food security in the region. This is an integrated recent program run by the 
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In general, DECSI has excelled in terms of reaching a big number of households in its 
short period of existence. For example, in just two years after its official launch, over 210,000 
households (6.6 per cent of the total population) accessed DECSI’s credit with 1.4 million 
credit transactions amounting to ETB 447 million. The volume of loan increased each year 
until it slowed down in 1999 due to the border conflict with Eritrea (SOS Faim, 2000). 
However, the momentum quickly resumed afterwards, with the number of households that 
accessed credit reaching 423,830 in 2006 (See also table 3A.1 in chapter three). This trend 
however tells little about the overall borrower profiles and consistency of borrowing over the 
years. A preliminary evaluation of DECSI in 2000, for example, indicated that there was high 
borrower turnover every year. Although many households saw opportunities that could be 
exploited using credit and continued to borrow, still about 12 per cent dropped out each year 
and the study called for a more rigorous study of this issue (SOS Faim, 2000). A similar study 
in 2002 estimated the total number of clients that abandoned DECSI up to that year at 
100,000-150,000 (SOS Faim, 2003). A major reason identified by the study is that most 
dropouts belong to those that “stepped back because they become aware of the risk; because 
of the difficulties using credit for productive purposes; or the disintegration of their group”. 
However, this study, though qualitatively, finds improvement in the lives of participant 
families and attributes it to number of years they have been clients. 
Apart from credit provision, DECSI has also recently introduced other financial 
products, mainly money transfer, pension payment, and deposit mobilization (savings). 
Money transfer and pension payments are two important services DECSI provides at each 
branch. Next to credit, deposit mobilization is the second most important financial product of 
DECSI. There are two types of deposits in DECSI: the compulsory deposits which credit 
group members have to save monthly and voluntary deposits which both regular loan clients 
and the public at large save. DECSI provides a deposit rate of 3 per cent. Its deposit portfolio 
has grown rapidly. This is one of DECSI’s remarkable successes in recent years (Woldehanna, 
2005:241). By 1999, it mobilized about ETB 74 million deposits of which 47 per cent of came 
from its credit clients, which included their compulsory savings (Van Esbroeck, 2000). By the 
end of 2001, the amount of deposits exceeded the total amount of loans disbursed in the same 
year, of which voluntary savings accounted for 75 per cent (DECSI, 2002b). The number of 
active deposit clients reached more than 160,000, which is close to half of overall active 
regular credit clients in 2006 (Mix Market, 2007).  
In sum, although hardly quantitatively rigorous, existing studies (e.g., Meehan, 
2000:109-111, SOS Faim, 2000; 2003; Borchgrevink et al, 2005, Woldehanna, 2005:236, 
Hagos, 2002:11) are positive about DECSI’s contributions to the regional as well as overall 
economy. The improvements in the lives of its credit clients, e.g., as narrated by many success 
stories (Borchgrevink et al, 2005: 20-21), its ability to utilize local institutions in program 
                                                                                                                                                        
regional government offices in which DECSI provides credit that is subsidized and guaranteed by the 
regional government. 
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implementation, its ability to build reputation within society and mobilize local savings, and 
its ability to achieve a high level of efficiency and financial self-sufficiency (Van Esbroeck, 
2000), and its overall rapid expansion in the region are some of the success indicators often 
mentioned.  
 
2.4 The study villages and description of the data 
 
This study uses two separate household level data sets, i.e., a panel data and a cross-sectional 
data surveyed at different times from different villages in Tigray. The cross-sectional data set 
is specifically used in chapter four. The rest of the chapters used the panel data set. This 
section briefly describes the design of each survey and the data sets. 
 
 
2.4.1 The panel data set 
 
The panel data set comes from a sub-sample of a bigger household survey that initially 
covered 100 villages7 in Tigray. Four of the five administrative zones - Southern, Eastern, 
Central, and Northwestern- that cover most of the highlands of Tigray are included in this 
study8. This comprises eleven Woredas (districts) (see table 2.1 and Figure 2.1) where a 
DECSI branch is located to serve the villages in its premises. Sixteen villages are sampled 
from each zone. The survey was conducted in five rounds (1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2006). 
Efforts were made to keep the seasonal comparability among rounds. To achieve better 
representation, sampling was done at two stages. First, stratified by altitude (mainly 
highlands), agricultural potential, population density, and access to infrastructure (mainly 
market, credit, and irrigation), four Tabias were selected from each zone. A tabia contains a 
group of villages. One village is selected from each sample Tabia.  
Second, a total of 400 borrower and non-borrower households, 25 from each village 
were randomly selected from the village list. Table 2.1 presents a list of sample villages and 
their key characteristics by zone. A standardized household questionnaire that assesses 
household on-farm and off-farm income, consumption expenditure, housing and assets, credit 
and saving information and access to infrastructure was administered.  
 
 
                                                 
7The bigger survey was designed by a collaborative research project between Mekelle university, Ethiopia, 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI), funded by Norwegian Research Council, Norway. Building on this, follow-up surveys were run by 
author of this thesis as well as other researchers from Mekelle university and Norwegian University of life 
sciences.   
8During the survey design, the present Northwestern and Western zones comprised one zone, and were 
represented by the four villages currently in Northwestern. 
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Table 2.1 Sample zones, villages and their key characteristics 
Zone Village 
(Tabia) 
(Woreda) 
Branch name 
(see Figure 2.1) 
Access to Woreda  
town/ market 
(yes  if  <10 km)  
Access 
 to irrigation 
 
Southern Hintalo Hintalo-Wajerat No Yes 
 May-alem Enderta Yes No 
 Mahbere-genet Enderta Yes Yes 
 Samre Samre Yes No 
Eastern Kihen Wukro No No 
 Genfel Wukro Yes Yes 
 Embasmena Wukro Yes No 
 Hagere-selam Gulo-mekeda No No 
Central Seret Degua-tembien No No 
 Dibdibo Werie_leke (Enticho) Yes No 
 May-keyahti Ahferom No No 
 Addis-alem Mereb-lekhe No No 
North Western Hadegti Laelay-Adiabo Yes No 
 Tsaéda-ambora Laelay-Adiabo No No 
 May-adrasha Tahtay-koraro Yes Yes 
 Adi-menabir Tahtay-koraro No No 
 
Geographically, this sampling covers most of the densely populated highlands (1500 
meters above sea level) and hence credit provision is widely distributed (See Figure 2A) parts 
of the region. The western and southern lowlands that are less densely populated but are 
endowed with relatively better land resources and have unique climate are not included in this 
study. Note that the 2005 data is used only in chapter 3, because it lacked some information 
required in the rest of the chapters. In addition to the standardized questions, the 2006 survey 
included additional questions on the household relationship with DECSI and other sources of 
credit.  
 
 
2.4.2 The cross-sectional data set 
 
The cross-sectional survey was conducted in the summer of 2003 to study9, specifically, the 
process and outcomes of group formation in chapter four. Again, sampling was done at two 
levels. First, based on their proximity to town markets, roads, and agro-ecology, six out of the 
96 sub-branches of DECSI were selected from five woredas. This distribution roughly 
represents the sub-branches in the highlands with relatively immobile and more densely 
populated compared to the low lands. These are two important elements in group formation.  
                                                 
9 This survey was conducted by the author of this thesis as part of his M.Sc. thesis work. 
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Source: Extracted from the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI, 2007) GIS data (shape file) for  
Ethiopia 
 
 
 
The sample woredas also represent the relatively active economic activity areas in the region. 
Second, a total of 201 households that make up 57 randomly selected groups were surveyed. 
The number of households surveyed by sub-branch, Woreda and zones are given in table 2.2. 
A specialized structured household questionnaire that included household characteristics, 
main sources of income, assets, credit and saving history, group formation (e.g., screening, 
monitoring and enforcement) and social ties was administered. Besides, respondents were 
asked if they participated in local networks (e.g., Equb, Iddier, and religious gatherings) 
before and after the credit group formation. Open ended questions were included to 
accommodate unanticipated and broader responses. Moreover, discussion with key (client) 
informants, branch and sub-branch officers of DECSI was part of the survey, which gave 
useful insights into the overall social processes related to credit group formation. Summary 
statistics of key household characteristics are presented in chapter four. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Study sites in Tigray (see legend).  
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Table 2.2 Distribution of sample households by DECSI sub-branch  
 
Zone  
 
Woreda 
Sub-branch name 
(see Figure 2.1) 
Number of 
households 
Mekelle Debub Mekelle Mekelle  21 
Southern  Hintalo Wajerat Adi-gudom 26 
  Hiwane 41 
 Samre Samre 34 
Eastern Wukro Agulae (close to Wukro) 39 
Central Degua Tembien Hagereselam 40 
  Total 201 
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Appendix 2A 
 
Source: Extracted from the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI, 2007) GIS data (shape file) for  
Ethiopia 
 
Figure 2A The distribution of DECSI’s Branch (triangles) and Sub-branch (circles) offices 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
JOINT LIABILITY BORROWING DECISIONS UNDER RISK:  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM RURAL MICROFINANCE IN ETHIOPIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter investigates borrowing decisions of rural households from a 
microfinance institution in Tigray, Ethiopia, using household panel data and a dynamic panel 
probit model. The theoretical model takes two types of risks involved in joint liability lending 
explicitly into account: risk of partner failure and risk of losing future access to credit. 
Empirical results show that these risks are important in explaining borrowing decisions. 
Another finding is that the probability of repeat-borrowing is higher than the probability of 
new participation. This could imply that perceived joint liability threats deter participation 
and easing stringent punishments might help poor households’ access to credit.  
 
Key words: Microfinance, joint liability, risk, dynamic panel probit, maximum simulated 
likelihood, Ethiopia    
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3.1  Introduction 
 
The microfinance revolution is hailed for its innovative approaches that mitigate classical 
incentive and cost problems in the provision of credit (Ahlin and Jiang, 2007). A celebrated 
approach in microfinance is the joint liability contract, often combined with dynamic 
incentives (e.g. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Joint liability requires borrowers to form self-
selected groups in which all members are liable for all group members’ loans. In most 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), this is combined with the dynamic incentive of rewarding 
successful borrowers with subsequent loans and denying future access to strategic defaulters 
(for example, Armendáriz de Aghion, 1999). This contractual design assumes a long-term 
relationship between borrowers and MFIs on which enforcement relies. However, since 
interest in MFIs often lies in building sustainable financial institutions, the focus has been 
mostly on refining these contractual designs that expedite institution building rather than 
realizing effective participation in specific borrower environments. In most cases, joint 
liability designs are replicated with little or no flexibility to specific borrower interests and 
given socio-economic and environmental conditions (Wright, 2001). In a similar fashion, 
much of the theoretical microfinance literature is devoted to fine-tuning of how and when 
such contractual designs can help discipline borrowers. 
In many theoretical models (e.g. Armendáriz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000), the 
potentials for credit market efficiency and aggregate welfare gains due to the new MFI 
approaches are shown to exceed gains from standard lending methods, often under static 
incentive and participation constraints (Ahlin and Jiang, 2007). An important theoretical 
assumption is that borrowers are risk-neutral and insensitive to future income variability. This 
implies that risks can be effectively transferred onto poor borrowers without distorting 
borrowing incentives. Moreover, individual borrower welfare gains from accessing credit at 
lower interest rates are shown to exceed losses due to joint liability contracts (Ghatak, 1999). 
This argument has convinced donors and governments that microfinance can help to reduce 
poverty and as a consequence, there has been an unprecedented flow of resources into world 
wide microfinance in the last two decades (Morduch, 1999). 
Given access to joint liability credit, an important empirical question is however to what 
extent this microfinance ‘promise’ can be kept by both lenders and borrowers. While there is 
some evidence that the mechanisms emphasized in joint liability theory indeed discipline 
borrowers and improve repayments (Hermes and Lensink, 2007), evidence on whether and 
how these contractual designs influence borrowing incentives, in particular in risky 
production environments, remains largely unknown (Armedáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005: 99-113). A recent World Bank study reported that despite the unprecedented flow of 
finance into microfinance, access to and participation in credit by the poor remains 
unsatisfactory worldwide. This study also emphasized that identifying the barriers that 
prevent poor households from accessing credit remains crucial to policy making (World Bank, 
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2008)1. At micro-level many studies stress that client-MFI relationships remain unstable 
everywhere and contractual designs are among the main barriers impeding participation 
(Hulme and Mosley, 1997; Wright, 2001)2. For example, based on a survey from Bangladesh, 
Evans et al. (1999) identify several (contractual) risk factors as reasons for nonparticipation, 
resulting in participation by less than a quarter of the eligible households. Diagne and Zeller 
(2001: xi) claim that most rural households in developing countries continue to rely on the 
informal credit market despite the increasing credit supply through MFIs. They also conclude 
from a study in Malawi that access does not matter if the institutional designs do not take into 
account the conditions under which households operate. Hulme (1999) and Wright (2001) 
observed high client dropout rates of 25 to 60 per cent per annum for East African MFIs and 
point to inappropriate product designs as main reasons.  
Given such non-participation and dropout rates, a key question is whether certain 
characteristics of the joint liability lending contract also impede participation. More 
specifically, can the transfer of ‘default risk’ from the lender to the borrower and the dynamic 
incentive of conditioning future credit access on repayment partly explain nonparticipation? 
This is an empirical question that has not been addressed in the literature thus far. Our study is 
further motivated by two important observations from fieldwork on a MFI in northern 
Ethiopia: despite the unprecedented joint liability based credit supply, even at lower than 
global MFI interest rate (Morduch, 2008) or interest rate set by other sources in the area (e.g., 
Woldehanna and Oskam, 2002), the majority of ‘eligible’ households are not happy to 
participate in joint liability credit and, contrary to the theoretical literature (for example, 
Ghatak, 2000), the majority of rural households prefer credit on individual basis, even if that 
implies higher interest rates. 
Starting from the standard joint liability model, this chapter conceptualizes borrowing 
decisions in a dynamic stochastic framework where the contractual risk of joint liability and 
future access to borrowing are taken explicitly into account. When potential borrowers are 
risk averse, as is the case for most rural households experiencing shocks, the optimality of 
these contracts depends on the trade-off between insurance and incentives to borrow. Our 
conceptual model shows that joint liability contractual designs may no longer be optimal in 
the absence of insurance mechanisms such as repeat-borrowing to cover consumption ex post 
and production shortfalls following shocks and when borrowers are over-stretched to repay 
loans at the cost of their subsistence.  
In the empirical analysis a five-wave panel dataset (1997-2006) on 400 rural households 
in Tigray, Ethiopia is used. Participation decision is modeled in a dynamic random effects 
                                                 
1 According to the International Poverty Centre, 47.8 per cent of the 193.6 million poor families worldwide 
in 2006 were within reach of MFIs (World Bank, 2008). For the same year, this figure was only 11.4 per 
cent for Africa and the Middle East.  
2 Traditionally, providing access to- and not necessarily participation in- credit is seen as a sufficient 
remedy for the credit-constraint problem. Diagne et al. (2000) discuss the distinction between access to and 
participation in credit in the context of rural credit markets in developing countries. 
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probit framework based on Heckman (1981a) that is implemented using recent quadrature 
estimation techniques (Stewart, 2006). Controlling for effects of observed and unobserved 
(initial) conditions and state dependence, we find that joint liability risk and household 
differences in future liquidity are important in explaining nonparticipation. Results also 
indicate that unobserved household heterogeneity is important in explaining participation but 
also that participation was state dependent. Moreover, systemic shocks such as rain failure 
strongly affected participation.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a joint liability 
framework that mimics the practice in Tigray. It also conceptualizes the theoretical interplay 
of the contract with other household decisions. Section 3.3 presents the empirical model and 
estimation strategy and section 3.4 describes the study area and the data. Results are given in 
section 3.5. Conclusions and implications are given in section 3.6. 
 
 
3.2 Joint liability lending and household borrowing decisions 
 
This section consists of two parts. First, contractual risks in the joint liability design, 
mimicking the practice in Ethiopia are introduced. In the second part these contractual risks 
are conceptualized within a farm household decision framework.  
 
 
3.2.1 Joint liability lending 
 
Consider household i  with endowment, tW  and access to joint liability credit with other 
sources of credit limited. Suppose households attach a value vi to this ‘expected borrowing 
potential’ from the MFI, which the latter uses as a leverage to enforce loans. The MFI extends 
future loans conditional on previous repayment of the group loan. To simplify the household’s 
borrowing decision problem, we do not consider strategic group interactions in repayment and 
assume that each group member, if able, is fully committed to repay her individual loan 
obligations. In other words, loan defaults are assumed to be non-strategic3.  
                                                 
3  Admittedly, strategic group interactions could matter for individual household decisions. Several 
theoretical papers have addressed this issue (for example, Besley and Coate, 1995). The focus in this paper 
is however on the role of borrower-lender related contractual risks under the condition that potential 
households are ‘integrity-safe’ to the MFI but success is exogenously determined. This is a crucial element 
often subsumed in the participation constraint of the joint liability theory. Moreover, in the context of 
immobile farm households such as in rural Ethiopia where communities lived together for years, intra-
group strategic interactions can be theoretically assumed to implicitly be taken care of in the group 
formation processes. Empirically, this assumption is controlled by including social capital variables such as 
‘trust’ and intra-group interactions. 
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Ability to repay depends on overall household’s liquidity at the due date, which in turn 
depends on past and present household income and endowments. Income and endowments are 
however subject to systemic and idiosyncratic risks such as weather, pests, floods, disease or 
price variability, occurring with probability pi and affecting the ability to repay. The MFI is 
however not only imperfectly informed about the borrowers’ abilities but also about their 
intentions to repay and  punishes defaults even when they are non-strategic, a threat well 
perceived by households in the study area4. Let this threat of wrong punishment, according to 
household beliefs, occur with probability τ , 10 ≤≤τ . This introduces an information 
asymmetry problem into our analysis, which reduces the limited liability often assumed in the 
literature by a probability τ. 
To study the possible outcomes of the contract and their subsequent effects on 
household income variability, let borrowers i  and j  form a joint liability contract )m,r(ij =  
of the form described above, where r is the interest payment and m is a parameter for joint 
liability payment. The timeline is that first the MFI disburses a loan to the group at season t 
that, for simplicity, i  and j share equally and itL is the share of i to be repaid after harvest 
when outcomes are realized at t+1.  
Both i and j can be affected by a shock, determining whether they can repay (S) or not 
(F), and the outcomes for i and j are assumed to be independent. This leads to four possible 
states of contract ij , i.e. }FF,FS,SF,SS{  that occur when both i and j  succeed (with 
probability ji pp ), when i  succeeds but j  fails (with prob. )p1(p jt − ) and vice-versa and  
when i  and j  fail (with prob. )p1)(p1( ji −− ), respectively. Repayment by i, affecting 
income in the next period, depends on the state of the contract and the resulting group loan 
repayment:   
 
[ ]
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−
−++
−−+
=+
)p1(pwithFSif0
or),p1(pwithSFifL)mr1(
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R
ij
jiit
jijiit
1t,i
τ
        (1) 
 
Two potential contractual outcomes influence i’s decision to borrow. First, the state of own 
success combined with partner’s failure (SF) involves extra income risk of m)p1(p ji − , 
)r1(Lm jt +≤ . In the standard joint liability theory with risk-neutral borrowers, which 
predicts the formation of self-selected homogenous groups as in Ghatak (2000), this 
                                                 
4 According to discussions with key informants in the field, despite well noticed harvest failures, some 
households are forced to dissolve their assets to repay debts to the MFI. Others claim to have migrated to 
cities after shocks, hiding from their lender. According to some branch officers, this is done to prevent the 
precedence of running away in the future. 
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contractual risk is the opportunity cost ‘safe’ borrowers would like to forgo in order to access 
credit at relatively lower interest rate. However, when borrowers are risk averse, this income 
risk may outweigh the gains from the reduction of interest rate ex ante - an increase in m for a 
given decrease in r leaves risk averse borrowers worse off (Ghatak, 2000). In other words, 
potential borrowers could manage risks of joint-liability borrowing ex ante by deciding not to 
participate in group lending, with the foregone interest rate reduction of joint liability lending 
as a risk premium. This corresponds to the well established idea that small farmers, who are 
necessarily risk averse because they need to secure their subsistence from current production 
or face starvation (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989), avoid risky decisions of higher income levels 
and instead prefer safer decisions that smooth future income (Binswanger and Sillers, 1983; 
Morduch, 1994). A number of empirical studies (e.g. Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; 
Morduch, 1995) have found that in marginal environments, ex ante income risk management 
strategies include risk avoidance even if that involves loss of profitable opportunities. A 
central argument in this chapter is thus, given exogenous shocks, contractual risks of joint 
liability approaches may limit credit uptake by inducing potential borrowers to manage risk ex 
ante, despite their promise of making credit available at relatively lower rates.   
Second, conditional on both being considered a ‘strategic’ default by the MFI (state FF  
occurring with probability )p1)(p1( ji −−τ ), both i and j are compelled to liquidate 
productive resources to repay or else they are denied future access to credit. In other words, 
even when both borrowers fail to repay due to bad harvests (non-strategic defaults), group 
members might still be held accountable for their group debt or else lose future access to 
credit, depending upon τ that reflects the extent of MFIs state verification problems or its 
desire to punish defaults. Although this indeed might tighten the possibility of strategic 
defaults, it does so at the expense of introducing the risk of losing access to future borrowing. 
So, the decision to borrow today involves a risk of losing borrowing in the future. However, 
to the extent of  j’s success or ability to rescue the group, i’s access to borrowing is persevered. 
Note that i’s gains (in the bad state) from j’s success is essentially an insurance to access 
future credit. The effect of this second risk element on the decision to borrow therefore 
depends on the balance between the two.  
In sum, while access to credit is often seen as insurance against income variability, the 
decision to borrow also introduces two types of risks, i.e. the risk of partner failures that may 
offset the risk of own failure and the risk of loosing future options to borrow. This leads to 
trade-offs between incentives and insurance. It follows that households operating in risky 
environments would participate in borrowing only if they expect that the benefits of 
borrowing more than compensate for the combined negative effects of these risks. This is an 
interesting trade-off because poor farm households, in order to avoid further destitution, may 
choose not to borrow and therefore forgo an opportunity to move out of poverty.  
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3.2.2 Joint liability borrowing decisions under risk  
 
Borrowing decisions have to be considered as part of the full set of decisions that the 
household makes in each period. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, borrowing 
today has implications for income and borrowing options tomorrow. So, household borrowing 
decisions should be analyzed in a dynamic context. This is discussed in this section.  
To conceptualize borrowing decision in a dynamic household decision framework, 
consider a household i that has a planning horizon T, choosing levels of consumption, 
production, and borrowings at t where choices are constrained by the possibilities available to 
the household in each t. The decision problem at each t can be summarized by assuming the 
household maximizes the expected value of time-separable utility, u(.), derived from 
consumption: 
 
( )∑−
=
+
tT
0k
kit
k
t CuEMax β , tT,...,0k −=    
subject to: 
( ) kitkitkitkitkit1kit DYICW)r1(W +++++++ ++−−+= ,                (2) 
),I(fY kitkitkit +++ = εσ                     (3) 
0vv kit1kit ≥= +++ ρ                     (4) 
0CC kit >≥+ , minimum consumption constraint                (5) 
0WiT ≥ , the transversality condition                  (6) 
 
where Et is the expectations operator based on information available at t, β is the rate of time 
preference, abusing notation, for now r, is the deposit rate often different from the lending 
rate, Cit+k is consumption at t+k,  f(.) is a concave production function, Yit+k is expected gross 
household income at t+k,  Iit+k is gross household investment and σ ≥ 1 indicates the 
productivity increase due to borrowing, which equals one if there is no borrowing. We assume 
that credit is associated with higher expected yield. Furthermore, εit+k represents production 
shocks at period t+k and the net debt is defined as )R(ELD kitkitkit +++ −=  where )R(E kit+  is 
the expected repayment obtained from the sum of own and partner joint liability repayment 
multiplied by their respective probabilities as given in eq.(1). The probability that access to 
credit is kept is )p1)(p1(1 kjtkit ++ −−−= τρ , 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Uncertainty enters into the 
household maximization directly through own as well as partner’s income shocks.    
The constraints in (2) and (4) provide the state transition functions for household 
endowment and future access to borrowing, respectively.  Wit+k+1 is defined as initial 
endowment plus net debt and income minus consumption and input expenditure. Since 
consumption occurs throughout the year but agricultural income is generated at the end of the 
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year, consumption at t +k depends on initial endowment at t+k. In the absence of credit, and 
given eq. (2), eq. (5) is binding. Production is non-negative and has a minimum input 
requirement and consumption is at least equal to its subsistence level. Whereas the wealthier 
poor in bad years can cope by lowering their consumption to a minimum (Zimmerman and 
Carter, 2003), the poorest households are dictated to deplete their productive endowments to 
fulfill their subsistence consumption requirements. Borrowing thus enters the household 
endowment transition so as to relax both production and consumption constraints. While most 
MFIs are production-credit oriented, a typical characteristic of the smallholder economy is 
that production and consumption decisions are non-separable (for example, Feder et al., 1990) 
and that production-credit is directly or indirectly used to smooth consumption. Borrowing 
therefore relaxes the household budget through its liquidity effect at t+k as well as by 
updating the endowment through additional productivity gains from investment at t+k+1.  
As noted earlier, liquidity and productivity gains of borrowing at t+k come at the risk of 
sliding down into debt spirals at t+k+1 and beyond, mainly due to additional contractual risks 
in combination with stochastic production. Moreover, to the extent of unlimited liability 
borrowing at t+k may entail changes in future borrowing status, removing the possibilities of 
repeat-borrowing for investment as well as ex-post budget smoothing. This makes borrowing 
a dynamic variable with trade-offs between present liquidity and future endowment and hence 
consumption. The decision to borrow is therefore evaluated in a stochastic dynamic discrete 
choice framework that falls into the general family of optimal stopping problems (Adda and 
Cooper, 2003: 175). With borrowing option Z, the household maximization problem can be 
summarized in the following Bellman equation where the value function ( )kitkitkit ZvWV +++ ;,  
gives the maximum attainable sum of current and future expected rewards given the current 
endowment kitW +  and expected access to credit kitv + . 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]v,WV,Z,v,WVmaxZ;v,WV NBkitB kit}NB,B{zkitkitkit ++∈+++ =                 (7) 
 
where (.)B kitV +  and (.)
NB
kitV + are expected discounted lifetime utilities with and without 
borrowing, respectively. After substituting the transition functions (2) and (4) and denoting 
gross income with and without borrowing by Y and 'Y these can be written as:  
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In the expected lifetime utility with borrowing (eq. (7a)) uncertainty enters directly through 
production shocks and indirectly through net debt and value of future access to credit. In the 
no-borrowing case (eq. (7b)) uncertainty arises only due to the production shock. Both eq. (7a) 
and (7b) can be rewritten to reflect the stochastic income where expectation operators are 
substituted by their respective probabilities as follows:  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[{
( )] }kitkitkitkit
kitkjtkitkit1kitkitkitkitkit
B
kit
vL)r1(Y)p1(
L)mr1)(p1(YpVv,LIWuZ;v,WV
++++
+++++++++++
++−−+
++−−++−=
ρτ
β
 (8a) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }kit' kitkit' kitkit1kitkitkitkitNBkit vYp1YpVv,IWuv,WV +++++++++++ +−++−= β  (8b) 
 
Although the distribution of production shocks remains the same under both borrowing and 
no-borrowing scenarios and expected gross income is higher with than without borrowing, 
expected income net of borrowing, given in the square brackets of eq.(8a) and (8b), is more 
variable with than without borrowing. The relative riskiness of borrowing given by difference 
between eq.(8a) and (8b) provides the explicit policy that governs the decision to borrow: 
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where xit  is a matrix of other taste covariates. The household participates in borrowing if 
(.)(.) NBB VV ≥ . The first term of the RHS of eq. (9) is the utility of having a loan size of L , 
given x, at t+k. This is the utility of having a relaxed budget derived from the extra liquidity 
that borrowing provides at t+k. It is either, the utility gain from higher consumption at t due to 
release of resources from production, or given the non-fungibility of credit, the amount of 
borrowing diverted for consumption. The second and third terms indicate how loan 
repayment, which is higher in the good state by the joint liability amount, and the punishment 
threat in the bad state influence income variability. The two terms in square brackets provide 
the relative income variance due to borrowing under the ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ states, which are 
represented by the corresponding probabilities. The last term gives the state of future access to 
borrowing, determined subsequently. Note that ρ is less than one means that v is negative 
indicating the expected reduction in welfare due to lose of access to credit. Borrowing is thus 
determined by the expectations formed on the net effect of the two terms ex ante. In sum, the 
theory developed in this section helps to understand how households evaluate the relative 
riskiness of borrowing by comparing the sum of present and discounted stochastic future 
benefits with and without borrowing. 
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3.3 Empirical model and estimation strategy  
 
In the empirical analysis the goal is to investigate if, after controlling for other factors, 
contractual risks indeed hinder participation in borrowing. This section presents the 
econometric model and estimation strategy implemented. As implied by eq. (9), contractual 
risks of income and future access to credit, ceteris paribus, are two key factors hypothesized 
to determine participation in borrowing. In short, the dynamic decision to participate boils 
down to expectations on future income variability with and without borrowing as well as 
households’ degree of dependence on MFI credit in the future.  
Realizations of income (or consumption) seem to be good candidates to proxy 
contractual effects of borrowing. However, since realized outcomes are likely to be influenced 
by borrowing status, they are endogenous to borrowing decisions and thus cannot give 
consistent estimates. Instead, we assume that expectations about income and future access to 
borrowing depend on individual household risk preferences at the time the decision takes 
place. A central issue in our estimation is identifying the roles contractual risks play in the 
decision to borrow. Separate identification of the two risk components (that is, joint liability 
and future access) is however problematic because both are simultaneously determined. As 
motivated in the theory, the first component can be best compared to a standard individual 
liability, which unfortunately was not properly practiced in the study area. We therefore try to 
unbundle the two effects by comparing the joint liability to a hypothetical individual liability 
of the same future access incentive structure. In the survey, we elicited preferences related to 
joint liability borrowing by a hypothetical question comparing joint liability partner risk to a 
reduction from an individual liability interest rate. Specifically, we asked respondents 
“holding other things the same, how much extra (or less) interest rate will you pay over the 
existing joint liability rate to access an individual liability?”5 This value, which apparently 
measures the ‘risk premium’ households would like to pay to avoid joint liability relative to a 
standard individual liability, is used to proxy joint liability risk along with other indicators for 
individual as well as systemic risk indicators. However, this predicted risk (based on self-
reported information) can be endogenous to individual risk bearing capacities that may vary 
with individual characteristics that in turn depend on borrowing status such as participation in 
the extension programs and land size cultivated. Households may, for example, participate 
less in ‘extension programs’ or rent-in less land because both are credit dependent. It is thus 
instructive to use predicted value of our ‘risk premium’ using some exogenous characteristics 
as regressors.  
                                                 
5 Note that the scale of the premium ranges between -1 and 1; a positive value indicates preference for 
individual liability and is the risk premium households would pay to avoid joint liability risk. Note that 
efforts were made to minimize measurement error by framing the question such that households elicit the 
extra payment to avoid only the ‘joint liability’ element in group lending, excluding other factors such as 
group meetings and hassles, and differences in contract flexibilities. 
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The second component, future access to credit, has to do with household’s relative 
dependence on external finance in the future and can be proxied by indicators for availability 
and potentials of future liquidity such as safety nets and the natural log of livestock holdings, 
at t-1 to avoid endogeneity. The two components are thus used to explain participation 
decisions together with other indicators for intra-household preference differentials and 
systemic risk.  
Participation is a binary indicator and a binary choice model is therefore an appropriate 
empirical framework6. Availability of panel data allows for modeling unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and dynamics but also raises the issue of initial conditions (Heckman, 1981b). 
However, estimation of such a non-linear panel data model is not straight forward because of 
the well known incidental parameter problem (with fixed T, N→ ∞), which is due to the 
presence of individual heterogeneity (Hsiao, 1986: 73-76). In a linear panel data model this 
heterogeneity is often wiped out by a within transformation of the data (Baltagi, 2001: 206). 
For the fixed effects logit model, Chamberlain (1980) suggested a solution to the incidental 
parameter problem by maximizing a likelihood function conditional on a minimally sufficient 
statistic for the individual heterogeneity parameter. However, the problem with this solution 
in our case is that it yields inconsistent estimates because observations that never change 
status over time are dropped (Verbeek, 2008: 395). Besides, we are interested not only in 
those that change borrowing status over the years but also in those that never change status 
because throughout the sample period they never or always borrowed. With a fixed effects 
probit model it is also not possible to get rid of the fixed effects and, besides computational 
difficulties, this approach also yields inconsistent estimates due to the incidental parameter 
problem in short panels like ours (Heckman, 1981b)7.  
A natural option is to estimate a random effects probit model. To elaborate this we first 
specify a static random effects panel probit model for the decision variable as follows8:   
 
⎩⎨
⎧
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≥==
otherwiseNB
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  
itiitititit exvmZ +++++= αββββ 4'3'20* )                 ),...,1;,...,1( TtNi ==  (10) 
 
where the latent variable *itZ  indicates the propensity to borrow, itm
)  is the joint liability risk 
indicator predicted from individual household risk preferences explained earlier, vit is a vector 
                                                 
6 Obviously, this ignores the intensity of participation in the event that households react to uncertainty by 
reducing amount of borrowing rather than avoiding it altogether. Nevertheless, the focus in this paper is on 
the extreme situation where households abandon borrowing for contractual risk reasons. 
7 For a brief review of this problem see Baltagi, 2001:209 and Cameron and Trivedi, 2005: 782.  
8 Although not formally derived from the theoretical model, our analysis here draws from eq. (9) to specify 
a reduced form empirical model capturing key features of the problem. 
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of indicators for future credit access, xit  are other exogenous covariates, β ’s are parameters to 
estimate and ite , for now, is Gaussian distributed with mean zero and 
2
eσ =1. Furthermore, iα  
is a household specific error component capturing heterogeneity, where )1/( 22 += αα σσλ  is 
the proportion of variance due to individual heterogeneity, which is assumed equal across 
periods. This proportion can be used to test whether the specified random effects probit 
specification is more appropriate than a standard pooled probit model that neglects 
unobserved heterogeneity. Pooling is not appropriate if the hypothesis λ = 0 is rejected.  
The standard random effects probit estimator yields consistent parameter estimates if the 
following assumptions hold: i) participation at t is independent to participation at t-1 (no true 
state dependence), ii) initial participation conditions, Zi1, are uncorrelated to individual 
heterogeneity αi (no spurious state dependence), and  iii) ite  is serially independent. However, 
the nature of participation in MFI borrowing makes the validity of these assumptions doubtful. 
Borrowers select themselves into the program by joining a group of their choice on which the 
MFI decides to grant a loan based on its own criteria9. In both cases, selection can be based on 
observed and unobserved ‘initial’ household characteristics (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005: 199-223). Note that observables such as availability of partners, village-level 
trust, MFI eligibility criteria, group screening and group characteristics are easily controlled 
for. Nevertheless, initial participation can be based on unobserved household characteristics 
such as entrepreneurial skills and perceptions on credit that may persist over time. Moreover, 
as implied by the theory, in underdeveloped credit markets like in rural Ethiopia where formal 
borrowing is limited, previous participation may influence future participation (true state 
dependence) by reducing perceived risks and through learning or vice versa. Although 
changes in risk perception can be subsumed to be captured by the risk parameter, state 
dependence due to non-risk factors can still confound consistent estimation.  
Consequently, assumptions (i) and (ii) are worth reconsidering in our context. True state 
dependence can be accounted for by including a one period lag of the dependent variable: 
 ( )0u'xvmZ1Z itit3'itit21itit ≥++++= − βββγ )              )T,...,2t;N,...,1i( ==  (11) 
 
where, the error components in (10) are condensed to itiit eu +=α . If the hypotheses 0≠γ  
cannot be rejected, the dynamic specification in (11) is correct, indicating the presence of true 
state dependence. Again, if (ii) and (iii) can be assumed, eq.(11) is consistently estimated 
using a standard random effects probit. However, also assumption (ii) is expected to be too 
strong to hold in our context. If this is indeed the case the estimator is inconsistent and 
parameters tend to be overstated, particularly the degree of true state dependence, γ (Baltagi, 
                                                 
9 Further discussions of the participant – non-participant classification is provided in section 3.4 (see also 
figure 3A.1, appendix). 
                                                                              Chapter 3 
   35
2001: 216). Three approaches to this ‘initial conditions’ problem due to Heckman (1981a), 
Orme (1997) and Wooldridge (2005) are proposed to relax assumption (ii). Recent Monte 
Carlo evidence indicates that the Heckman approach, despite its relative computational 
complexity provides the least biased parameter estimates of these approaches (for example, 
Miranda, 2007). This approach is implemented in this study using recent simulation based 
estimators that facilitate estimation. The Heckman approach requires a separate specification 
for the initial condition, Zi1, conditional on αi, which is estimated as a system with eq.(11):  
 
1ii
'
1i1i eMZ ++= ψαθ )1t;N,...,1i( ==  (12) 
 
where Mi1 is a vector of exogenous instruments that also includes xi1 and, if available, other 
pre-sample variables. θ and ψ  are parameters and αi and ei1 are assumed independent. Under 
assumption (iii), the Heckman approach uses the joint probability of the full observed 
sequence (Zi1,…,ZiT) conditional on αi to approximate the probability of observing the 
sequence for individual i: 
 
∏
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This approach provides consistent estimates for the parameters of interest and enables to 
separately estimate the initial condition parameters that are useful to perform robustness tests. 
The likelihood function for the latter requires integrating the probability of αi  against its 
density, φ (αi ), which can be evaluated using a Gaussian-Hermite quadrature procedure 
(Butler and Moffitt, 1982). A program developed by Stewart (2006) reduces the 
computational difficulties of ML implementation of the quadrature for this Heckman 
estimator10.  
If however assumption (iii) does not hold, the Heckman estimator too is inconsistent. 
Extending it to incorporate an autocorrelated error structure makes estimation using ML 
Gaussian-Hermite quadrature infeasible because it involves evaluation of T-dimensional 
integrals of Normal densities (Contoyannis et al., 2004, Stewart, 2007). Stewart (2006, 2007) 
presented a simulation based implementation strategy, Maximum Simulated Likelihood 
(MSL), based on the GHK algorithm for this approach allowing autocorrelation of errors. 
Assuming an AR(1) process, we run this simulation for 150 replications to check for 
autocorrelation, specifying a quasi-random matrix to initiate a Halton sequence that facilitates 
convergence. 
 
                                                 
10 Interested readers are referred to Heckman (1981b:114 -178) for detailed outline of the model and to 
Stewart (2007) for a concise presentation and implementation strategy. 
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3.4 Microfinance in northern Ethiopia and the data  
 
Panel data used comes from 400 rural households randomly sampled from sixteen villages of 
four zones in the Tigray region, Ethiopia. This section gives a brief overview of the 
microfinance practice and underlying agro-climatic and economic conditions of the study area, 
the data collection processes and the data itself.  
 
 
3.4.1 Microfinance practice and economic environment 
 
Tigray is the north most region of Ethiopia, located in the semi-arid belt of the Sub-Sahara 
region. Erratic rainfall, decades of civil-war and conflicts, overpopulation and severe natural 
resource degradation characterizes its economy, generally classified as food-deficient. 
Smallholder agriculture, the main stay of 775 thousand rural households, is unpredictably 
subject to the vagaries of nature. Efforts to increase productivity by introducing new 
technologies such as high-yielding crops and fertilizer are often hindered by income shocks 
because formal insurance schemes to smooth consumption after shocks are absent and 
informal risk-sharing is limited.  
A recent effort to mitigate the volatile economic situation and reduce poverty through 
improving input use and productivity includes the provision of financial services to farmers. 
The Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) is one of biggest and pioneer MFIs in 
Ethiopia operating in the region providing working capital credit to smallholders that are 
neglected by traditional banks. DECSI started trial operations in 1994. It officially launched in 
1997 and expanded its client size to nearly 424,000 and average loan size to USD 217 
between 1997 and 2006, encroaching to almost all parts of the region (see table 3A.1). By 
2001, DECSI’s network has grown to 96 sub-branches covering 91 per cent of villages in the 
region (Borchgrevink et al., 2003). While almost all respondents reported they knew DECI in 
1997, only 42 per cent of them reported that a DECSI branch was in their ‘nearest town’ in 
the same year. This number grew to 74 per cent in 2000 and to 86 per cent in 2006, reflecting 
the rapid expansion of DECSI. Lending interest rates range between 12.5 and 15 per cent per 
year. Maximum loan size is close to USD 500. Joint liability loan repayment in the study 
period ranged between 1-2 years.  
DECSI followed a ‘Grameen-style’ joint liability credit contract and implemented it in a 
stricter sense. A credit application is made by a group of 3 to 7 self-selected borrowers 
screened by a credit committee composed of DECSI as well as local officials. After approval, 
individual loan demands are awarded for which all group members become responsible and 
borrowing repayment is strictly conditional on previous (group) repayment. Anything less is 
considered default and consequently all group members, sometimes even their village, is 
denied access to future credit. Contrary to the ‘limited liability’ assumption in the 
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microfinance literature, DECSI, with the help of local officials, tracks down defaulters to jail 
or local courts regardless of realized outcomes. Although not officially declared, this strategy 
is pursued to “avoid bad precedence for run-away borrowers” and is at the heart of DECSI’s 
‘high’ repayment performance.  
 
 
3.4.2 The data 
 
The panel data covers ten years (1997-2006) observed in five waves with intervals of about 
two years. The first four waves of data were collected by other researchers. In 2006, we took 
advantage of these earlier surveys and visited the same households. Note that the last survey 
included recall questions regarding key borrowing history to track down those that dropped 
out in any of the earlier surveys. This information is mainly used in this chapter. The data 
includes household characteristics, assets, income and expenditure, perceptions and attributes 
of the household head, and village and MFI information. Borrowing information include 
alternative sources of credit and nature of borrowing, perceptions on future access to credit 
and participation. The empirical identification benefits from the fact that the first round 
survey coincided with the extensive encroaching of DECSI into most of the (sample) villages. 
Moreover, the initial survey tracked some pre-survey information on households useful in the 
reduced-form Heckman model estimated.  
To give an idea about general structure of household borrowing, the population with 
“physical access” to microfinance can be broadly classified as participants and non-
participants (see Figure 3A.1 in the appendix). We define participants as those that were in a 
joint liability based borrowing relationship in a given year. Admittedly, the non-participant 
group is heterogeneous in terms of reasons for non-participation, which can be further 
classified as involuntarily and voluntarily excluded from borrowing. Involuntarily excluded 
are those that despite their preference to participate were excluded by the MFI because they 
are ineligible (for for example, age, risk considerations) or those that were eligible but 
discriminated for non-loan product reasons such as social status or political reasons.  
 
Table 3.1 Yearly participation and repeat participation 
Yearly participation Overall participation 
Yearly  Number  % Repeat times Number % 
1997 121 30.3 Never 118 29.50 
2001 130 32.5 Once 155 38.75 
2003 89 22.3 Twice 66 16.50 
2005 85 21.3 Thrice 48 12.00 
2006 59 14.8 Four times 13 3.25 
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The voluntary excluded include those that never demand credit regardless of the nature of 
credit provision, for example, because of availability of other sources, or for religious reasons 
and those that need credit but decided not to participate due to contractual risks. While the rest 
are also included, this later group is the main target of this study. 
In general, asked about their demand for credit in the years covered, nearly 95 per cent of 
households reported they needed credit during the study period, of which 73 per cent had at 
least once applied for joint liability credit. A negligible number of them (2%) reported their 
applications had been turned down by the screening committee for reasons they did not know. 
Four percent of the households excluded themselves for religious reasons (haram). When 
asked about ‘why a household decided not to borrow while there was a need for credit’, 59 
per cent of them reported that they had feared failure to repay group loans and risk of sliding 
down into debt-trap even if their projects would have been profitable. Some seven percent of 
the participants had experienced “non-strategic” partner default. Very few of them reported 
that they had other sources of credit. Thus, regarding borrowing status, households in the 
sample had either borrowed repeatedly, participated at least once but dropped out, or never 
participated at all over the years (see Figure 3.1). In general, participation of sample 
households, although slightly increased from 1997 to 2001, declined over the survey period 
(see table 3.1). This is consistent with institution-level trends over the same period (see table 
3A.1)11. The overall repeat participation between consecutive survey years is given in table 
3.1. While 30 per cent never participated throughout, only three percent participated four 
times and none did more than four times over the years. Average group size during the study 
period was 4.7. Of participant households, 52 per cent reported their groups were formed 
among households heterogeneous in wealth but only 17 per cent of participants switched from 
their first group to another group12. Table 3.2 summarizes specific variables used in the 
empirical analysis of predicting the joint liability risk as well as the main participation 
decision model.  
The estimated dynamic probit model contains the two groups of variables in the reduced 
form Heckman model, namely, t >1 variables and initial period (t=1) variables, which include 
all x-variables and the pre-sample variables. The lagged dependent variable is one of the t >1 
variables. The pre-survey variables include an indicator for household ability to find credit 
partners if needed. To control for overall social capital and trust respondents were asked if 
they believed trust had deteriorated over time. These two variables provide information about 
the social capital on which joint liability heavily relies. An underlying factor in this study is 
that smallholder agricultural borrowing risks are predominantly derived from exogenous 
systemic as well as individual shocks. 
                                                 
11 Recently, DECSI has introduced a variant of individual credit ‘packaged’ with specific inputs. Total 
borrower numbers in table 3A.1 include these borrowers, which are not included in the analysis. In the 
empirical analysis, this is controlled by including it in the ‘other source of borrowing’ variable.  
12 Descriptive information summarizing these questions not given here can be obtained from the authors. 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistic of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable description Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Participated in joint liability borrowing (yes=1) 0.24    0.43     0 1 
Joint liability risk premium 0.03    0.08 -0.06 0.25 
Predicted risk of joint liability 0.03 0.010 -0.01 0.08 
Losing future credit access worst punishment (yes=1) 0.08    0.27 0 1 
Unable to find a partner (yes=1), (t=1) 0.87 0.34 0 1 
Partner repayment problem (if participated) (yes=1) 0.90 0.31 0 1 
“Trust” deteriorated in the community (yes=1), (t=1) 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Experienced partner repayment problem (yes=1) 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Size of joint liability group (if participated)  4.75 1.38 3 7 
Natural log of value of live stock holding (t-1) 7.45 1.47   2.99 11.00 
Size of land owned in Tsimad (= 0.25 ha.) 4.62 2.94 0.25      18 
Income from off-farm employment 692.26 1801.16 0 36,000 
Annual transfers received (remittance, family)  192.44 602.90 0 9,612 
Annual household consumption (log) (t-1) 7.46 0.85  2.57 11.21 
Location/village is highland (=1; otherwise, lowland) 0.69 0.47   0 1 
Annual rainfall (nearest station), in milliliters 697.14  150.70 419.05 1100.40 
Systemic shock occurred (reported) (yes=1) 0.07    0.26     0 1 
Idiosyncratic shock occurred to household (yes=1) 0.24  0.43     0        1 
Participated in food-for-work and safety nets (yes=1) 0.51 0.50      0         1 
Participation in extension program risky (yes=1) 0.62 0.49      0         1 
Male headed household (male=1) 0.78    0.42      0         1 
Age of household head (years) 52.76 14.50    20       90 
Household size 5.30 2.39       1       13 
Household head is literate (yes=1) 0.29 0.45       0         1 
 
A well known source of systemic shock in Ethiopia is rain failure and annual rainfall 
information (measured at the nearest station to the village) is used. To account for intra-
household differential impacts of the systemic shocks, respondents were asked if there was a 
major (systemic) shock such as draught, floods, locust swarms that affected the household in 
the year before the survey. 
We also probed for information regarding idiosyncratic (for example, illness or death of key 
household member, animal loss) shocks in the just ended year. Copping mechanisms are 
diverse, which among others include investing in livestock holdings, remittances, transfers, 
and food-for-work (safety net) activities. Livestock is the most liquid asset for rural 
households in Ethiopia and is often considered as an insurance against downside shocks in the 
household. Another well known insurance policy in Ethiopia, which has been re-instituted as 
‘productive safety net program’ recently is the ‘food-for-work program’, often available for 
households hit by drought.  
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3.5 Estimation, results and discussions 
 
This section presents estimation results based on the econometric strategy outlined in section 
3.3. Section 3.5.1 gives results of the joint liability risk indicator, which together with other 
variables is used in estimating the participation decision in the section 3.5.2.   
 
3.5.1 Predicted joint liability (partner) risk 
 
OLS estimates of this first-stage regression for the endogenous risk premium are presented in 
table 3.3. All variables as a group and the variables of interest individually significantly 
explain the joint liability risk preference at acceptable critical levels. White-robust standard 
errors are calculated to correct for possible heteroskedasticity. The predicted values from table 
3.3 are used in the main model estimation.  
 
 
3.5.2 The decision to participate in joint liability credit 
 
Coming back to the estimation of the main model of borrowing participation, as a first step, 
we test whether the data can be pooled estimating a standard random effects probit for the 
same sample and specification as in the Heckman model. Pooling (λ=0) is strongly rejected in 
favor of the random effects estimator by the likelihood-ratio test ( χ2(01) = 25.02,  p = 0.000), 
implying that individual heterogeneity is an important element in our borrowing decisions. 
Unfortunately the standard random effects estimator simply assumes initial conditions as 
exogenous. Estimating the dynamic random effects model using the Heckman estimator 
resolves this problem. Results are presented in table 3.4, along with the standard estimates to 
investigate the bias due to the exogenous initial condition assumption in the latter. The 
parameters in the estimated reduced form model, excluding the t=1 values for the initial 
conditions, are jointly highly significant with a χ2 (11) Wald test statistics of 91.86. The 
hypothesis γ = 0 is rejected in both the standard and Heckman estimator, confirming the 
relevance of the dynamic specification. The estimate for γ is however overstated in the 
standard estimator both quantitatively (0.27) and qualitatively (highly significant). After 
properly controlling for initial conditions in the Heckman procedure, the estimate is almost a 
third smaller and less significant. The parameter for αi in the linearlized (ψ ) eq. (12) is 
significant at the 10 per cent critical level, once again confirming nonrandom initial 
participation in joint liability borrowing. The positive ψ sign means that even controlling for 
initial household, group and village characteristics (age, age-squared, trust, availability of 
partners and other sources of finance, the latter not reported in table 3.4), households with  
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Table 3.3 OLS estimates of predictors for joint liability risk  
 
Dependent var.: elicited joint liability risk premium  
 
Coefficients            
(Robust  
Std. errors) 
Male headed household (male=1)      -4.204*             (2.385)    
Household size      -0.848*  (0.383)     
Size of land owned in Tsimad (= 0.25 ha.)      -1.034***       (0.257) 
Household head is literate (yes=1)       -1.976           (1.914) 
Considers participation in the extension program risky (yes=1)       2.331*           (1.781) 
Income from off-farm employment      -2.93×10-4*       (3.72×10-4) 
Amount of annual transfers received (remittance, family)       -1.76×10-3**     (1.09×10-3) 
Location/village is highland (=1; otherwise, lowland)       1.784***       (1.666) 
Believed likely to experience partner repayment problem 
(yes=1)  
    18.037***       (2.514) 
Size of joint liability group (if participated)     -2.388***       (0.452) 
Intercept     43.845***       (2.660) 
F( 10,  1989)      10.69***  
R-squared       0.3970  
Number of obs. 2000  
Notes: (*), (**), (***), significant at 10%, 5% and 1% critical levels, respectively. Dependent variable: 
hypothetical willingness to pay risk premium to shift to individual liability, avoiding joint liability  
 
some unobserved favorable conditions to joint liability borrowing were more likely to 
participate than otherwise. All other parameter estimates from both models are comparable or, 
as expected, slightly lower (in absolute value) for the standard than for the Heckman estimator. 
Results (not presented here) of the simulated Heckman estimator with correlated errors using 
the MSL tell a similar story and the hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected at 
acceptable critical levels. Results from the Heckman estimator with no autocorrelation are 
therefore interpreted. Controlling for observable and unobserved household, group, and MFI–
level effects, including state dependence, the two important hypotheses in this chapter are 
confirmed by our data.  
 First, predicted joint liability has a significant negative impact on borrowing 
confirming the unfavorable impact of joint liability downside risk on participation. Based on 
our elicited risk preference, we find evidence that households that are willing to pay a positive 
risk premium to avoid a joint liability contract in favor of an individual liability contract of 
the same structure, including the ‘future access punishment upon non-repayment’ 
arrangement, are less likely to participate in joint liability borrowing. Second, our key 
indicators for future liquidity and credit constraint, and hence future access to credit, i.e. the 
natural log of livestock at t-1, access to food- for-work and safety nets, explain participation 
significantly. 
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Table 3.4 Probability of the decision to participate in joint liability based MFI borrowing. 
Dynamic random effects panel probit  
Variable description Standard 
estimator    
Heckman 
estimator 
1 if participated in joint liability borrowing (t-1), zero 
otherwise 
  0.266*** 
 (0.083) 
      0.186*     
     (0.093)                  
Predicted risk of joint liability -14.918*** 
 (3.971) 
-21.148***      
(5.200) 
Annual rainfall (nearest station), in milliliters  -9.7×10-4*** 
 (2.5×10-4) 
-8.0×10-4***   
(2.5×10-4) 
1 if shock (illness or death of key household member, 
animal loss) occurred to the household  
 -0.027 
 (0.081) 
-0.033    
(0.082) 
1 if losing future access to credit worst punishment   0.496*** 
 (0.123) 
 0.495*** 
(0.124) 
Natural log of value of live stock holding (t-1)   0.057* 
 (0.026) 
 0.047*   
(0.026) 
Live stock value (t-1) * systemic shock occurrence  
(reported by household) 
 -2.0×10-5 
 (2.0×10-5) 
-3.0×10-5   
(2.0×10-5) 
Natural log of annual household consumption (t-1)  -0.043 
 (0.044) 
-0.048    
(0.044) 
1 if participated in food-for-work and safety nets   0.161* 
 (0.074) 
 0.155*   
(0.074) 
Age of household head (years)   0.015 
 (0.017) 
 0.012    
(0.017) 
Age of household head squared (scaled by 100)  -0.022 
 (0.016) 
-0.019    
(0.016) 
1 if unable to find a partner (t=1) - -0.046 
(0.364) 
1 if believed “trust” deteriorated in the community (t=1) - -0.222 
(0.281) 
Constant  -0.054 
 (0.608) 
-7.204    
(5.601) 
λ, proportion of variance due to individual 
heterogeneity    
- -4.446 
(1.380)*** 
 
ψ, Parameter for initial conditions 
-  2.560* 
(1.518) 
♣Wald χ2(11)  100.48*** 91.980*** 
LR test of proportion of panel-level variance= 0:  χ2 (1)   25.02***  2.860* 
♣Log likelihood -791.557 -1022.037 
Number of obs.         1600 2000 
(***), (**), (*) significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% critical level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
(♣) refers to parameters in the t>1 reduced form model, (t-1) are variables measured with one year lag. 
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Controlling for other factors, the more a household owned livestock at the time of 
borrowing, and also the better the access to food-for-work, the greater the probability to 
participate. This is an interesting finding with implications for equity and the ‘safety net’ 
policy. To account for intra-household ability to cope with shocks of systemic nature, a 
dummy equal to one if reported it was bad year for all is interacted with natural log of 
livestock at t-1 and shocks of idiosyncratic nature are included. Both are found insignificant 
but with the expected parameter sign. However, reported annual rainfall from the nearest 
station (in milliliters), another indicator for systemic shock turned out to be negatively highly 
significant13. Thus, risks of systemic but not idiosyncratic nature together with contractual 
risks of joint liability borrowing seem to impede the decision to participate in joint liability 
based borrowing in these villages. On the other hand, credit is less significantly used to 
smooth consumption gaps ex post. That is, the natural log of annual household consumption, 
measured at t-1 to capture effects of lagged consumption on downside risk, reflects that joint 
liability credit is rarely used to smooth consumption shortfalls. It also means that there is no 
enough evidence of showing loan diversion for consumption in those particular years.  
Another indicator for future access to credit, based on a question asking whether a 
respondent thinks that denial of credit is the worst punishment of all possible punishments, is 
also found to be significant. The positive sign indicates that the higher households value 
future credit access, the more likely they keep their relationship with the MFI by borrowing 
and repaying frequently, which is also in line with our state dependence finding. It may be 
argued that participation causes higher valuation. But again, this way of causality is captured 
by the state dependence parameter, which is an interesting addition to our findings. In fact, the 
positively significant lagged dependent parameter means that the probability of repeat-
borrowing is higher than first-time entry (true state dependence). One implication of this is 
that first-time entry is more barred than repeat borrowing or that imagined contractual risks 
and punishment threats are more important for households considering borrowing for the first 
time.   
The variables for availability of a reliable (preferred) partner and the general perception 
on trust are also significant and with expected parameter signs. Both capture the ‘partner risk’ 
associated with a joint liability contract. The smaller the chances of obtaining a reliable and 
trusted partner, the more likely to perceive encountering partner default and the less likely to 
join a joint liability contract. Age and age-squared are also included to capture eligibility 
criteria of the MFI but their parameters are insignificant.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Thus, although qualitatively in the same direction of influence as the rainfall variable, we suspect that our 
dummy for systemic shock, which is reported at household level (=1 if bad year) might be measured with 
errors. 
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3.6 Conclusions and implications  
 
This chapter investigates both theoretically and empirically how joint liability risk and the 
threat of losing future access to credit after failure to repay group credit influence households’ 
borrowing decisions. Unlike most existing theoretical models in microfinance that consider 
participation in joint liability borrowing from an ‘independent project’ perspective, our 
theoretical framework examines participation decisions within the ‘household entity’ where 
production and consumption decisions take place inseparably. This approach is a novel 
attempt to examine recent microfinance contractual approaches within intertemporal 
household decisions. 
Using a unique panel dataset from sixteen villages in Ethiopia, the chapter studies the 
impact of the two contractual risk factors on agricultural borrowings where exogenous shocks 
like rain failure, death and illness of productive inputs are explicitly taken into account. A 
dynamic random effects probit estimator is implemented allowing for endogeneity of initial 
conditions and including risk preference indicators and unbundling them from state 
dependence using recently developed econometric simulation techniques. Three main findings 
follow from the empirical investigation. 
First, controlling for MFI selection, eligibility and persistence due to initial differences, 
we find that joint liability risk as measured by predicted risk deters borrowing in a highly 
significant way. Second, in line with this finding, we find evidence that intra-household 
differentials in future liquidity and insurance (such as livestock endowment- the most liquid 
asset, and access to food-safety nets- the last resort to bridge household resource gap after a 
shock) are important factors in participation. These findings have interesting equity and 
insurance policy implications for the MFI and regional policy makers. Specifically, even if 
joint liability is an innovative approach to remove the collateral requirement theoretically, in 
practice, it does so at the expense of rationing the poorest of the poor (as proxied, for example, 
by livestock) out of borrowing. Good news for policy makers is that the well known safety net 
program recently instituted in Ethiopia to cushion households against production shocks 
appears to promote use of credit.  
Our results also indicate that joint liability borrowing, which is meant only for 
production, is also associated with downside consumption risk. This is not just a loan 
diversion story, but may well mean that some household consider MFI credits only as a last 
resort to bridge downside risks and not, as presumed by the lender, for improving productivity. 
However, rainfall, a more general village-level indicator for systemic major draughts, tends to 
reduce the probability of participation substantially. The more draught is felt across borrowers, 
the less the probability to borrow, controlling for ex-post coping mechanisms. Third, 
controlling for time-invariant unobserved initial households heterogeneity, which also 
mattered for participation, we find that households who happened to participate once are more 
likely to repeat borrowing. One possible implication of this is that punishment threats and 
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risks associated with joint liability are perceived bigger than they are in reality and policies 
that help to ease perceived risks and threats might help to encourage households to benefit 
from MFI borrowings. 
To conclude, one major reason microfinance credit is needed in those areas is to help 
cushion against risk. However, if some elements of the contract introduce and exacerbate 
aversion to risk, then it will continue to keep poor but potential households unable to protect 
themselves against downside risk stay in poverty by avoiding productive credit- just as the 
well known trade off between insurance and incentives. Ensuring physical availability of 
credit through MFIs without improving such contractual risks is therefore only a step but not 
a sufficient condition to access credit in poor and risky environments. For the borrowers of 
the MFI at stake, providing full-fledged credit services, including credit for consumption, may 
help to cope with risks after shock and thus encourage them to use credit to tackle poverty. 
Most importantly, the policy of ‘one size fits all’ does not seem to be the most effective way 
of providing access to credit in rural areas with diverse socio-economic and environmental 
conditions. 
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Appendix 3A 
 
 
Figure 3A.1. Access to credit and participation in MFI borrowing: the contractual risk-rationed  
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2008: 29) 
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Table 3A.1 Number of borrowers, average and total loan (2001-2005) 
Year No of 
borrowers 
growth rate 
(No of borrowers) 
Average 
loan ($) 
growth rate 
(average loan) 
Total loan        
($) 
growth rate 
(total loan) 
1994 8,446 - 125 - 1,052,060 - 
1995 13,881 0.643 98 -0.212 1,362,030 0.295 
1996 20,515 0.478 118 0.204 2,423,007 0.779 
1997 67,057 2.269 111 -0.060 7,449,692 2.075 
1998 168,976 1.520 92 -0.167 15,616,007 1.096 
1999 210,572 0.246 69 -0.253 14,543,162 -0.069 
2000 187,470 -0.110 61 -0.118 11,427,221 -0.214 
2001 158,883 -0.152 82 0.342 14,398,280 0.260 
2002 225,996 0.422 109 0.333 24,685,525 0.714 
2003 336,733 0.490 138 0.266 46,362,212 0.878 
2004 419,052 0.244 186 0.348 77,886,681 0.680 
2005 392,693 -0.063 217 0.167 85,304,139 0.095 
2006 423,830 0.079 231 0.065 97,904,968 0.148 
 
Source: Own calculations from (Mees, 2000) and MIX MARKET (2007).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RISK-MATCHING BEHAVIOR IN MICROCREDIT GROUP FORMATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM NORTHERN ETHIOPIA1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Theoretical models on group lending assume the formation of groups of 
homogenous risk types. Recent theoretical and empirical findings challenge this view arguing 
that when markets for insurance are missing, risk homogeneity may not hold anymore and 
risk heterogeneity can be the optimal outcome. Using data from an MFI in Tigray (Ethiopia) 
this chapter examines the homogeneity hypothesis and reflects on implications for repayment. 
No evidence is found that supports risk homogeneity, even accounting for matching frictions. 
However, we also do not find an explicit link between the presence of risk heterogeneity and 
side-payments due to missing insurance as suggested in the literature. Instead, other trust 
based social networks seem to underlie heterogeneity. Such social networks are often 
synchronized with credit groups and influence the probability of repayment under 
heterogeneity. The implication is that successful repayment rates in group lending need not 
arise only under risk homogeneity but can also arise under risk heterogeneity. Heterogeneity 
may also serve to bridge missing insurance markets in poor rural environments. MFIs 
therefore need to consider such local conditions when designing their lending schemes. 
 
Key words: microfinance, group formation, risk matching, risk homogeneity, Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A paper published as Guush Berhane, Cornelis Gardebroek and Henk A.J. Moll (2009). “Risk-matching 
behavior in microcredit group formation: evidence from northern Ethiopia,” Agricultural economics, 40 
(2009):409-419. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Microfinance has become a standard tool of poverty alleviation programs that take the 
provision of financial services at the centre of development policy. Provision of financial 
services to low-income households requires however solving two central problems: the 
information problem (how to establish group members' willingness to repay) and the cost 
problem (how to handle small financial transactions with a short duration cost-effectively).  
Experience over the past twenty years has shown that some Microfinance Institutions 
(MFIs) focusing on low income households are able to overcome these two problems. One of 
the approaches adopted by some of the successful MFIs to overcome the information problem 
and the related possibility of default is joint liability in group lending. In group lending, 
borrowers are required to form small groups that are held jointly liable for the debts. 
Moreover, MFIs use the threat of banning the entire group from future loans if one or more of 
the group members fail to repay. The idea is that group members will either develop team-
support and help each other in case of default or pressure members inclining to strategically 
default. Joint liability thus mitigates the information and cost problems by inducing borrowers 
to behave in the interest of the MFI through peer screening (e.g. Varian, 1990; Ghatak, 1999) 
and peer monitoring (Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995). By effectively transferring 
costs of screening, monitoring and enforcement from the MFI to the borrower, group lending 
helps MFIs to reduce lending costs (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000).  
In practice however the performance of MFIs is mixed and how differences in success 
arise is not clear (e.g. Morduch, 1999). A central issue in group lending is the group formation 
process and the group types that arise. Some argue that groups are formed among members of 
similar risk profiles, known as homogeneous risk matching: safe borrowers strive to select 
safe partners, and risky borrowers end up with other risky partners (Varian, 1990; Ghatak, 
1999). Assuming borrowers are fully informed about each others’ types, a number of 
theoretical studies (e.g. Varian, 1990; Ghatak, 2000) show homogeneity is necessary for 
welfare improvements under group lending. The central argument underlying the homogenous 
risk matching hypothesis arises due to differences in the effective borrowing costs faced by 
risky and safe borrowers. Since risky borrowers fail more often than safe borrowers and 
assuming that the risky cannot fully compensate for the extra risk safe borrowers would have 
to bear when joining risky borrowers, it is optimal for borrowers of similar success 
probabilities to select each other (e.g. Van Tassel, 1999; Ghatak, 2000). As a result, any 
observed risk heterogeneity within groups must be due to matching frictions and not an 
optimal choice of borrowers. Matching frictions may arise due to unavailability of similar risk 
types or information asymmetry in finding a perfect match. It is this notion of homogeneity 
within groups that is considered as strong social capital to deal with lending problems that 
may otherwise arise. Likewise, many empirical studies (e.g., Wenner, 1995; Sharma and 
Zeller, 1997) take homogeneity as given. 
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Exceptions are Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier (2000), Sadoulet (1999) and 
Guttman (2008) who argue heterogeneity can arise under different conditions and the 
homogeneity result is not always necessary for welfare improvements in group lending. 
Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier (2000) conclude that group lending can be optimal with 
heterogeneity. In their model, cross-subsidization among relatively mobile, anonymous and 
heterogeneous urban group members acts as collateral to enforce loans without borrowers’ ex 
ante full information about their partners and without requiring the homogeneity outcome. 
Van Tassel (2000) also finds heterogeneous matching in unobservable business characteristics 
for urban credit groups in Bolivia.  
Sadoulet (1999) challenged the homogenous risk matching hypothesis by arguing that 
homogeneity is not optimal when borrowers operate in risky environments where insurance 
markets are missing and other mechanisms such as side-payments are endogenous in group 
formation. Allowing for endogeneity of such insurance scheme, he presents a theoretical 
model in which non-monotonic matching patterns arise: safer types match with medium-risk 
types; medium-risk types match either heterogeneously with safe types or homogenously with 
their types if no safe type is available; and risky types match homogenously with their risky 
types because they are too risky to be accepted in such insurance schemes. He assumes that 
medium-risk types can make side-payments of higher surpluses to safer borrowers (than other 
safe borrowers would) for the guarantee the latter provides in the event of the former’s 
failure 2 . Sadoulet’s heterogeneity outcome arises because his model considers repeated 
interactions among group members, whereas the homogeneity outcome in other theoretical 
models such as in Ghatak (2000) arises because of the static consideration. By explicitly 
incorporating dynamic incentives due to repeated interactions on which Sadoulet’s (1999) 
result is based, Guttman (2008) theoretically shows homogeneity does not necessarily hold if 
earlier models such as Ghatak (2000) are extended to include dynamic incentives, mainly, the 
threat of not being refinanced if the group defaults. Intuitively, since future borrowing is 
denied if both of them fail, which is less likely for a safe borrower, a risky borrower is willing 
to pay more to have a safe partner than another safe borrower will be willing to pay. In direct 
contrast to Ghatak’s (2000) arguments, Sadoulet (1999) and Guttman (2008) emphasize 
heterogeneity is more likely when side-payments between borrowers are feasible.  
Empirical research is required to determine which of these two theoretical results, i.e. 
the homogeneous risk matching model (e.g. Ghatak, 2000) or the heterogeneous risk 
matching model (e.g. Sadoulet, 1999) holds in specific settings. Such knowledge is also of 
practical relevance to MFIs. If heterogeneity in group lending is indeed observed, an 
important implication is that it can improve welfare through enabling risk-sharing and 
insurance mechanisms via heterogeneous groups in addition to solving information problems. 
                                                 
2 Note that heterogeneity is incentive compatible to a safe borrower as well because Sadoulet (1999) 
assumes the marginal effect on safe borrower’s surplus caused by lowering the risk of her partner decreases 
with her own risk and, in the extreme, homogenous matching yields her zero surplus. 
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Therefore, MFIs operating in poor rural areas, such as in rural Ethiopia, where formal and 
informal insurance is limited would need to re-design their lending mechanisms taking 
heterogeneous matching processes into account. The only empirical studies done so far are by 
Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) using data from urban retailers in Guatemala and by Lensink 
and Habteab (2003) using data from petty-traders with some farming activities in Eritrea. 
Both follow the theoretical work by Sadoulet (1999) to examine risk matching among group 
members and test the causality between individual risk and the level of risk heterogeneity in 
groups, accounting for endogeneity between choice of group risk and choice of individual 
(project) risk. Both find evidence that supports heterogeneity. While Sadoulet and Carpenter 
suggest heterogeneity might be in line with the missing insurance theory by Sadoulet (1999), 
Lensink and Habteab (2003) propose to have further research to investigate why 
heterogeneity arises.  
Following similar methodological approaches as in Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) and 
Lensink and Habteab (2003), this chapter examines the validity of the homogenous risk 
matching hypothesis among credit groups of a microfinance operating in a different socio-
economic setting. Whereas the above mentioned studies focus on urban and semi-urban poor, 
the data used in this chapter comes from credit groups among smallholder farmers in rural 
areas in Tigray (northern Ethiopia). The specific objectives of this study are the following. 
First, to identify the factors determining risk heterogeneity in group formation of 
microfinance; second, to test the often assumed homogeneous risk matching hypothesis; and 
third, to investigate the link between social networks and group formation and repayment. The 
contributions of this study are twofold. First, the rural setting in Ethiopia gives an ideal 
environment to test the risk homogeneity hypothesis where credit groups are operating not 
only under missing insurance markets but side-payments are also limited due to relative 
covariance of risks. It also offers a good contrast to an urban environment where matching 
frictions are relatively higher due to mobility and anonymity. Moreover, in rural areas group 
formation processes may be endogenous to risk-sharing arrangements that rely on trust 
developed over the years through clubs and networks (e.g., religious gatherings) typical of 
poor economies where legal institutions play little role (Fafchamps, 2006). Therefore a second 
contribution of this study is that it provides new empirical insights into the underlying social 
processes behind risk heterogeneity and its implications for repayment using a unique data set 
from rural households in Ethiopia. In general this study contributes to the understanding of 
microfinance credit, which is widespread in Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in the 
world.  
Consistent with the previous empirical findings by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) and 
Lensink and Habteab (2003), we find strong statistical support for heterogeneity after 
accounting for matching frictions. While there is not enough evidence from our data to 
support the ‘side-payment’ intuition held in theory, we find some evidence on endogenous 
links between the group formation processes and traditional credit groups and trust-fostering 
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religious gatherings operating in the study area. The implication is that if borrowers are 
allowed to match freely, group lending may serve to mitigate other missing markets such as 
insurance. Thus, MFIs operating under similar circumstances may need to consider such local 
specificities and underlying social processes when designing their financial products.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 motivates the risk matching hypothesis 
and presents the empirical method used. Section 4.3 describes the data and the MFI where the 
data comes from, the Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI), one of largest MFIs in 
Ethiopia. Section 4.4 explains measurement of risk and risk heterogeneity within groups. In 
section 4.5 these risk measures are used to estimate the effects of matching friction and 
optimal risk and subsequently the homogeneity hypothesis is tested. Results are compared to 
other studies. Implications of observed risk matching on repayment are also given. 
Conclusions are drawn in the last section.     
 
 
4.2 Conceptual model and estimation strategy 
 
The empirical strategy in this section follows the method first implemented by Sadoulet and 
Carpenter (2001) and adopted by Lensink and Habteab (2003). As discussed above the 
homogeneous risk matching hypothesis states that microcredit joint-liability groups are 
formed among members of similar risk types and that any observed heterogeneity in group 
formation is due to matching frictions. Empirically, if this hypothesis is valid, there must be 
no systematic relationship between members’ (observed) individual choice of risk and their 
choice of (observed) level of group risk heterogeneity. With matching frictions, estimation is 
not straightforward because individual preferences determine optimal choices of own (project) 
risk as well as partners’ risk simultaneously. Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) deal with this 
problem by specifying the risk matching model as follows. First, in a frictionless world, the 
structural equations for level of risk heterogeneity, *ih  and optimal own risk, 
*
iθ , are specified 
as:   
 
)0,(Hh *i
*
i θ=  (1) 
 ( )*ii*i h,Xθθ =  (2) 
 
where iX  represents the set of borrower i’s exogenous individual characteristics, and H and 
θ are functions for *ih  and *iθ , respectively. Equation (1) indicates that the risk 
heterogeneity in borrower i’s group is a function only of the optimal risk level. According to 
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equation (2) the optimal chosen risk depends on the borrowers’ individual characteristics and 
the level of risk heterogeneity. Both equations can be combined to:   
  ))X(Z),0(H,X( i
*
ii
*
i == θθθ  
 
If there were no matching friction, it is instructive to see that optimal own risk only depends 
upon individual characteristics and simultaneous determination of *ih  and 
*
iθ  is not an issue. 
In practice, however, there is not a frictionless world and these frictions affect not only the 
desired level of risk heterogeneity but also the choice of own risk compared to a non friction 
situation. Let ih  denote the observed risk heterogeneity in the presence of matching frictions 
and let if  represent a vector of variables causing matching friction. The structural equations 
for observed optimal risk heterogeneity and observed own risk iθ  in the presence of matching 
frictions, respectively, are then specified as:  
 
)f,(Hh i
*
ii θ=  (3) 
)h,X( iii θθ =  (4) 
 
And the reduced form equation for iθ  includes matching frictions:  
 
)f,X(K))X(Z,f(H,X( iiiiii ≡=θθ  (5) 
 
The fitted value of iθ  from (5) is used to estimate the heterogeneity equation (3) from which 
the homogeneous risk matching hypothesis can be tested by setting:  
 
0h*
i
i =θδ
δ  
If this null-hypothesis can be rejected in the presence of matching frictions fi, it indicates that 
heterogeneity relates to optimal risk choice, rejecting the homogeneous risk matching 
hypothesis. The test requires measurement of observed risk, observed heterogeneity and a 
proxy for matching frictions (Sadoulet and Carpenter, 2001). 
 
 
4.3 Group lending and clients in Ethiopia 
 
To implement the model described in section 4.2, we conducted a survey among borrowing 
households participating in group based credit of the Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution 
(DECSI), a MFI operating in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia. This section gives the basic 
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characteristics of borrowers included in the study. But, first a description of the practice of 
group lending in DECSI that unconventionally operates in remote rural areas of Tigray is 
given. 
 
 
4.3.1 The practice of group lending in DECSI 
 
Established in 1994, DECSI provides financial services to poor borrowers, mainly farmers. 
DECSI is the biggest institution operating in this economically marginal area where millions 
are living at subsistence levels with limited economic opportunities and high risk (Mehan, 
2001). DECSI adopted the (Grameen style) group lending method since its inception. Small 
initial loans, up to ETB3 5000 are disbursed to jointly liable poor but “capable” groups of 3 to 
7 members for self-employment purposes and income generation activities. Groups are 
formed voluntarily among credit users: members simply select their partners. DECSI accepts 
individual applications under the eligibility requirements that borrowers come in groups, are 
above 18 years old, and are not from the same family. Loan periods differ among activities: a 
maximum of two years (with yearly repayments) for agricultural loans and one year (with 
monthly repayments) for non-agricultural loans.  
DECSI pursues group pressure and social sanctioning to enforce its loans. In principle, 
further loans are extended after the previous group loan is entirely paid back. Group credit 
exclusion follows for subsequent loans when a loan is in default for more than the due date. 
Sometimes exclusion leads to denying credit to an entire village or ‘Tabia’ (lowest local 
administrative unit) if one or more groups do not repay. Under certain circumstances, such 
gross exclusion serves as a pressure for local leaders to get involved in enforcing defaults, 
which often takes the form of linking privileges to repayments. Such sanctions are more 
authoritative and effective tools of enforcement. In terms of outreach, DECSI has now 9 main 
branches with 96 sub-branches throughout Tigray and covers 91 per cent of the communities 
in Tigray (Borchgrevink et al., 2003). DECSI’s interest rates range from 12 to 15 percent for 
credit depending on the nature of economic activity and 3 per cent for saving. The repayment 
rate of the regular loans for the period was 97.6% (DECSI, 2003).  
 
 
4.3.2 The data   
In 2003, we conducted a survey on 201 borrowing rural households that constituted 57 credit 
groups selected from 45 villages where DECSI operates. The sampling method used in 
selecting the sites was one of convenience sampling. Out of the 96 DECSI sub-branches 
throughout Tigray, six representative sub-branches in terms of socio-cultural, agro-ecology, 
                                                 
3 ETB stand for the Ethiopian currency, ‘Birr’; USD=8.34 ETB  during the survey period. 
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market access, and proximity to the formal banking facilities in nearest towns, and sub-branch 
bank performance were selected.  
Respondents were asked selected household characteristics and credit mechanisms, 
mainly, group formation, monitoring and enforcement. Respondents are characterized by 
subsistence traditional farming (see table 4A.1 in appendix) with average land holdings of 
0.75 ha and a reported average annual income of ETB 2217 as well as poor asset 
compositions. Average family size is 5.47. Only in periods with good harvest or good 
business group members can on average fulfil their repayment obligations (see table 4A.2 in 
appendix). Reported data shows an average borrower is unable to cover repayment obligations 
in bad years, regardless the nature of the repayment schedule. This is different for households 
with diversified income sources such as petty trading and petty production (34%) viz. 
handcrafts and honey production. Regarding group dynamics, about 20 percent of members of 
current groups have been in another group before. One reason is that smaller groups are 
preferred over larger ones and following a recent change in DECSI’s minimum group size 
policy from 5 to 3, average group size declined from 5 to 4. Interestingly, according to key 
informants in the study, social and traditional networks such as Equb4 seem to facilitate the 
effectiveness of joint liability and its repayment rates in DECSI. 
 
 
4.4 Measuring risk and heterogeneity 
 
A crucial element in the empirical strategy is measuring individual borrowers’ risk, which 
then can be used to estimate the level of risk heterogeneity among group members. Risk is 
however a latent variable and requires proxy variables that are often not readily available. 
Both Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) and Lensink and Habteab (2003) calculate the difference 
between outstanding payments and savings made before the due date as a proxy for risk. In 
section 4.4.1, we adopt this method, modifying it to capture savings in our setting. Section 
4.4.2, measures group heterogeneity based on the risk measure. 
 
 
4.4.1 Measuring borrowers’ risk 
 
The risk measure based on outstanding payments and periodical savings from the project 
financed by credit assumes a one-to-one correspondence between project financing and 
repayment. In other words, borrower risk is taken equivalent to the risk of the project for 
which the loan is used. However, in a rural household setting where fungibility of credit use is 
common, borrower risk may not necessarily coincide with project risk. Other household 
                                                 
4Equb is an Ethiopian variant of a Rotating Saving and Credit Association (ROSCA). 
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income or liquidity (de)stabilizing factors may change household’s credit risk. Specifically, 
the higher households’ potential to secure the required liquidity for repayment before the due 
date, the lower the risk. A risk measure that accounts for such ‘potential’, which may also 
include the ‘borrowing potential’ of the household from its informal lenders (see e.g. Moll, 
1989:25), is difficult to measure without errors. Nevertheless, we try to minimize this error by 
estimating the household’s expected liquidity (Li) at the due date. This is a composite of 
household specific liquidity sources, mainly cash savings, (expected) income from animal 
(product) sales,  petty trade, off-farm work, any form of near liquid wealth like gold and other 
household assets that can be liquidated or held in balance by group partners, potential side-
payments, and harvest income.  
Following Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) and Lensink and Habteab (2003), the risk 
index, θ i, is thus constructed from Li and outstanding loan repayment Pi as follows:  
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The index is censored at zero from below because those with values below zero (or negative 
risk) are those that have liquidity in excess of their current repayment obligation. Likewise, it 
is also truncated from above when Li is equal to zero, which makes sense because the greater 
the positive margin between Pi  and  Li, the higher the risk of the borrower, and the closer θi  is 
to unity, and vice versa. Summary statistics of this calculated θi  and the variables used to 
construct it are given in Table 4.1.  
 
 
4.4.2 Measuring risk heterogeneity in groups 
 
The next step is to measure the risk heterogeneity within groups using the calculated 
individual risk index. The Euclidean Distance measure is applied (similar to Sadoulet and 
Carpenter, 2001) to determine the degree of heterogeneity. Since DECSI’s group size ranges 
from three to seven we use standardized average Euclidean distances to estimate hi such that 
the potential problems of non-standardization and outliers in the heterogeneity measure are 
minimized.  
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics of heterogeneity and indicator variables 
Variable    Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loan Size 201 1365.547 1066.389 100.00 5000.00 
Repayment (Pi)       201 448.816 434.199 10.00 2816.00 
Observed/actual risk (θi) 201 0.386 0.39 0.00 0.99 
Mean of individual group risk  ( kθ )   201 0.426 0.25 0.00 0.93 
Group size (Nk)       201 3.960 1.17 3.00 6.00 
Heterogeneity (hi) (censored) 201 -0.009 0.65 -1.00 1.00 
Censored risk ( iθ )=0, if iθ <=0) (74 left-censored). 
 
The average (standardized) Euclidean distance measure is given by (see e.g. Sharma, 
1996:218): 
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where θi is the risk index for borrower i calculated from (7); k is the group in which i and j are 
members and has group size Nk and a group mean risk of kθ . The formula measures the 
weighted variance of an individual borrower’s risk from partners’ risk. The closer the 
individual index to the average group risk, the smaller the variation in risk and the more risk 
homogeneous the group is. The sign of the heterogeneity measure indicates whether i’s risk is 
above or below the group average. A value of zero indicates homogeneity and values close to 
-1 or 1 indicate heterogeneity. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for risk and risk 
heterogeneity measures together. The average loan size for the period is 1366 ETB and the 
average periodical outstanding repayment 445 ETB. The average group risk is 0.39. Group 
sizes range from 3 to 6 with average 3.96. Heterogeneity is within the range [-1,1] with mean 
-0.009. This censored variable is used to test the heterogeneity/homogeneity hypothesis in 
section 4.5.2.  
 
 
4.5 Empirical analysis, results and discussion 
 
In this part, the empirical strategy motivated in section 4.2 is implemented. Section 4.5.1 
describes how predictions for optimal risk and matching frictions are obtained from the 
following empirical specification for the reduced form risk model introduced in section 4.2 by 
equation (5): 
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 ii 'f'X εβαθ ++=  (9) 
 
It is discussed how variables of this specification are defined and how the equation is 
estimated. From these equation predictions for matching frictions ( fˆ ) and optimal risk ( *iˆθ ) 
are obtained that are used as regressors in the empirical counterpart of the heterogeneity 
model (equation (3) in the theoretical model): 
 
          hii
*
ii fh εδθγα +++=
))
                                                         (10) 
 
Section 4.5.2 describes estimation issues of this heterogeneity model and how it is used to test 
the homogeneous risk matching hypothesis. A specific point of attention is how to deal with 
potential endogeneity of the optimal risk variable that arises since proxy variables are used, 
introducing measurement error. The results of our analysis are also compared with findings 
from other studies. Based on the outcome of the homogeneous risk matching hypothesis test 
section 4.5.3 empirically investigates the link between social networks and repayment. 
 
 
4.5.1 Risk estimation: matching friction and optimal risk indicators 
 
Before we can test the homogenous risk matching hypothesis, we need to separately identify f 
and *iθ  (i.e., risk without matching frictions) that are used in estimating the heterogeneity 
model (10). This enables to disentangle the risk heterogeneity into matching friction and 
optimal risk components. However, the challenge is that ‘matching friction’ is unobservable 
and that its many potential proxies might be multicollinear with X variables that explain *iθ . 
This problem is dealt with using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which is often used to 
reduce multicollinearity and dimensionality (Sharma, 1996). We use PCA to select good 
proxies for f that are orthogonal by construction to the X variables in equation (9). Thus, 
factor loadings of individual variables onto particular components that by definition indicate 
X and f help to establish identification of X and f. The procedure is also exploited to reduce 
dimensionality without loss of information relevant to the analysis. Details of the PCA 
analysis can be obtained from the authors. 
Based on the PCA factor loading, two sets of variables are identified. In line with 
common sense, the two factor loadings indicate that the variables that explain optimal risk 
(risk without friction), have to do with borrowers’ ability to pay while the matching friction 
indicators are related with group formation and monitoring elements. The following variables 
are selected using PCA to proxy for optimal risk: FEMALE for female group, ILITRT for 
educational background, INFRAST for proximity to selected basic infrastructures, FARMY for 
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main income source, LANDSZ for the size of land owned. Proxy variables for matching 
frictions, f, include KNOWBFR, BORN, KNOWINCM and EQUB. KNOWBFR captures group 
members’ knowledge of group partners before the group formation takes place. BORN is 
whether or not a member is born in the village and represents familial and social ties of group 
members. KNOWINCM  is about whether or not borrowers know the income of their partners. 
While both KNOWBFR and BORN capture the extent of information (a) symmetry crucial for 
screening, KNOWINCM is related to information on partners’ overall status that is helpful for 
monitoring in post group formation. EQUB refers to participation in Rotating Saving and 
Credit association (ROSCA).  
Once the proxies for matching frictions are known, the next step is to predict optimal 
risk and matching frictions from the risk model. We therefore estimate the reduced form risk 
model in (9) using the X variables and indicators for f as regressors from which both f and *iθ  
are predicted. Due to the censored nature of the dependent variable iθ , a Tobit specification 
(Verbeek, 2008: 230-240) is chosen to estimate equation (9). Before predicting values for 
optimal risk and matching friction from (9), it is instructive to examine the relevance of the 
variables in the risk model. Results are presented in table 4.2. All parameters except for 
ILITRT have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero at 95% or 90% level.  
 
Table 4.2 Tobit estimates of the risk model 
Variable name 
 
Variable Description 
 
Coefficients 
 
St. errors 
               Optimal Risk Indicators 
FEMALE 1 if in a female group, 0 otherwise                                0.220** 0.092 
ILITRT 1 if borrower is illiterate, 0 otherwise                            0.120 0.085 
INFRAST Mean distance to basic infrastructure                           0.020** 0.005 
FARMY 1 if main income source is farming, 0 otherwise        0.453** 0.124 
LANDSZ Total land size (in hectares)            -0.158** 0.072 
                 Matching Friction Indicators 
BORN 1 if born in the same village, 0 otherwise                     -0.200* 0.108 
KNOWINCM 1 if borrower knew income of partners,   
0 otherwise                       
 -0.133* 0.076 
EQUB 1 if participating in ROSCAs                                    -0.403** 0.104 
KNOWBFR 1 if borrowers knew each other before group 
formation, 0 otherwise      
  0.226* 0.126 
Intercept Constant                                          -0.331** 0.162 
   N  186  
(**) significant at the 5% level, (*) significant at the 10% level.  
Log likelihood = -117.32366, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.  Pseudo R2 = 0.2941.  
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Including quadratic terms for FARMY and AGE, as proposed by Lensink and Habteab (2003), 
does not improve our specification. Parameters for FARMY, LANDSZ and INFRAST are also 
highly significant with the expected sign, indicating that being dependent on farming as the 
main source of livelihood, farming on small size land and living further away from social 
infrastructure, respectively, increase risk. In DECSI, women groups are encouraged. FEMALE 
represents a women group and being a female group increases risk, which may have to do 
with their relatively low control over household resources. Being born in the same village 
(BORN) and knowing the annual income sources (KNOWINCM) reduces matching friction. 
As expected, knowledge of each other’s income status helps to select the best match. 
Participation in the traditional Ethiopian Equb (ROSCAs) also helps to get to know integrity 
and reduces matching friction. In fact, it is discussed later in section 4.6 that this network is 
essentially part of households’ borrowing structure and there are indications that it is 
synchronized with group lending. As indicated earlier, predicted values for optimal risk and 
matching-frictions are obtained from (9) such that αθ )) '* Xi =  and β
))
'ff = , respectively. In 
the next section, these values are used to estimate the risk heterogeneity model.  
 
 
4.5.2 Testing for risk homogeneity in groups: results and discussions 
 
Next, equation (10) is estimated using the heterogeneity measure calculated in section 4.4.2 as 
the dependent variable. As indicated earlier, this measure proxies how far individual 
borrowers’ observed risk varies from their partners’. The main interest in this chapter is to 
investigate whether the observed heterogeneity is entirely explained by matching frictions or 
whether optimal risk also plays a role, violating the homogenous risk matching hypothesis. 
Again, because of the censored dependent variable, we estimate a Tobit model of the reduced 
form equation in (10). To see if the censoring of the heterogeneity variable has an effect on 
our distribution, the uncensored heterogeneity measure is also estimated using OLS.  
A problem that was also noted by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) is measurement error 
in the predicted values for optimal risk and matching friction. If measurement error in these 
proxy variables is present and substantial, it leads to biased estimates. Since any proxy 
variable introduces some measurement error, the question is basically how good these proxies 
are. Since our four indicators for matching frictions all indicate knowledge on (potential) 
partners we think that a prediction based on these four variables gives a good proxy for 
matching frictions with minimal measurement error. Also note that the test on the 
homogeneous risk matching hypothesis is performed on the parameter γ for optimal risk in 
equation (10). Therefore, in testing for this endogeneity problem using a Durbin-Wu- 
Hausman test (Verbeek, 2008:144) and potentially solving for it we concentrate on the 
optimal risk proxy *iˆθ . 
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Testing and solving the potential endogeneity problem due to measurement error 
requires a set of variables that can serve as Instrumental Variables that are both valid and not 
weak. Validity implies that potential instruments are not correlated with the measurement 
error or measured with error themselves. Instruments are considered not to be weak when they 
strongly correlate with the variable to be instrumented, reflected in an F-test value exceeding 
10 in the first-stage regression (Murray, 2006). The first requirement cannot easily be 
assessed and requires careful selection of instruments. Based on these considerations we 
choose two variables as instruments, i.e. households’ self evaluations of their wealth status 
compared to people in their neighbourhood and their spread in agricultural plots. The first 
instrument indicates household’s perceived ability to cope with risk and equals one if the 
household perceives it has a good wealth status and is zero otherwise. Spread in agricultural 
plots is also related to risk since one way of diversifying production risk (e.g. due to rainfall, 
flood, locust) in these areas is by having plots in different geographical locations. This 
instrumental variable indicates the extent of household’s agricultural plot diversification and 
is equal to one if less-diversified and zero otherwise. Both variables are easily measured 
without errors, while at the same time not correlated to potential errors of the heterogeneity 
(dependent) variable. Regressing the first-best proxy for risk *iˆθ  on these two variables 
indicates that both are significantly related at the 5% level with an overall F-test value of 
48.67, indicating that these instruments are not weak and can be used as instruments and to 
perform the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicated that the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity of the first best risk proxy *iˆθ  could not be rejected (p-value 0.88), 
indicating that measurement error is not a problem for this proxy variable. Results of Tobit, 
OLS and the (less efficient) IV estimation of equation (10) are given in table 4.3.  
Estimates of the Tobit, OLS and IV models all show that the parameters for matching 
frictions and optimal risk are significantly different from zero, indicating that the observed 
heterogeneity is explained by both matching frictions and optimal risk choice. In fact, under 
all estimators, the optimal risk parameter is highly significant.  
 
Table 4.3 Tobit estimates of risk heterogeneity  
Variables Tobit OLS IV 
Optimal Risk  )( *iθ
)  0.738 (0.131)**  0.679 (0.119)** 0.706 (0.232)** 
Matching Friction )( f)  1.042 (0.469)**  0.981 (0.486)** 0.997 (0.442)** 
Intercept -0.356 (0.070)**  -0.324 (0.078)** -0.338 (0.124)** 
Tobit, F(2,199); OLS, F(2,198) 16.09** 16.35**  5.56** 
N 201  201 201 
(**) significant at the 5 % level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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However, matching frictions also matter. This implies, contrary to the commonly held view, 
that credit groups in group lending are formed among members of different risk types not 
only because members fall short of finding their perfect match but also because it is to their 
best interest to do so. Our result does not come as a surprise, given similar previous findings 
by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) and Lensink and Habteab (2003). Using data from a rural 
area our results supplement these findings and provide more empirical support to the theory 
posed by Sadoulet (1999) that states that risk heterogeneity might also be an optimal choice 
instead of being due to matching frictions. 
 OLS results indicate that the censoring has some effects on parameter estimates but 
not on their significance. IV estimates are rather similar to the OLS results, as was expected 
since the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test already showed absence of endogeneity due to 
measurement error.  In view of the theoretical (e.g. Armendáriz De Aghion and Gollier, 2000) 
and empirical (e.g. Van Tassel, 2000) insights (see section 4.1), and given that our data comes 
from a rural setting where borrowers are expected to be less mobile with observable economic 
activities and anonymity is less likely compared to an urban setting, the result presents 
interesting as well as challenging questions regarding credit group formation. An important 
question is, apart from matching frictions, why groups are formed risk heterogeneously rather 
than risk homogeneously. In line with Sadoulet’s (1999) and Guttman’s (2008) theoretical 
insights, Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) find some evidence from their (semi-) urban setting 
that this might be due to missing insurance markets in the area. They suggest that it may be 
optimal for those looking for insurance due to risk of failure and loss of future borrowing to 
arrange side-payments (e.g., labor) with those that are able to cover all group debts in case of 
failure. Therefore, our survey also included questions on such forms of side-payments among 
group members. However, only four households in the sample reported having such 
exchanges with group partners. This is small compared to those who had repayment problems, 
when such an arrangement could have helped to solve it immediately. Thus, based on 
respondents’ direct reports, there is not enough evidence to conclude the insurance-side-
payments claim holds among our borrowers.  
Observation from key informants during the survey however reflects group members 
often engage in some form of traditional networks such as Equb (ROSCA) or other traditional 
and religious gatherings (e.g., tsebel or mahber)5.  The descriptive analysis also shows nearly 
40 percent of the respondents who are members of Equb are at the same time members of a 
credit groups. In fact, such networks are part of the group formation processes and provide the 
foundation for establishing trust or are in some way linked to borrowing and saving practices 
of borrowers. In several of the sample sites, particularly those closer to the village towns, 
borrowers engaged in petty trade activities reported they often synchronize their group credit 
                                                 
5 Tsebel and mahber are religious gatherings, not necessarily, of the same neighbourhood or socioeconomic 
status, that include monthly sainthood-services and festivities common in Tigray; reciprocal in nature, 
where every participant is duty-bound to serve. 
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repayments to the allocation of the ‘Equb pot’. Studies (e.g. Besley et al., 1993, 1994) show 
that the ROSCA pot can be allocated either by random (drawing lots) or by bidding. A 
different type of the ROSCA in which allocation of the pot is made ‘by consensus’ among 
members is witnessed in the study area. The explanations for the existence of this type of 
ROSCA are beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it may be that the ‘consensus’ is 
explained by cooperative behaviour and trust developed over the years more than the 
‘insurance-side-payments’ claimed to be associated with wealth or risk differences observed 
in credit groups. In the next section, we examine if these elements of social networks can 
partially explain the probability of individual borrowers’ repayment, which in turn provide 
insights into the role they play in credit groups.  
 
 
4.5.3 Social networks, group formation and repayment: any link? 
 
The high repayment rate of successful MFIs is often attributed to the joint-liability in group 
lending. The notion that group lending is key for repayment success is associated with one of 
its unique features that induces borrowers to act responsibly through out the lending process, 
which yield desired outcomes for the lender. One desired outcome is assortative matching, 
which leads to homogenous matches and helps to separate risky and safe borrowers, so that 
the lender is able to provide discriminatory interest rates, a process that maximizes aggregate 
welfare (Ghatak, 2000). But, if the outcome of group formation is not homogenous any more, 
but rather heterogeneous, do elements of group formation matter for repayment? If not, given 
heterogeneity, what explains the high repayment rate of 97.6 per cent in DECSI in 2003? Can 
simultaneous participation in social networks and group lending tell something about 
repayment in heterogeneous groups?  
To investigate these follow up questions, we estimate a logit model taking indicators for 
peer screening, peer monitoring or social pressure, trust and networks, and household 
characteristics as regressors. Information about variables used is given in the appendix. The 
dependent variable is one for group members that had unresolved repayment problems after 
due date (26%) and zero otherwise6. Table 4.4 reports the logit model estimates. Three 
variables (ACTKNOW, OPT_GTYP, and GSZ_NOW) are included to proxy peer screening.  
ACTKNOW captures knowledge on activities of partners before group formation, which is 
useful information to discern partners of their choice. OPT_GTYP captures the degree of 
optimality of the realised matches. GSZ_NOW measures effects of group size and is 
indeterminate apriori. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Self-reported claims related to repayment problems have been cross-checked with local branch officers. 
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Table 4.4 Logit estimates of factors explaining repayment problems   
Variable Description Coefficients   St. errors 
 Elements of peer screening, monitoring and peer 
pressure 
  
ACTKNOW 1 if borrower knew other members’ activities -0.290    (0.857)  
OPT_GTYP 1 if borrower thinks s/he joined its “optimum” group 0.242 (0.539) 
GSZ_NOW Current group size 0.093 (0.170) 
GAGE  Age of the group (in months) -0.144* (0.082) 
AVDSTNC      Distance (in KM) between major economic 
aactivities of group members 
0.132* (0.078)   
MYOBLGN6     1 if repay only because of moral obligation                  0.387 (0.424) 
WPENALTY 1 if borrower feels asset confiscation /prison is worst 
penalty of upon default  
0.785* (0.474)   
 Elements of trust/social networks   
EQUB      1 if participated in networks (e.g., Equb, Edir, Tsebel, 
etc) with one or more group members 
-1.464* (0.759)   
OPTIONS   1 if other (informal) sources of credit exist 0.759* (0.440)   
FEMALE 1 if female group -0.062 (0.469) 
 Borrower characteristics   
LnLASTLOAN (log )loan Size in last cycle 0.342 (0.313) 
HHSIZE Household size 0.031 (0.102) 
LANDSZ Total land size in hectares -0.236    (0.310)   
LnAVERGY       Household’s average annual income (values) -0.595** (0.202)  
ILITRT     1 if the respondent  is illiterate 0.566 (0.480) 
 The constant term   -0.219 (2.464)   
Log pseudo-likelihood = -88.118953; Pseudo R2 = 0.1535; N= 176; (**) significant at the 5% level, (*) 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Larger groups may have more chances to dilute risk but may also increase chances of free-
riding. None of these peer screening indicators is significant however. Peer monitoring is 
proxied by average distance between major economic activities of members and age of the 
group. Both indicators are statistically significant. Social pressure and enforcement is 
captured by whether or not the borrower feels obliged to repay either legally (WPENALTY) or 
morally (MYOBLGN6). While WPENALTY is statistically significant and MYOBLGN6 is not. 
It appears that borrowers feel more legally obliged than they are morally obliged.  
 Variables EQUB, OPTIONS, FEMALE are also included to explain social networks 
and associated trust. Except FEMALE, which tracks whether or not a group is female or male 
group (because DECSI’s group lending is gender based), the rest two are statistically 
significant (with the expected sign), which support our earlier observation that social 
networks play crucial roles in resolving repayment problems and perhaps heterogeneity 
through the complex social processes among members. Note that availability of other 
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borrowing options tends to aggravate the probability of facing repayment problems 
significantly. This is unexpected result but may signal that networks are not necessarily useful 
to the MFI. Lastly, it is important to note that of all the general household variables only 
(natural log of) income is statistically significant.  
In sum, while many variables have the predicted parameter signs, only few, mainly 
monitoring and trust indicator variables significantly explain repayment problem. This may 
imply that there are some peer monitoring activities even when groups are heterogeneous in 
risk types and homogeneity is not a necessary outcome for monitoring to take place. 
Moreover, the non-significance of peer screening variables may indicate that screening might 
have taken place (such as during formation of Equb) long before credit groups are formed.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusions  
 
This chapter investigated the empirical relevance of the homogeneity hypothesis commonly 
held in the group lending literature. It also attempted to investigate the effects of the observed 
group risk structure on repayment. The data comes from credit groups in rural Tigray 
(northern Ethiopia). As first step in the analysis, risk is indexed from a comparison between 
outstanding repayments and ability to repay and a risk model is estimated. Being in a women 
group, non-proximity to infrastructure, and having farm income as main income source, 
ceteris paribus, increase risk of default. But, larger land area, participation in Equb, knowing 
each other’s income, and village acquaintance reduce the probability of default risk.  
Controlling for matching frictions, the empirical test on risk matching behavior of group 
members, after accounting for matching frictions, rejects the hypothesis that group members 
form homogenous groups in equilibrium. This suggests that heterogeneity is an important 
feature in credit groups and plays a role in group formation. The explanation given for the 
heterogeneity observed is not found to be consistent with the missing insurance argument. 
Rather, this chapter finds that networks linked with credit groups may help to build trust 
among group members over time. The link between formal and informal financial 
intermediation, specifically the link between credit groups and participation in the Ethiopian 
version of ROSCA, Equb, is one important finding in this chapter. Borrowers take the 
advantage of established networks through the years not only to smooth out information 
problems, develop reputation among each other or take advantage of the long-time 
accumulated experience on which they can count to form credit groups (regardless of 
homogeneity) but may also use credit groups as a reputation indicator strengthening the 
ROSCA stability.  
The empirical evidence does not support the notion that homogeneity is a necessary 
condition for peer screening and peer monitoring to take place effectively. In fact, we find 
evidence that particularly peer monitoring reduces the probability of default even if groups are 
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organized heterogeneously. The link with peer screening seems indirect. Peer screening in 
many cases takes place long before the establishment of credit groups because other informal 
networks function as building blocks for credit groups. This is implied through participation 
in other networks (like, Equb) that are linked with DECSI’s credit.    
A final note is that compared to previous similar studies, our sample comes from a 
remote rural socio-economic environment where other formal borrowing options are scarce 
and access to credit is limited. Nevertheless, results are consistent with findings from urban 
settings. It appears however that the underlying rationale for the findings is different than in 
these other studies. In our case, the absence of other borrowing options which often give way 
for traditional financial and insurance networks to play a greater role seem at the same time to 
set the grounds for microfinance group formation and credit transactions. The policy 
implication is that MFIs operating under similar circumstances may need to consider such 
socio-economic specificity when designing their financial products. Moreover, there is a need 
for further research on the link between formal credit groups and ROSCAs or other informal 
networks existing in rural communities. This chapter found evidence that this link exists but 
this is not well addressed in the microfinance literature.  
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Appendix 4A. Borrower characteristics, group formation and dynamics 
 
Table 4A.1 Socio-economic characteristics of group members  
Variable                                           Mean Std. dev. 
Age                        42.0  12.09
Household size                           5.47  2.14  
Land size (in ‘tsimdi’) (LANDSZ)              3.00  2.94  
Average Annual Income (AVRGEY)                                 2288.31  2794.67  
% Female  (FEMALE)                                                                          32.3 
% Single Respondents                                                                          19.5 
% of households members that earn an Independent Income              10.4  
% using irrigation                                                                      19.4  
% of households employed as 1st income source is:         
                              Farming          63.18  
                              Employment with fixed salary 1.49  
                              Daily labourer                                   3.98  
                              Service giving              4.48  
                              Petty trade              19.90  
                              Others                6.97  
% Households perceived their wealth status as:   
                             Extremely Poor                3.0  
                             Medium Poor                                                  50.2  
                             Poor                                40.8 
                             Rich                                                          5.0  
% Educational level:  
                             Illiterate (ILITRT)       50.7 
                             Just read and write                                                  14.0 
                             Primary school complete and Above                      35.3 
N=201  
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Table 4A.2 Borrowing, group formation and saving characteristics of group members a  
    Characteristic                              Number     Mean Std. de       Min   Max 
Age of the group (in Months) (GAGE)          190    36.18   28.97     1  108
Group size at establishment          201 5.35 1.40     3 7
Group size at survey time                              198 4.40 1.20     3 7
Optimum group size         196    2.98     1.28     2  7
Amount of loan applied for                    197   580.8     1597.40     200 10000
Actual borrowings:     
                        last loan cycle (DECSI)         170 1255.6       843.70     100  5000
                        Present loan cycle (DECSI)             196  1378.4       1028.40     100 5000
Savings in Cash/Liquid form:     
                        Equb, Edir, DECSI, etc        158    1042.3      2906.3        2  25500
                        Only in DECSI         189    235.4           390.7     18  3000
                        In other forms               14    1012.7       2629.9     70  10000
Expected saving at due date when payment 
is every end of monthc:     
    
                        Good harvest/business times              59    496.5        771.5      20  3,600
                        Bad harvest/business times              48   198.0   357.7      0 2,000
Expected saving at due date when payment 
is every end of yearc: 
    
                        Good Harvest times                 119    845.6    1,361.9      0  10,000
                        Bad Harvest times        119        0.0             0.0          0  0
Access to other sources of credit (%)b Number  %   
                        yes          44    24.0         
                        no                139    75.9         
Faced repayment difficulties at least once     
                        yes                   141    73.44   
                        no                      51 26.56   
Defaulted at least once     
                        yes                                                 173 86.07   
                        no                                                   28   13.93   
Borrower thinks s/he joined optimum group 
type 
    
                        no                 33    16.58       
                        yes               166    83.42       
Which form of credit arrangement do you 
like to have? 
    
                        group credit             31    15.42       
                        individual credit            161    80.10       
                        don't mind                9    4.48       
aAmount in ETB. b include borrowing potential from money lenders, relatives, friends and remittance  
cvalued in 2003 local market prices 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
EVALUATING THE LONG-RUN CAUSAL IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE CREDIT 
USING PANEL DATA ECONOMETRICS: A CASE STUDY FROM ETHIOPIA1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter evaluates the long-term impact of microfinance credit from the 
intensity of participation in borrowing. We use a four-round panel data set on 351 farm 
households that had access to microfinance in northern Ethiopia. Over the years 1997-2006, 
with three-year intervals, households are observed on key poverty indicators: improvements 
in annual consumption and housing improvements. The relatively long duration in the panel 
enables to measure household poverty changes between consecutive periods and see the long-
run effects of exposure to microfinance from the intensity of participation in borrowing. The 
fixed-effects model is innovatively modelled to account for potential selection biases due to 
both time-invariant and time-varying unobserved individual household heterogeneities. 
Results show that microfinance borrowing indeed causally increased consumption and 
housing improvements. A more flexible specification that allows for the number of times the 
household has been in borrowing also shows that repeated borrowing is effectively increasing 
consumption: the longer the borrowing relationship,  the larger the effect partly due to lasting 
credit effects. Impact estimates that do not account for such dynamic effects may therefore 
undermine the effect of MFI borrowing.  
 
Key words: Microfinance, treatment effects, trend model, panel data 
 
 
                                                 
1 Paper by Guush Berhane and Cornelis Gardebroek submitted to American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
The microfinance revolution got considerable momentum around the world in the last two and 
half decades. The potentials of microfinance as an effective tool to break the vicious circle of 
poverty have been widely voiced. As a result, several microfinance schemes have gone 
operational around the world, providing financial access to millions of poor people both in 
rural and urban areas. Important questions are however if and to what extent microfinance 
credit over its long time existence has contributed in reducing poverty.  
Despite efforts to measure this impact, evidence on the poverty reduction effects of long 
term microfinance credit remains unclear mainly due to the difficulty of measuring 
counterfactual outcomes and the lack of follow up data spanning over sufficiently long 
periods to measure the impact. Without experimental designs, evaluations based on simple 
comparisons between participants and non-participants are subject to biases from two sources 
(e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Ravallion, 2001). The first bias is due to program placement 
and occurs because microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not randomize over villages to place 
programs. They often choose on village characteristics that may not be observable to the 
researcher. The second bias is due to the tendency of individual borrowers to self-select into 
programs. From the nature of borrowing it is evident that potential applicants can choose 
themselves to apply for a loan. When selection into the program is based on unobservable 
individual attributes (e.g. entrepreneurial ability) that simultaneously affect the impact 
outcome, attributing observed differences to credit gives biased impact estimates. 
 But even if pre-designed experimental or quasi-experimental designs that randomize 
over potential sources of selection are implemented, estimates based on one-shot observations 
may fall short of capturing the complete picture because longer periods may be required 
before the full effects from credit are realized (Karlan and Goldberg, 2007). A recent review 
of the evaluation literature emphasizes the issue of ‘timing and duration of exposure to 
programs’ is as important but relatively less studied than the identification problems that often 
attract much of researchers’ attention (King and Behrman, 2009). Long period data is, 
however, costly and largely unavailable. As a result, most studies so far (e.g., Coleman, 1999; 
Pitt and Khandker, 1998) exploited program specific designs and employed innovative quasi-
experimental survey methods to generate control and treatment groups from cross sectional 
data. A few exceptions are Khandker (2005), Copestake et al. (2005) and Tedeschi (2008) 
who used two-period data to estimate impacts. Long-term panel data, under certain 
conditions, allows to measure impact from intensity of participation over time by overcoming 
selection biases. An attractive feature of panel data is the possibility to deal with unobserved 
time-invariant individual and village heterogeneity using fixed-effects. However, when the 
selection processes is based on time-varying unobservables, such as individual motivation 
which is likely to change over time and borrowing status, standard panel data methods like 
fixed-effects and difference-in-difference are biased (Armendárize de Aghion and Morduch, 
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2005: 210). Other less frequently used panel data techniques such as random trend, and 
flexible random trend models offer alternative approaches to mitigate this problem by 
allowing an arbitrary correlation between time-invariant unobservables as well as individual 
trends in time-varying unobservables to program participation (Wooldridge, 2002: 317).  
This chapter uses unique four-round household survey data covering 1997-2006 to 
estimate the impact of participation in microfinance credit on annual household per capita 
consumption and housing improvements. The data comes from sixteen villages in northern 
Ethiopia. We first investigate the impact of credit using fixed-effects approaches that is 
standardly applied to account for time-invariant individual as well as village unobservables. 
Further, we use variants of the random trend model due to Heckman and Hotz (1989) that 
mitigates both time-invariant and individual trends in time-varying unobservables. We find 
that program credit has significant impact on household consumption and housing 
improvements of participants compared to non-participants. However, compared to the 
random trend approach, results from the standard fixed-effects approach that does not account 
for individual trends in time-varying unobservables overestimates credit impact. We also 
model program credit more flexibly by including the effect of loan-cycles and individual 
specific trends and find that credit impact on per capita consumption increases with frequency 
of borrowing. The effect of borrowing on the probability of housing improvement is realized 
after one-cycle but declines sooner after the third cycle borrowing. From the flexible approach, 
we conclude that borrowing effects last longer than one-period and cumulative effects are best 
captured the longer the time covered in the analysis. Besides, while household borrowing 
effects are multidimensional and cannot be captured by a single household outcome, we also 
conclude that effects on household outcomes are not monotonic over time. Impact estimates 
that do not account for such dynamic effects may therefore underestimate the effect of MFI 
borrowing. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a brief review of the 
main approaches followed in the literature on impact assessment. Section 5.3 describes the 
nature of the data and section 5.4 presents the empirical method used. Section 5.5 provides the 
estimation results and section 5.6 concludes. 
 
 
5.2 A review of microcredit impact studies  
 
This section presents a brief survey of the main methodological approaches of mitigating 
selection bias in microfinance impact evaluations.  
Measuring the impact of microcredit programs is a challenging task because establishing 
‘causality’ between credit effects and changes in the outcome of interest is complicated by the 
well known problems of self-selection and program placement biases that are inherent in such 
programs (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998). Self-selection is a problem because, compared to 
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non-participants, participants may already have initial advantages such as better 
entrepreneurial ability that can translate into higher outcome variables, even without credit. 
Using data from a Peruvian MFI, Tedeschi (2008) finds that “selection into credit programs is 
a substantial problem: those who will eventually become borrowers have significantly higher 
incomes than those who will not become borrowers”. The main challenge is therefore to 
address the counterfactual question ‘how would participants have performed in the absence of 
program credit or ‘how would non-participants have performed had they participated in the 
program’.  
MFIs may also design their credit programs to fit into specific villages or specific 
groups and screening may be based on criteria that influence outcomes of interest. Self-
selection and program placement decisions in principle do not pose problems if they are based 
on known and measurable variables, because then they can be easily controlled for 
empirically. The problem is however that these decisions are often based on unobservable 
variables. In the absence of “comparison” and “treatment” groups, credit impact assessments 
that do not account for these problems are likely to be biased (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005:200-223; Tedeschi, 2008).  
How microfinance impact studies have dealt with these problems varies. One strand of 
literature that is common among MFI practitioners simply compares existing clients 
(‘treatment group’) with new entrants (‘control group’). Although simple to implement, this 
method is criticized for attributing the mean difference between the two as impact without 
dealing with selection problems (Tedeschi, 2008).  
A second strand of literature that relies on cross sectional data deals with the selection 
problem employing instrumental variable and quasi-experimental techniques that exploit the 
nature and timing of program designs. One of the earliest and most cited studies in this line is 
by Pitt and Khandker (1998) who used cross-sectional data from Bangladesh and employed a 
quasi-experimental survey design to instrument nonrandom program placement and self-
selection. However, such instrumental and experimental designs are often coincidental and 
difficult to replicate. Moreover, these approaches assume that the initial conditions of control 
and experiment villages are identical. A final problem is often that it is difficult to come up 
with strong and valid instrumental variables. 
An ideal credit impact evaluation would have been one that compares effects with and 
without the program. A third approach that received considerable attention in recent 
microfinance evaluation is a pre-designed randomized experimental approach (Karlan and 
Goldberg, 2007). Experimental designs that randomize over observable and unobservable 
attributes of participants and non-participants would, in principle, provide unbiased estimates. 
Such designs are however time consuming and costly to undertake. Besides, it can be difficult 
to implement on ethical and political grounds (Heckman and Hotz, 1989).  
A fourth strand of recent literature uses panel data to mitigate the biases present in 
cross-sectional studies. Assuming strict exogeneity between selection variables and time-
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varying unobservables that could affect the outcome of interest, fixed effect panel data 
methods can provide consistent estimates by differencing out time-invariant unobserved 
individual and village effects (Wooldridge, 2002: 637). Khandker (2005), Copestake et al. 
(2005) and Tedeschi (2008) relied on this assumption and used a fixed-effects approach to 
analyze the impact of credit. The fixed-effects estimator is however critically dependent on 
this strict exogeneity assumption, particularly on the assumption that the time-invariant 
heterogeneity is the only potential source of selection bias. Literature in empirical labor 
economics that studies the effect of labor-training programs on earnings under nonrandom 
program assignment extends the evaluation literature by allowing for individual heterogeneity 
to vary over time according to a linear trend (Heckman and Hotz, 1989). This approach is 
used in this study and is explained in more detail in section 5.4. 
 
5.3 Brief description of the MFI, survey design and the data  
 
Data used in this study comes from rural households in northern Ethiopia where a 
microfinance program, Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI), provides financial 
services only for production purposes. Although DECSI, under the auspices of a local NGO, 
started providing credit services in few trial villages since 1994, it officially launched credit 
and saving programs in 1997 and expanded quickly into almost all villages in Tigray. By 
2000, it extended loans to 1.4 million rural households with total outstanding loans of 447 
million ETB and savings of 74 million ETB2. As of 2002, DECSI covered more than 91% of 
the villages in the region and extended to about half a million borrowers (Borchgrevink, et al., 
2003). Initially DECSI provided Grameen style joint liability based credit mostly used for 
farm inputs, which eventually diversified into micro and small enterprise loans and other off-
farm activities. Loans are extended once a year because production is largely monsoon rain 
dependent, and depending on activity, mature between 6-12 months.  
 
 
Table 5.1 Households’ participation and changes in borrowing status over survey years  
Number of times borrowed up to the survey year  
Survey year Never Once Twice Thrice Always 
1997 140 211 - - - 
2000 87 182 82 - - 
2003 61 143 112 35 - 
2006 40 102 130 46 33 
 
Source: Survey data (1997- 2006) 
                                                 
2 ETB stands for Ethiopian currency, ‘Birr’; (annual average) USD conversion rate of 6.32 ETB in 1997 
and  8.94 ETB in 2006. 
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In 2003, DECSI started individual loans packaged with some specific farming activities such 
as bee-keeping and milk production activities. Loan maturity in this latter loan product ranges 
between 1-2 years. In this study, participation in borrowing is defined as being in a borrowing 
relationship with DECSI in the year preceding the survey and no attempt is made to make a 
distinction between the different loan products provided.   
Four-rounds of surveys with three-year intervals (1997-2006) were administered on 
randomly selected 400 borrower and non-borrower rural households. The dataset covers 
household- and village-level information ranging from household characteristics, 
consumption, assets, credit and savings to village infrastructure, markets, and credit contracts. 
Asked about access to credit in 1997, only a few respondents indicated that they were 
ineligible to borrow mainly due to old age and physical unfitness, which DECSI implicitly 
considered as selection criteria3. These are excluded from our analysis. Respondent attrition 
was minimal, mostly related to the Ethio-Eritrea border war, which started in 1998 and ended 
in 2000. This chapter is thus based on a balanced panel of 351 households, out of which 211 
borrowed and 140 did not in the 1997 survey. Table 5.1 gives a summary of the evolution of 
borrowing status over time. Borrowing status changed in subsequent years with some 
households joining, while others dropped out. In general, there were 33 households that 
borrowed in all four periods and 40 that never did. The other households borrowed at least 
once in one of these years but also had years without a loan.  
An advantage in this data set to study impact is that the first survey coincided with the 
massive expansion of DECSI into most villages in the region, which gives the opportunity to 
identify impact using the 1997 as baseline information for both borrowers and non-borrowers. 
Moreover, due to the government’s as well as donors’ inherent interest to synchronize credit 
services with the regular input extension programs that was running through out the region, 
there is little reason to believe DECSI’s quick and massive branching out to villages has been 
systematic and endogenous to village outcomes. All residents were, in principle, eligible to 
branches available in the nearest rural town. E.g., credit was available for all in the most 
nearest-to-town villages as well as remote villages in 1997. However, households may have 
self-selected into credit and participation can be endogenous at individual level, which we 
explicitly tackle in the empirical analysis.  
Although credit is given for productive purposes (e.g. fertilizer, oxen), eventually this 
will lead to higher per capita consumption. Our survey interval of three years is considered as 
an advantage in this respect, since this higher consumption is expected to materialize in years 
after having experienced higher output due to increased input use made possible by borrowing.  
 
 
                                                 
3 We also test if there was no significant difference between participant and non-participant groups in the 
base year in terms of our outcome variables. 
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics of household per capita annual consumption and housing improvements  
                            Survey years 1997 2000 2003 2006 
Participants 211 135 126 160 
Annual per capita 
consumption 
    
             Mean  442    683   651     1422     
             Std. Dev. 523     503    371 1051 
Housing improvements     
            Mean  0.033     0.193     0.429     0.594     
            Std. Dev. 0.180 0.396 0.497 0.493   
     
Non-participants 140 216 225 191 
Annual per capita 
consumption 
    
            Mean  371    675 577       1087   
            Std. Dev. 215 543 496   715       
Housing improvements     
            Mean  0.027    0.042     0.102     0.115      
            Std. Dev. 0.167 0.200 0.304  0.320 
 
 
The time lag needed to translate borrowing into outcomes also strengthens the usefulness of 
the first- round survey as baseline information to identify impact. We measure credit impact 
on two welfare indicators in Tigray, i.e. annual household consumption and housing 
improvements. Household consumption is a continuous variable and housing improvement is 
a binary indicator. Households were asked if they had improved their roof to corrugated- sheet 
of iron anytime between the last and the present survey year. Household consumption is 
aggregated from food and nonfood consumption of selected items, both from own sources or 
purchased over a period of one year. Necessary adjustments are made to make measured items 
and units comparable over the survey years. A consumer price index for the region is used to 
adjust for price changes over time (Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, 2008). To 
minimize measurement error from age structure heterogeneities among households, per capita 
adult consumption is used. Summary statistics of indicators are presented in table 5.2. 
In general, compared to non-participants, an average participant enjoyed higher per 
capita consumption levels and more often improved her house in all years observed. Note 
however that average outcomes in table 5.2 are based on participation or non-participation 
status in each survey year, i.e., regardless of previous status. We take such contamination 
effects into account in our econometric modeling and estimation. Moreover, the table doesn’t 
indicate whether higher consumption and housing improvement can be ascribed to borrowing 
or whether they have increased due to other factors 
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5.4 Empirical Methodology  
 
In this section the origins of selection bias in estimating impact from long term panel data and 
the panel data techniques to control for it are discussed. Consider the following generic 
specification for program evaluation: 
 
 itiititit uMprogXC +++= αγβ        N,...2,1i;T...,2,1t ==  (1) 
 
where the outcome variable consumption, Cit for household i at time t, is determined by a 
vector of observable household-, village-, and MFI-level characteristics Xit, a binary program 
participation variable, progit (=1, if participated in borrowing at t, zero otherwise), and a 
vector Mi of time-invariant unobservable variables4. Borrowing in turn depends on a set of 
observable (Zit) and unobservable variables (Wit), i.e. itiitit vWZprog ++= φψ , where Zit can 
be contained in Xit. Selection bias arises when unobservables Wi and residuals vit determining 
borrowing, correlate with unobservables Mi and residuals uit affecting consumption. Or 
households that select themselves for borrowing may do so on the basis of unobservable 
characteristics that may also determine the outcomes consumption and housing improvement 
(Heckman and Hotz, 1989). This is a testable hypothesis from the first year survey and we 
follow Tedeschi (2008) to test whether or not the 1997 consumption and housing 
improvement outcomes for those who eventually become borrowers or those who always 
borrowed were statistically different from those who never borrowed: 
 
 iiiiiii BranchNewDropoutAlwaysXC εββββββ ++++++= 654321  (2) 
 
where X is a vector of household characteristics, the dummy variables Always, Dropout, and 
New provide the test against those that Never borrowed, and the dummy Branch is one if 
borrower knew there was a DECSI branch in the nearest town and instruments for bias due to 
branch assignment by the MFI5. If selection is indeed a problem the impact of borrowing on 
consumption or housing improvement cannot be consistently estimated from (1) by standard 
pooled OLS estimators. Panel data models with specifications that allow program 
participation decision to be correlated with unobservables affecting outcome variables provide 
unbiased impact estimates (Heckman and Hotz, 1989; Papke, 1994). Three such specifications, 
i.e. the standard fixed-effects model, the random trend model, and a flexible random trend 
model are elaborated below and used in our analysis.  
                                                 
4 We follow Wooldridge (2002:247) to use W and M to denote the ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ term is a 
random variable and not a parameter to be estimated and thus ignore φ and α  in subsequent discussions. 
5 We assume the further away a branch was located from a village in 1997, the less known it would be for 
villagers. 
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The standard fixed-effects estimator provides a consistent estimate of the borrowing 
parameter, γ, under the assumption that all unobservables that influence the outcome of 
interest are time-invariant, since these unobservables are removed by a within or first-
difference transformation (Wooldridge, 2002: 252). If such individual-specific unobservables 
change however over time, which may happen for various reasons, the estimate for γ is still 
biased. In our setting, there are two such potential reasons. First, unobserved negative 
economic shocks affecting households’ input endowments may pressurize households for 
input-bridging borrowings or repeat-borrowings to settle earlier debts. Anecdotal evidence 
from our sample villages indicate that households indeed resort to microfinance borrowings 
after experiencing a negative shock. Moreover, some repeat-borrowings may follow failure on 
an earlier one. Second, as argued earlier, credit may have lasting effects on unobservables on 
which selection is based. E.g. unobserved household characteristics such as entrepreneurial 
abilities, which may condition credit demand, may change over time depending on previous 
exposure to microfinance credit. Under these conditions, a more robust specification is 
required to remedy bias in the parameter estimates of interest.  
A more robust specification due to Heckman and Hotz (1989)- the individual-specific 
trend model- allows both household specific time-invariant unobservables and individual 
trends of time-varying unobservables to correlate with program participation (Wooldridge, 
2002: 315). This model, also used by Papke (1994) to study the effect of nonrandom 
enterprise zone designation on unemployment and investment, is specified as: 
 
itiiititit utgMprogXC ++++= αγβ   (3)   
 
where gi is an individual trend parameter, which in addition to the level effect Mi, captures 
individual-specific growth rates over time. A consistent estimate for γ , viz. the treatment 
effect of borrowing, can be obtained by wiping out the time-varying unobservables and the 
trend in time-invariant unobservables that can potentially bias γ  (Wooldridge, 2002: 315). 
First, eq. (3) is first-differenced to eliminate Mi, which gives a standard fixed-effects model: 
 
itiititit u~g~g~proX
~C~ +++= γβ                  t=1,2,…,T (4) 
 
where 1ititit CCC
~
−−= , 1ititit XXX~ −−= , 1ititit uuu~ −−=  and )1t(gtgg~ iii −−= . Second, eq. (4) 
is consistently estimated using a standard fixed-effects approach, i.e. using a within 
transformation or by differencing the equation (again) to eliminate gi and then estimate by 
OLS. The latter is preferred if uit after the first differencing cannot be assumed white noise but 
at the cost of losing one period information in each transformation (Wooldridge, 2002: 316). 
Note that γ can be estimated consistently from this specification only if T > 3. In short panels 
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like ours, it may be reasonable to assume uit to be serially uncorrelated after first-differencing. 
However, using a second differencing transformation has an extra advantage of not assuming 
homoskedasticity of the first-difference of uit (Wooldridge, 2002:316). We therefore second-
difference eq. (4) and estimate by pooled OLS.  
Although we only have four rounds of panel data, still our data covers a period of ten 
years. An advantage of panel data covering a longer period is that it enables to estimate the 
impact from long-term rather than one-shot program participation. Repeated participation may, 
in addition to shifting the levels in each borrowing year, affect the rate of change of the 
outcome variables relative to nonparticipation. Following Papke (1994) and Friedberg (1998), 
we account for this by including progit·t in eq. (4):  
 
 itiiit2it1itit utgMtprogprogXC +++⋅++= αγγβ  (5) 
 
This specification provides impact estimates robust to random periodical changes by allowing 
the individual-specific trend to vary on participation over time. Estimation follows the same 
procedures as in eq. (4).  
The specifications in (3) and (5) however impose the restriction that each successive 
loan-cycle’s borrowings have uniform effects as their preceding borrowing. Initial borrowings 
may however entail lasting effects on incentives as well as on consumption levels, which alter 
the scale of the effects of borrowings later. A more flexible specification suggested by 
Wooldridge (2002: 317) allows program indicators to reflect the frequency of participation in 
each possible participation year as presented in table 5.1. This is done by replacing progit and 
progit.t in eq. (5) with a series of program indicators for each loan-cycle the participant has 
been in the program: 
 
itiiitkit1itit uMtgprogk,...,1progXC ++++++= αγγβ  (6) 
 
where progjit =1 if household i has been in the program for exactly j years in year t and zero 
otherwise; k is the maximum number of (observed) years a household can be in the program. 
Program indicators attach more weights to differences between households’ degree of 
participation regardless of year of participation. More weights are also given to the timing of 
participation within each indicator 6 . As before, eq. (6) is first-differenced and then 
transformed again by a within or another difference procedure. 
Finally, note that since one of our outcome variables, i.e. housing improvement, is a 
binary indicator, the model is basically a limited dependent with binary regressor of the type 
                                                 
6 E.g., for household i and j that borrowed twice each, but i borrowed in the first two years and j borrowed 
in the last two years, the model attaches the same weights for both i and j (i.e., prog1 =1 and prog2 = 1, for 
i and j, i ≠ j). However, in the within observations, prog2 gives more weight to i (i will have more ones in 
prog2) than to j. 
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discussed in Angrist (2001). Binary choice models with panel data are problematic to estimate 
due to the incidental parameter problem. Angrist (2001) emphasizes rather than imposing 
distributional assumptions which may complicate estimation and yield inconsistent estimates, 
a simpler estimator such as the linear probability model (LPM) is attractive and consistent for 
answering the question of interest, mainly estimating the effect of binary regressor in models 
with limited dependent variables. Thus, we stick to the simple LPM specification, which also 
provides an estimate conveniently interpreted as effect on the mean of the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2002: 454-457). 
 
 
5.5 Estimation results 
 
In this section estimation results from the models outlined in section 5.4 are provided. 
Selection bias test results are first presented. The test is carried out by estimating eq. (2) using 
OLS for the 1997 consumption expenditure outcome and using a logit model for the 1997 
binary housing improvement outcome. The null hypothesis that all parameters of interest are 
simultaneously equal to zero is rejected by the F-statistic test at 1 per cent significance level 
for both the OLS and logit models, indicating that both fit the data set well. Results are given 
in table 5A.1, appendix 5A. 
The most important test results are given by the parameter estimates for Branch, New 
and Always. First, in both models, the insignificance of the proxy for DECSI branch in 1997 
suggests that there is no bias due to program placement. Second, the hypothesis that New is 
different from zero is also rejected at acceptable significance level in both models, but the 
same hypothesis cannot be rejected for Always at 10 per cent significance level in the 
consumption expenditure model. Thus, controlling for dropouts, we cannot confirm those who 
will eventually become borrowers in 2000 had higher consumption levels than those who 
never did. However, we find evidence that those who always borrowed had consumption 
levels higher than those who never borrowed. Thus, our analysis here after must account for 
potential bias due to self selection but not due to program placement.  
The basic model given in eq. (1) is estimated by the standard fixed-effects estimator 
where instead of a binary participation variable, the number of years the household has been 
in a borrowing relationship is used to account for the degree of participation as suggested by 
Copestake et al., (2001). Since we are primarily interested in credit impact estimates, only 
household observables that may systematically correlate with selection even after controlling 
for effects of time-invariant unobservables are included. One implicit borrower screening 
criteria of DECSI is household head age. Besides, as household heads become older, they 
self-select out of borrowing activities. Since most household variables collected are time-
invariant we included only time-varying variables that may be systematically correlated to 
participation, mainly, land size and its square, gender of household head, household head’s 
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age and its square as other explanatory variables related to selection into the program. 
Although land is state owned in Ethiopia, farmers are given user rights. ‘Ownership’ of land 
and size cultivated therefore determines amount of input use, including credit. A year dummy 
(equal to 1 for 2006, zero otherwise) is included to contrast the relatively stable and good 
harvest year 2006 to the earlier years that are characterized by adverse conditions such as war 
and drought. That 2006 was a very good year is also reflected in table 5.2 that shows that 
average deflated consumption in that year was much higher. Note that household head’s 
gender and skills are time variant. This specification is similar to Tedeschi’s (2008) fixed-
effect model except that our specification considers the cumulative effect of several loan-
cycles as compared to ‘number of participation days’ used in the former paper. Results are 
reported in table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Household fixed-effects estimates of the impact of credit  
 
Dependent variables 
Per capita annual household 
consumption 
Housing improvements 
Number of (observed) years 
borrowed  
414.665*** 
(27.584)     
0.273*** 
   (0.015) 
Women headed household 61.058  
   (51.853) 
-0.038 
   (0.028) 
Additional skills other than farming  62.136 
   (60.823) 
0.039 
   (0.033) 
Year 2006 dummy 264.098***  
 (38.227) 
-0.012 
    (0.021) 
Age of household head 10.216 
  (9.597) 
0.004 
   (0.005)   
Age-squared -0.059 
   (0.090) 
-0.628×10-4 
   (0.491×10-4) 
Cultivated land size 
(in Tsimad = 0.25hectare) 
-11.735 
   (9.378) 
-0.002 
   (0.005) 
Land size-squared  
 
0.066 
   (0.295) 
-0.139×10-3 
   (0.162×10-3) 
Intercept -289.897 
   (246.768) 
-0.168 
   (0.135) 
Within R-squared 0.215 0.257 
 F (8, 1045)  35.77*** 45.250*** 
Household fixed-effects Jointly significant*** Jointly insignificant 
Number of observations 1404     1404 
*, ** ,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; Standard errors in parentheses 
The F-statistics (at 1 per cent significance level) indicate that for both household consumption and housing 
improvement models all parameters are not all jointly equals to zero.  
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Based on the fixed-effects estimation, credit has a significant positive effect on annual 
household consumption expenditure and housing improvements of borrowers compared to 
non-borrowers. After controlling for potential selection on unobservable fixed-effects, 
household per capita consumption for an average borrower household has increased by ETB 
415 for each additional borrowing year. Moreover, the probability of improving the house 
increases on average by 0.27 per year of credit taken. Note that the parameter for the 2006 
dummy is also statistically highly significant in the consumption equation, indicating 
differential impacts on participants and non-participants due to aggregate macroeconomic 
variability, which also includes specific events which may have occurred due to aggregate 
effects (e.g., death of livestock due to drought and death of key labor in the household due to 
war). Compared to non-participants, participants have seen ETB 264 more consumption in the 
good year 2006. 
The individual household heterogeneity not picked up by the variables included is 
captured in the fixed-effects parameter. For the household consumption model there is 
evidence for household heterogeneity given the significance of the fixed-effects. This is not 
however the case for the housing improvement model, suggesting for a pooled estimation. 
Estimating it by pooled regression also provides qualitatively the same results as the fixed-
effects results. Note that the FE within procedure also has the benefit of removing potential 
selection bias due to time-invariant unobservables. As indicated in section 5.4, error terms 
may correlate due to selection based on time- varying individual-specific unobservables. In 
that case the individual trend model as specified in eq. (3) is more robust than the standard FE 
model since it allows selection to be based not only on individual averages of unobservables 
(i.e., fixed-effects) but also on individual-specific unobservable trends. This model is 
estimated by OLS after differencing twice to eliminate the trend component. This is done for 
both consumption and housing improvement outcomes. Since results for the housing 
improvement model are very similar to the fixed-effects results presented in table 5.3 they are 
not reported here. Results for household consumption are reported in the first column of table 
5.4.  
In general, removing individual-specific unobserved dynamics by including an 
individual trend and differencing the data twice provides more conservative results. 
Specifically, according to this individual-specific trend specification, per capita annual 
consumption increases by ETB 199 per year of credit taken. This result is statistically 
significant and credit impact is substantially reduced (by a more than 50 percent a year) 
compared to the fixed-effects result. This difference is the bias in the standard fixed-effects 
result due to time-varying individual dynamics. Consistent results are obtained when the same 
specification is estimated by fixed-effects after first-difference.  
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Table 5.4 Household specific trend model results of credit impact on per capita annual 
consumption  
 
 
Variables 
 
Individual trend 
model 
Individual trend model, 
and trend based on 
participation 
Number of (observed) years in 
borrowing 
  199.317** 
   (77.065)      
160.738** 
 (79.016) 
Random trend *borrowing participation   
   - 
33.858** 
(16.043) 
Year 2006 dummy 323.439***  
  (32.594) 
                324.497*** 
                 (32.517) 
Age of household  head  2.003 
   (9.428) 
                    1.632 
                   (9.407) 
Age-squared -0.022 
   (0.089) 
                   -0.017 
                   (0.089) 
Cultivated land size 
(in Tsimad = 0.25 hectares) 
-0.496 
   (13.249) 
                   -1.739 
                 (13.229) 
Land size-squared  0.139 
   (0.463) 
                    0.193 
                   (0.462) 
Intercept -130.553 
(88.088) 
               -113.738 
                 (88.230) 
R-squared      0.164                     0.169 
F (6, 695); F (7, 694) 22.640*** 20.14*** 
Number of  obs. 702               702 
*, ** ,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; standard errors in parentheses 
 
After the first-difference, the fixed-effects error component is however jointly insignificant 
favoring estimation by pooled OLS. Second-differencing eliminates the trend and provide 
results more robust to second-order serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
A variant of the individual-specific trend model given in eq. (5) allows individual 
household consumption not just to vary at different trends but also allows borrowing effects 
to depend on these unobserved individual-specific trends. Note that in this case, trend is 
interacted with participation (progit) indicator and not with ‘number of years in borrowing’. 
Results are reported in column 2 of table 5.4. The credit effect estimate is both quantitatively 
as well as qualitatively consistent to the results in column 1 in table 5.4, but again more 
conservative than the standard fixed-effects estimate. After controlling for both time-invariant 
and time-varying selection bias, each borrowing cycle increases per capita consumption by 
ETB 161 directly and by ETB 34 indirectly (by changing other unobserved time-varying 
individual characteristics).  
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Table 5.5 Result of flexible random trend model with participation indicators  
Dependent variables Household per capita 
annual consumption 
 
Housing improvements 
One year borrowing 273.936**   (107.526)  -0.004        (0.075) 
Two years borrowing 319.132**    (137.706) 0.244**     (0.097) 
Three years borrowing 310.697         (213.204) 0.555***   (0.149) 
Four years borrowing 665.024**     (337.707) 0.457*        (0.237) 
Year 2006 dummy 326.079***     (31.954) -0.019          (0.022) 
Age of household head  2.578             (9.432) -0.007          (0.007) 
Age-squared -0.027            (0.089)     0.531×10-4      (0.623×10-4) 
Cultivated land size 
(in Tsimad = 0.25hectare) 
-0.887           (13.250) -0.004          (0.009) 
Land size-squared  0.175             (0.463) -0.159×10-3     (0.3245×10-3) 
Intercept 16.268           (70.153) -0.017          (0.049) 
R-squared 0.170 0.044 
F(9, 692) 15.76*** 3.560*** 
Number of  obs.        702  702 
*, ** ,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Thus, after accounting for selection biases, credit has been responsible not just to change the 
levels but also the rate at which yearly per capita consumption grew for an average borrowing 
household in the ten years considered. Note that other results are also consistent across the 
two specifications presented in table 5.4. A consistently significant negative intercept in both 
specifications captures a general consumption decline trends not captured by our aggregate 
shock variable. The results in table 5.4 provide interesting insights into how effective 
microfinance can be for households trying to extricate themselves from poverty in those 
villages, other factors remaining the same, by keeping their relationship with the MFI.  
Important follow-up questions from a policy point of view are whether impact can be 
associated to the extent of repeat-borrowing. This is analyzed using the flexible individual-
specific trend model given in eq. (6), which assigns indicators for the number of times each 
household has been involved in borrowing. Results are given in table 5.5. Again, the double 
differencing estimation procedure reduces the potential of selection bias to a minimum. 
Results show once more that borrowing has a significant impact on (future) consumption, but 
interestingly enough the magnitude of impact substantially increases with the increase in the 
length of relationship with the MFI. Specifically, compared to non-participants and other 
participants, per capita consumption has significantly increased by ETB 274 for one year 
participants and by ETB 319 for two year participants (which for them adds to the first year 
effect of ETB 274). The effect is (slightly) statistically insignificant for three year participants 
(p-value 0.145). Since for most three year participation the third cycle coincided with the 
occurrence of one of worst droughts the country has seen, the effect seems to have been 
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neutralized by the overall drastic consumption shortfall for participants and non-participants 
alike. However, having participated in the previous three years has had an inertia effect for 
four year participation such that per capita consumption has increased substantially (by ETB 
665) only for households that participated in all four cycles. It means that while the 
cumulative effect of the pre-shock participation might have slightly helped to overcome 
consumption shortfalls for participants compared to non-participants, those that participated 
for four years, including after the shock, have benefited substantially in terms of per capita 
consumption increases. For the housing improvement model, the probability of improving the 
house has significantly increased after the second round borrowing and raises up to 0.244 if 
households borrowed for two periods, 0.555 if borrowed for three periods and 0.457 if 
borrowed in all periods. The relatively lower effect in the case of borrowing in ‘all periods’ 
would not be surprising as households eventually shift attention from improving their houses 
to other activities.   
Compared to the average impact on the participant obtained from the individual-specific 
trend model, this finding supports the lasting impact of credit over time by uncovering the 
specific impacts on each cohort of participants. Thus, while the impact of one time borrowing 
is close to the average impact previously obtained, it also uncovers having borrowed three and 
four times leads to even higher increases in consumption and probability of house 
improvements. Such high percentage increases attributed to credit is not surprising given the 
importance of credit at such marginally low initial conditions (e.g. initial average per capita 
consumption is ETB 442 for participants and ETB 371 for non-participants) and the relatively 
long period covered in which 8-11 per cent GDP growth was registered in the country.     
 
 
5.6 Conclusions  
 
Impact evaluations are often prone to self-selection and program placement biases. This 
chapter uses panel data techniques to deal with these potential selection biases. Standard fixed 
effect models mitigate selection based on time-invariant unobservables, whereas the more 
advanced random trend model also account for individual trends in time-varying 
unobservables. The dataset used is a unique four-round panel data set among households in 
Tigray, Ethiopia that covers a period of ten years, so that lasting effects of credit can be 
established.  
The analysis started with tests of program placement and self-selection biases. While 
there was no indication of bias due to systematic program placement, the data did not confirm 
absence of bias due to self-selection. The analysis therefore accounts for any potential 
selection bias. Results indicate that microfinance credit significantly raised annual per capita 
household consumption. It also significantly raised the probability of improving housing 
(roofs), which is an important welfare indicator in this area. The random trend model with 
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flexible participation indicators, which considers frequency of participation, shows that per 
capita household consumption (except in the bad year 2003) and probability of improving the 
house substantially increased with the frequency of participation. One time borrowing has no 
impact on housing improvements but significant improvements in per capita consumption, 
which is plausible at such early stages of livelihood changes for households in those marginal 
areas. Repeat-borrowing did matter in both cases however, but with a slight decline of the 
probability of housing improvements for household that borrowed frequently.  
These findings have both substantive as well as methodological significance. First, they 
reflect the effect of credit on livelihoods is multi dimensional and cannot be fully captured by 
just a single household outcome. Moreover, the effect is not monotonically the same over 
time on all livelihood indicators used to measure impact. Second, it is also imperative that the 
effect of borrowing lasts longer than one or two periods. It therefore takes time before the 
effect of borrowing on livelihoods is fully materialized. Methodologically, impact estimates 
that rely on a single household indicator and only one-cycle of borrowing may undermine the 
potentials of microfinance credit on overall livelihoods that could be achieved over time. 
Future research must focus on more robust specifications that incorporate temporal as well as 
multidimensional effects of credit on livelihoods. 
The implication for MFI practitioners such as DECSI is that eligible households should 
not only be encouraged to borrow, but also, if successful, to stay longer in a borrowing 
relationship in order to realize the full potentials of borrowing. As such, early graduation 
from microfinance (in our case, as early as before ten years) might be pre-mature in terms of 
achieving the required goal of eradicating poverty and careful weighing is necessary before 
graduation takes place. The flexible specification results also suggest that those that were able 
to continue borrowing even after a major shock in 2003 have seen even higher consumption 
levels after that shock. This implies that rescheduling repayment so as to provide, rather than 
deny, access to future borrowing after a shock may help poor borrowers to bridge their 
consumption and regain economic normalcy after a shock. Finally, although the results of the 
fixed-effect and trend models deviate somewhat, due to different assumptions, specifications 
and estimation techniques, they all strongly suggest that microfinance in this part of Africa 
has been useful in terms of measured outcomes.      
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Appendix 5A. 
 
Table 5A.1 Test results for selection bias using base year data 
Variables  Per capita  
Consumption expenditure♣ 
 
Housing improvements† 
Intercept  312.295         (499.573) -9.894*   (4.568) 
Household characteristics   
Age of household head    55.171***      (19.222)  0.227      (0.161) 
Age-squared    -0.551***         (0.179) -0.002      (0.002) 
Women headed (yes=1) -707.499***    (113.386)  1.934*    (0.995) 
Special skills other than farming (yes=1)  388.856          (281.885)  1.325      (1.102) 
Household head’s education (literate=1)  411.233          (268.719) -0.020      (0.994) 
Number of oxen owned    53.220            (56.508)  0.521      (0.460) 
Per capita land size owned  431.512*        (212.639) -3.851      (2.330) 
Shock occurred (yes =1) -206.042*       (100.323)  0.378      (0.755) 
Village characteristics   
Micro dam available (yes=1)  229.822*        (125.988)  0.163      (0.652) 
Village is remote (yes=1) -237.003*       (103.117) -0.270      (0.837) 
Borrowing status   
Always  249.392*        (142.423)  1.505      (1.107) 
Dropout (in 2000)  191.481          (126.477)  0.024      (1.089) 
New (in 2000)   -91.490          (124.259)  0.859      (1.132) 
Knew branch was available in nearest 
town (yes=1) 
   77.345          (110.607)  0.359      (0.720) 
R-squared; Pseudo R-squared 1912   0.150 
F(14, 336); Wald χ2 (14)       7.80***  70.370*** 
Sample size   351 351 
♣ OLS estimates; †Logit estimates; *, ** ,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; Robust-std. 
errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
ASSESSING LONG-TERM CREDIT IMPACTS FROM THE TIMING OF 
PARTICIPATION IN MICROFINANCE1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter uses the concept of composite future counterfactuals to assess the 
long-term impact of farm households’ participation in microcredit. A four wave panel data 
spanning over ten years for credit-eligible rural households in Ethiopia is used to assess 
impact of (timing of) participation on consumption. New in this method is that only 
households that did not participate up to the time of participation are considered as 
candidates for controls. Further, to account for counterfactuals between timing of 
participation and outcome measurement period in a panel data setting where only the 
outcome variable is time-varying, potential future paths of individuals in the control group 
are considered. The propensity score method is used to adjust for initial differences between 
participants and controls. The combined methodological innovation enables us to overcome 
biases due to selection as well as problems of accounting for dropouts and new participants 
inherent in microfinance impact assessments. Results suggest that the timing of participation 
matters: the earlier the participation the better the effect. Results are robust compared to 
standard matched pair wise effects. Such comparisons suggest that not accounting for future 
counterfactuals, for the most part, overestimate impact.   
 
Key words: microfinance, impact, dropouts, composite counterfactuals, Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Paper by Guush Berhane and Cornelis Gardebroek submitted to Journal of Development Studies. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, microfinance is seen as a beacon of hope to help eradicate poverty and has 
been at the center of policy making in many developing countries. A central element in 
microfinance is providing small but progressively larger and repeated loans to those that lack 
the required collateral to access conventional lenders. Loans are expected to help lift 
borrowers out of vulnerability and poverty over time. In the case of Ethiopia, repeated loans 
are primarily intended to bridge short term working capital requirements so as to gradually 
build assets and improve the ability to mitigate aggregate shocks. If successful, such loans 
would eventually trickle down into measurable welfare gains such as increases in 
consumption (e.g., Menon, 2006), or reducing vulnerability to economic hardships (Morduch, 
1998). Nevertheless, many years since these programs are in operation, questions still remain 
if and to what extent these successive loans have been successful in achieving their intended 
goals.  
Existing studies focus on evaluating before and after effects, regardless of the timing of 
participation and dynamics between participation and outcome measurement periods2. There 
are however differences among target households when it comes to benefiting from 
availability of credit. One major difference is that not all targeted households start to use 
credit at the same time and in the same intensity (Berhane and Gardebroek, 2009). For some 
reasons, some join earlier than others; still some remain members for long time while others 
dropout quickly. As a result, the effect of microfinance credit varies across different client 
pools and therefore evaluating the trickled down effects of credit requires measuring the 
relative impacts across these pools (Karlan and Goldberg, 2007). The aim of this chapter is to 
evaluate the long-term impacts of MFI credit by overcoming heterogeneities across periodical 
participant pools. Of particular interest is whether and how differences in the timing (e.g., 
early versus late participation) of participation impacted livelihoods, particularly in the face of 
economic distresses such as droughts, after accounting for pre- and post-entry differences. 
This provides an insight into how Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) can improve the design 
and timing of their loan products given heterogeneities in entry and loyalty of target clients 
(Karlan and Goldberg, 2007).   
Evaluating such effects is however an arduous task not only because pertinent data 
spanning over sufficiently long periods is scarce but also because obtaining an appropriate 
‘control group’ to identify effects over time given heterogeneities due to the timing of 
participation is difficult (Karlan, 2001). Microfinance impact studies thus far have focused on 
either experimental (e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 2007) or quasi-experimental cross-sectional 
designs (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Coleman, 1999), or classic two-period panel data 
fixed-effects methods (e.g., Tedeschi, 2008) to investigate causal credit effects. Cross-
                                                 
2 A recent study emphasizes the issue of timing in evaluations is “as important but relatively understudied” 
(King and Berhrman, 2009).  
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sectional designs are useful to tease out biases due to individual borrower as well as MFI (e.g., 
program placement) selection characteristics inherent in such programs. They however lack 
the time-dimension required to capture lasting credit effects. King and Behrman (2009) 
emphasize the duration and timing of evaluation matter in program impact assessments. 
Likewise, although the classical fixed-effects method captures long-term effects when panel 
data is available, it has fundamental flaws when applied to repeated observations that go 
beyond the classic two-period case. First, in the case of dichotomous treatment, fixed-effects 
model works on the condition that individuals change treatment status (i.e., assumes treatment 
status is reversible) across time (Wooldridge, 2002:637-38). However, reversibility of 
treatment status means that impact estimates are biased because dropouts from previous 
borrowings are included in the control group (contamination-effect) and excluded from the 
treated group (attrition-effect). An appropriate impact assessment includes dropouts in the 
comparison group and the control group includes only untreated individuals (Karlan, 2001). 
Second, in time-varying treatments with more than two-period observations, counterfactuals 
need to account for potential future paths of individuals in the control group (Brand and Xie, 
2007). The fixed-effects method simply compares participants and non-participants pair wise 
and does not account for such future paths.  
The classical parametric evaluation literature is thus silent about these effects and time 
dimensions in treatments except that agents are exposed to one of two possible conditions of 
the treatment at a given time and outcomes are measured subsequent to exposure (Brand and 
Xie, 2007). Owing to the difficulty of establishing appropriate counterfactuals when both the 
treatment and outcome variables are time-varying, long-term impact evaluations in many 
applications remain challenging even when panel data is available. Recent developments in 
nonparametric methods offer alternative ways to handle such identification problems. A body 
of literature in epidemiology (e.g., Robins, Hernan, and Brumback, 2000) and sociology 
(Brand and Xie, 2007) exploits the conceptual apparatus of the ‘potential outcome approach’ 
in experimental causal inference and extends it to non-experimental panel data. The strategy 
involves establishing a composite of ‘forward-looking composite counterfactuals’ for each 
group in each loan-cycle, considering participation as an irreversible treatment. These 
composite counterfactuals combine weighted averages of those who will borrow later between 
the treatment and the outcome measurement period and those who will never borrow by the 
end of the outcome measurement periods. This alternative method is used in this chapter to 
overcome the difficulty of identifying credit impact from a four-wave panel data that covers 
ten years. The data comes from (non-) borrower households of a rural microfinance in Tigray, 
northern Ethiopia. 
Results indicate that compared to later participants, early participants are better off even 
after accounting for initial as well as future counterfactuals. Comparative results show that not 
accounting for future counterfactuals overestimate impact. It also suggests that the timing of 
participation matters when it comes to the capacities credit provides to overcome economic 
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distresses: the earlier the better. The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, we 
measure credit impact from long-term panel data accounting for counterfactuals in future 
pathways, reducing biases due to dropouts and time dimension. This contrasts with 
conventional methods that compare participants and non-participants pair wise. Second, the 
propensity score matching method is used to establish appropriate controls for participant 
groups in each period. Although this non-parametric method is not new, we believe, applying 
it to panel data to establish causality from sequential counterfactuals adds a new dimension to 
microfinance impact evaluations. Third, this chapter provides additional evidence on selection 
bias, mainly due to the timing of decision to participate and changes in the composition of 
participants and non-participant, and underlines the danger of employing parametric impact 
assessments that naively compare participants and non-participants pair wise. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. By way of describing the structure of the 
data set used, section 6.2 discusses the challenges to identify impact using conventional 
methods in time-varying settings. Section 6.3 introduces the concept of ‘forward-looking 
composite counterfactuals’. The techniques to overcome identification problems using this 
concept and its empirical implementation in this chapter are discussed. Section 6.4 presents 
and discusses the results. Section 6.5 concludes. 
 
 
6.2  Estimating long-term impacts of periodical participation in microfinance 
credit   
 
The main objective of this chapter is to assess the long-term impact of credit with periodical 
participation of households, which in more than two-period panel data setting involve 
identification problems due to differences in the timing of first-time participation. Before 
proceeding to discuss why these heterogeneities cause identification problems, it is essential 
to elaborate on the dynamics of participation using the structure of the data set at hand. 
Therefore, section 6.2.1 presents the data set structure and section 6.2.2 discusses the 
challenges of identifying credit impact using conventional methods in more than the classic 
two-period settings. An alternative method proposed by Brand and Xie (2007) that exploits 
the timing of treatment and outcome measurement to mitigate these identification problems is 
discussed in section 6.3.  
 
 
6.2.1 The structure of the data set used 
 
Panel data used in this chapter comes from farm households in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, 
whose livelihoods largely depend on rainfall based agriculture where production is only once 
a year. Data was collected during 1997-2006, in four-waves with a three-year interval.  
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Table 6.1 Summary statistics of yearly household consumption expenditure and other variables used in 
the propensity score matching Method. 
 
Variable name Mean Std.dev.
 
Min  Max 
Participation in program credit 0.450 0.498 0 1
Annual household consumption expenditure 3514 4271 229.82  72064
Family size 5.282  2.352 2  13
Male-headed (yes=1) 0.244 0.429 0 1
MFI Branch office close enough (yes=1) 0.762 0.426 0 1
Poorer village (yes=1) 0.239 0.427 0 1
Age of household head 52.875 14.852 19 92
Size of land owned (in tsimad=0.25 ha.) 4.408  3.835 0.25 10.5
Non-farm income dummy 0.742 0.438 0 1
Participation in extension programs (yes =1) 0.165 0.371 0 1
Micro-dam availability 0.514 0.499 0 1
 
Sample households include participants and non-participants of the Dedebit Credit and Saving  
Institution (DECSI), a MFI that provides credit services in the Tigray region of Ethiopia since 
1994. First on trial basis in selected villages, but since 1997 it is present in almost all villages. 
The official launch coincided with the first wave of this study. Respondent households were 
selected using a multi-level sampling procedure. First, 16 villages were selected to represent 
regional differences, including access to credit. Second, 25 households were randomly 
selected from each village. Of the total 400 households, 351 are included in the analysis, a 
total of 1404 observations for the balanced four-year panel. The remaining were excluded 
because they either became non-targets (outliers) over time, mainly due to old age or dropped 
out from the survey. Respondents were surveyed on several household- (e.g., annual 
consumption levels, participation in MFI credit), village- (whether or not village had access to 
basic infrastructure) and MFI-level (e.g., ease of access to MFI credit) characteristics. 
Expenditure values (in local prices) on major household (food and non-food) consumption 
items were collected. Table 6.1 provides summary statistics of annual household expenditure 
and other variables used in the analysis.  
An important issue in this data set for empirical identification is that households joined 
the MFI at different times during the survey. Of the sample households, 211 participated early 
(in 1997), while many others joined in later years. So, participation status of members 
fluctuated over the years. Some members dropped out after participating only once and others 
continued up to four times. Figure 6.1 presents the number (in parentheses), proportion and 
frequency of participation in each year. The fact that households switched their status over the 
survey years makes it possible to apply conventional (e.g., fixed-effects) methods to estimate 
the impact of participation. However, as will be made clear in section 6.2.2, these switches 
also make it difficult to establish appropriate controls for participants in each year.   
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6.2.2 Problems of identifying credit impact in long panels with periodical 
participation  
 
A straightforward method to estimate impact of periodical participation would have been to 
exploit the panel nature of the data and use the fixed-effects method. This method uses the 
time-varying nature of the treatment variable (i.e., participation) across observation periods to 
identify impact pair wise. Particularly, it exploits the fact that units change their treatment 
status across observation periods (Chamberlain, 1984: 1247-1317). In the case of borrowing, 
such status changes involve two-way transitions of members between participation and non-
participation status over time, which essentially assumes reversibility of the treatment. In 
other words, when previous borrowers dropout at some point, they become part of the control 
group as if their previous participation does not have an effect on their outcome. Moreover, 
the fixed-effects method does not use variations of households that do not change status (i.e., 
always participants and never participants) in explaining outcome variables.  
There are therefore three types of biases that arise in using standard parametric methods, 
such as the fixed-effects method, in panel datasets of more than two periods with 
dichotomous treatment as in our setting. First, not all participant households have become 
members of the MFI at the same time. For some reasons, some have joined earlier than others 
(see Figure 6.1). In other words, there are heterogeneities among the four new participant 
groups due to the timing of participation. One reason is that selection criteria by both the 
Year
 
Note: number of participants in parentheses, t = participation period, v = outcome measurement period, 
p=transition probabilities 
Non-borrowers 
(140), p =0.40 
New (211), 
p=0.60  
New (53), p=0.38
Once (143) 
Twice (112) 
Three times  (35) 
Once (102) 
Twice (130)  
Three times (46) 
Four times (33) 
Non-borrowers 
  (87), p=0.62 
Non-borrowers 
  (61), p=0.70 
Non-borrowers 
  (40), p=0.66 
    2000 
( t=2, v=2) 
   2003 
(t=3, v=3) 
    2006 
( t=4, v=4) 
    1997 
(t=1, v=1) 
Once  (129) 
Twice (82) 
New (21) p=0.34 New (26), p=0.30 
Figure 6.1. Borrowing participation transition of sample households, 1997-2006  
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MFIs and participants might have changed over time (Tedeschi and Karlan, forthcoming). 
Moreover, even the degree of participation over the years varies across members; some have 
continued to participate while others have dropped out. Second, estimates are biased if 
dropping out is non-random (Karlan, 2001)3, i.e. if dropouts are those who became worse off 
or better off due to the program. Third, since they were once in the treated (participant) group, 
dropouts may contaminate the control group carrying over the effect of the treatment to the 
control group, particularly when the effect of the treatment lasts longer than the treatment 
period as in borrowing used to acquire durable inputs, e.g., oxen or draft animals. Thus, 
although long-term panels can be advantageous to capture long-term impacts in many 
applications, in this particular application the use of such periodical participation and the 
resulting two-way transition yields biased estimates. As such, partly owing to these problems, 
most credit impact assessments are limited either to the two-period classic panel data methods 
or quasi-experimental cross-sectional methods that compare ever-participants to never-
participants on pooled data.  
 
 
6.3 Empirical method 
 
This section presents an alternative empirical method that overcomes the challenges of 
identifying impact of periodical participation in credit discussed in section 6.2.2. Section 6.3.1 
briefly introduces a method proposed by Brand and Xie (2007) and its implementation. 
Section 6.3.2 discusses the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method that is used to 
implement this method.  
 
6.3.1 The forward-looking sequential counterfactual method   
 
A central issue in our setup is that treatment effects are nonreversible and therefore our 
interest is to identify the causal effect from the timing of participation in credit on outcomes 
measured at several points in time subsequent to the treatment. However, when outcomes are 
measured at different periods other than just subsequent to treatment, it is no longer clear 
what the appropriate control group should include because the control group varies depending 
on the gap between the timing of the two events. The concept of ‘forward looking sequential 
counterfactuals’ proposed by Brand and Xie (2007) provides a framework to construct 
appropriate counterfactuals for treatments with lasting effects that vary over time. This 
concept is useful in applications where (a) exposure to treatment can take place at any point in 
                                                 
3 Karlan, 2001 discusses the nature of the bias in cross-sectional designs that exclude dropouts from 
the treatment group. Tedeschi and Karlan (forthcoming) measure the extent of this bias using quasi-
experimental method for two-period panel data from Peru. 
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time but once treated the effect stays on, and (b) the effect of the treatment varies over time 
subsequent to treatment, regardless of whether or not the treatment is repeated.  
In this approach, the control group for individuals treated at t whose outcome is 
measured at v is composed of individuals that are (i) untreated by t but are treated any time up 
to v, (ii) never treated up to the end of the observation period but can be potentially treated 
any time in the future. Thus, individuals that participated prior to t can no longer serve as 
controls at t and the only controls for individuals that have participated at t are therefore those 
that have never participated up to t. However, control individuals at t may or may not 
participate after t. Likewise, participants at t would have had the same potential paths after t 
had they not participated at t. E.g., a household that participated in 1997, in our case, would 
have had two possible paths (i.e., participate or not) in subsequent loan cycles had this 
household not participated in 1997. This means, if outcome is measured in 2006, this 
household would have had three other participation chances up to 2006. Brand and Xie (2007) 
argue not accounting for such counterfactual possibilities biases impact measurement and 
therefore an appropriate counterfactual outcome must include all potential outcomes of the 
future paths of the control units considered. This is done by assigning transition probability 
weights to each potential future path of the controls (see Figure 6.1). A forward-looking 
sequential approach therefore composes a ‘composite’ of counterfactuals that are weighted 
combinations of those individuals later treated and those individuals never treated. 
However participant and non-participant groups may also differ in their pre-treatment 
characteristics and participation may be based on these pre-treatment characteristics, in which 
case estimates are biased even after accounting for future paths. This problem is dealt using 
the propensity score method assuming the conditional independence assumption discussed in 
section 6.3.2. Under this assumption, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of 
participation in borrowing at time t, d=t, on annual household consumption expenditure, C, 
measured at time v, v≥ t, is calculated using forward-looking counterfactual approach as: 
 
X)E(C)XE(CX)C E(Δ tdv
td
v
td
v
>== −=   (1) 
 
where the LHS is the ATT of participation in borrowing at d=t conditional on X, a vector of 
exogenous (or pre-treatment) characteristics that determine participation. The terms on the 
RHS are expected annual consumption expenditure after d=t, conditional on X, for participant 
and non-participant groups at v, respectively. In our case, these two terms are calculated using 
PSM, given as the average treatment effects on the participants and non-participants had the 
latter participated (more on this in section 6.3.2). The difference between the two provides the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Note that d>t in )XC(E tdv
>  indicates that those 
in the control group are not treated until t but may or may not be treated up to v and this term 
is a composite of non-participants’ future outcomes expected between t and v. Depending on 
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the causal question asked, this term is decomposed into its future components. That is, 
decomposition depends on the treatment (d=t) as well as the outcome measurement, v periods 
considered. Note that decomposition is needed only if v>t. Otherwise, (1) is reduced to 
standard pair wise comparison between participants and non-participants.  
We illustrate this decomposition using two causal research questions in this chapter. 
First, consider ‘what is the effect of early (1997) participation (t=1) in credit on annual 
household consumption measured in 2006 (v=4)?’ As shown in Figure 6.1, in this specific 
problem, there are three possible paths for households who did not participate by t=1: to 
participate at t=2, to participate at t=3, to participate at t=4 or not to participate at all, d>4. 
Let the probability to participate at any future path t be given by p(t), otherwise q(t)=1-p(t). 
Ignoring X for now, the composite term can be decomposed into its path dependent additive 
components as follows (Brand and Xie, 2007): 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ]4d44d4
3d
4
2d
4
1d
4
td
v
CE)4(q)3(q)2(qCE)4(p)3(q)2(q
CE)3(p)2(qCE)2(p)XC(E)XC(E
>=
==>>
⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅=≅
 (2) 
 
where the terms in square brackets of the RHS give the weighted ATT of participation at t=2, 
t=3, and t=4 and non-participation by t=4, respectively, measured at v=4. Note that the 
transition probabilities p (t) and q (t) in (2) assign the likelihood of individuals to transit to 
one of the two paths (participate or not participate) at t conditional on being non-participant 
prior to t; i.e., )tdtd(prob)t(p ≥==  and )t(p1)t(q −= . We therefore use the probability 
of being in the participant group in each path such that p (t) + q (t) =1 (Brand and Xie, 2007). 
Combining eq. (1) and eq. (2) gives the ATT of early participation in MFI borrowing on 
household consumption expenditure measured in 2006.  
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Second, consider the causal question, ‘what is the effect of late (e.g., in 2003) participation 
(t=3) on annual consumption expenditure measured in 2006 (v=4)?’ As before, the composite 
term in (1) is decomposed into its components4. For non-participants at t=3 where v=4 (see 
                                                 
4 Analyzing the effect of participation at d=t, t+1,…T on outcomes measured at v=t, t+1, …T follows the 
same procedure. For a general formula that can be used in many other applications, the interested reader is 
referred to Brand and Xie (2007). 
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Figure 6.1), there is only one chance to participate before the survey period ends: to 
participate or not to participate at t=4. 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ]4d44d43d4tdv CE)4(qCE)4(p)XC(E)XC(E >=>> ⋅+⋅=≅  (4) 
 
Combining eq. (1) and eq. (4) gives the ATT of late participation (in 2003) in MFI borrowing 
on household consumption expenditure measure at v=4 (i.e., in 2006).  
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4
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4
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This procedure is implemented for all ten possible counterfactual constructions in this chapter. 
A complete computation for all these possibilities is given in appendix 6A. Comparative 
results are summarized in the results section from which the causal effect of e.g. early versus 
late participation can be made by comparing results obtained from (3) and (5).  
Note however that although non-reversible, participation in borrowing is repeatable. The 
time-varying treatment proposed by Brand and Xie (2007) does not give a way to incorporate 
the ATT of repeat-borrowers because treatment is assumed non-reversible and non-repeatable, 
or simply the treatment state is an absorbing state and once treated, individuals remain in the 
treatment state. The method discussed so far therefore provides the gross effect of credit after 
the onset of participation. To substantiate results from this method, effects of repeat-
borrowing and dropping out are analyzed pair wise. These results are provided in section 6.4.3.  
 
 
6.3.2 Propensity score matching method  
 
The composite counterfactual method discussed in section 6.3.1 gives a way to construct 
appropriate future controls for each participant group in each treatment period. However, 
participant and non-participant households in each treatment period may not be directly 
comparable because participant households may self-select (or, be selected) into the program 
based on initial differences, including the outcome of interest, in which case the mean 
outcome of the two groups differ even in the absence of the program. Therefore, before 
proceeding to future counterfactuals, initial comparability must be established to avoid initial 
selection bias, at least, based on some common observable characteristics.  
To deal with this problem, we use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique that 
has gained popularity in recent years for its potential to remove substantial amount of bias 
from non-experimental data (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). This technique helps to adjust 
for initial differences between a cross-section of participant and non-participant groups by 
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matching each participant unit to a non-participant unit based on ‘similar’ observable 
characteristics. An advantage of PSM is that it summarizes all the differences in a single 
dimension, the propensity score, which is then used to compute treatment effects non-
parametrically. The propensity score conveniently summarizes the conditional probability of 
participation given pre-treatment or exogenous characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
An important assumption on which this technique builds is the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA), which states that selection is solely based on observable characteristics 
and potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment5. Under the assumption that 
initial differences between the two groups determining participation are captured by 
observable characteristics, the participants’ counterfactual mean outcome had they not been 
participated is identified by non-participants’ mean outcome. Besides CIA, another condition 
in PSM is the Common Support requirement, which ensures that individuals compared from 
the participant and non-participant groups are, to begin with, comparable. Specifically, it 
ensures individuals with the same observable characteristics have a positive probability of 
being in both participant and non-participant groups (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999: 
1865). This requirement can be imposed such that estimation is performed on individuals that 
have common support. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is therefore given by 
the difference in mean outcome of matched participants and non-participants that have 
common support conditional on the propensity score.  
The following practical steps are followed to implement the PSM technique in this 
chapter. The first step is to predict the propensity score for each group in each period using a 
probit model. Justifying the CIA requires that only variables that simultaneously influence the 
participation decision and consumption outcome but that themselves are not affected by 
participation are included (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998). As such, variables included 
in our specifications are either measured before treatment or carefully selected exogenous 
characteristics. Specifications vary across participant groups, accounting for heterogeneities 
due to ‘timing of participation’. Since there are four observed treatments (loan cycles) whose 
outcomes are measured four times, a total of thirty distinct matching specifications, one for 
each cross-section, are needed to construct the ten composite counterfactuals (see section 
6.3.1).  
The second step is to choose a method by which weights are assigned for matching. 
Four different matching algorithms are available in the literature (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005). Throughout the chapter Kernel Matching (KM) is used. A major advantage of the KM 
method is that it ensures low variance because it uses weighted averages of all individuals in 
the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. Its drawback is however the 
possibility of bad matches because it uses full information. A recommended solution is to 
                                                 
5Obviously, this is a strong assumption and there may be bias due to unobservables. Given the complexity 
of the problem we try to handle in this chapter, we hope that this bias is empirically less important 
compared to the magnitude of bias that this method eliminates. 
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properly impose the common support upon implementation (Heckman, et al., 1998). Once the 
propensity score is estimated and used to compute the matching, the third and critical step is 
to perform a ‘balancing test’ to check if the matching procedure was effective, i.e. to test if 
matching balanced observable covariates across treated and control groups. A t-test on 
equality of means in the treated and control households suggests the extent to which the 
difference in the covariates between the treated and control groups have been eliminated so 
that any difference in outcome variable between the two groups can be inferred as coming 
mainly from the treatment (Heckman and Smith, 1995). 
 
 
6.4 Results and discussions 
 
This section presents results based on methods discussed in section 6.3.  Before proceeding to 
the main results, a pair wise comparison between matched and unmatched households 
discussed in section 6.4.1 highlights the bias due to initial differences. The main results are 
provided in section 6.4.2 where after matching among participants and non-participants in 
each loan cycle, average participation effects using composite counterfactuals are compared 
to average participation effects from simple pair wise comparisons. Finally, as a robustness 
check, section 6.4.3 provides comparative results between matched composite and unmatched 
pair wise comparisons.  
 
 
6.4.1 Matched versus unmatched pair wise comparisons 
 
The effect of participation for both matched and unmatched households is given in table 6.2. 
This table gives a simple pair wise comparison of average treatment effect of participants as 
compared to non-participants (controls) in each year with and without matching. Note that in 
this table each new participant group’s (i.e., t=1, …, 4) annual consumption is observed over 
subsequent observation years (i.e., v=1, …, 4). E.g., average annual consumption of new 
participants in the first observation year (t=1) is given under v=1 to v=4, hence, the table is 
diagonal. There are two columns under each observation year, which give average impact 
estimates for the same participant group with and without matching. Comparing the matched 
against unmatched estimates for the same participant group (in each t) gives the bias reduction 
after appropriately accounting for initial differences using the matching method. It can be 
observed that the average effect on each new participant’s annual consumption (see diagonal) 
is higher for the unmatched than for the matched. E.g., for new participants at t=1, average 
annual consumption increased by ETB 476 before matching but after matching, the increase is 
reduced to ETB 398. As such, comparing the new participants (on the diagonal of the table) 
against their appropriately matched controls reduces the average impact. One implication is 
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that compared to an average non-participant that constituted the unmatched controls, better off 
households have self-selected into the program in each year. Clearly, comparing the new 
participants in each year against non-participants without accounting for initial differences, in 
our case, overestimate impact. The bias remains even after entry (off-diagonal). However, the 
direction of bias differs from year to year. 
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Table 6.2 Simple pair wise comparisons between matched and unmatched households 
Average participation effects  on yearly household consumption expenditure 
1997 
(v=1) 
2000 
(v=2) 
2003 
(v=3) 
2006 
(v=4) 
Timing of 
participation
Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched 
t=1  398.05*** 
(109.12) 
475.67*** 
(112.67) 
 529.72* 
(281.95) 
 506.30* 
(282.55) 
371.16** 
(146.65) 
268.15* 
  (1.82) 
1487.97*** 
(546.15) 
1663.48*** 
(540.30) 
t=2    133.16 
(428.50) 
 258.85 
(380.23) 
-296.51 
(263.56) 
-439.12* 
(247.02) 
1457.28* 
(871.11) 
1135.41** 
(751.85) 
t=3     717.04* 
(462.32) 
739.88** 
(378.99) 
  497.06 
(1178.49) 
1398.76** 
(918.44) 
t=4       429.15 
(1591.53) 
2041.47*** 
(934.48) 
Note: ***, ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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6.4.2 Matched composite versus matched pair wise comparisons 
 
The pair wise comparison of participation effects between matched and unmatched groups in 
the previous section suggests that matching reduces a significant part of bias due to 
differences prior to entry. However, it does not account for how participating households 
would have fared in subsequent years if they had not participated. Such effect is captured by 
the composite counterfactual estimated according to methods provided in section 6.3.1 and 
6.3.2 (detail calculations are given in appendix 6A). Main results are given in table 6.3. For 
comparison purposes, matched pair wise effects are also provided for each outcome 
measurement period along with the composite effects. The columns in table 6.3 provide these 
comparative results for each group of participant (t=1,…, 4) and in each outcome 
measurement period (v=1,..,4). Note that standard errors are not given for composite results 
because they are calculated from several matching results according to methods in (2) and (4) 
(see appendix 6A). 
 There are two important findings in this exercise. First, regarding the main causal 
question of comparing the effect of early versus late participation, the composite 
counterfactual results suggest that early participants have consistently fared better than late 
participants. Specifically, after accounting for both initial differences and potential future 
changes in the composition of participants and their controls, long-term participants have 
enjoyed relatively higher average annual consumption than short-term participants. In table 
6.3, this can be seen by comparing the composite effects for each new participant group (i.e., 
at each t) against its preceding participant column wise. Note that the composite effect, for the 
most part, declines going from top (early participants) to bottom (late participants) in each 
column. One reason is that the effect of borrowing lasts longer than the specific period it 
refers to and that long- rather than short-standing participants are more likely to enjoy higher 
effects in terms of capacity to smooth consumption over time. Another is since participation is 
state dependent, at least, in this data set (see results in chapter three); the chances of repeat 
participation and hence further increases in consumption are higher for early than late 
participants.   
Second, in contrast to simple pair wise effects, the composite effects provide 
conservative results in all comparisons except for the initial year1 . This is because the 
composite effects take future potential counterfactuals into account whereas the pair wise 
estimates do not. In other words, not accounting for future potential counterfactuals 
overestimates impact. This is so because not participating in any earlier year does not 
preclude the possibility of participating in any later year and given positive effects of 
participation, not accounting for these chances of later participation overestimates impact of 
                                                 
1 Note that in each initial year, the pair wise effect is the same as the composite effect because t=v and 
there is no need to account for future potential counterfactual. 
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early participation. This can be elaborated using the most early participants (i.e., t=1) whose 
outcome is measured in four period. The composite effect in the last outcome measurement 
period (v=4) takes into account the fact that some of their matched controls (i.e., non-
participants at t=1) have been able to participate at t=2, t=3 or at t=4. This reduces the 
average effect from ETB 1488 to ETB 1238. Clearly, the difference is the counterfactual for 
early participants had they not participated at t=1. Thus, failing to account for the different 
future pathways between participation and outcome measurement periods overstates the effect 
of (early) participation.  
Obviously, many factors other than borrowing dictate changes in consumption levels 
over time and, with a slight downturn in 2003, average consumption increased between v=1 
and v=4 for both participants and non-participants, albeit at different pace. Specifically, 
except in the bad year 2003 in which case there was a consumption downturn, the pair wise 
causal effects, for the most part, overestimate impacts because the counterfactual paths are not 
taken into account.  
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Table 6.3 Matched composite versus matched pair wise comparisons 
Household consumption expenditure measurement period 
1997 
(v=1) 
2000 
(v=2) 
2003 
(v=3) 
2006 
(v=4) 
 
 
Timing of 
participation 
Composite 
 
Pair wise 
 
Composite
 
Pair wise 
 
Composite
 
Pair wise Composite Pair wise 
t=1 398.045 398.045*** 
(109.118) 
388.733 529.716* 
(281.947) 
859.674 371.162** 
(146.650) 
1238.704 1487.966*** 
(546.147) 
t=2   133.156 133.156 
(428.498) 
-568.872 -296.506 
(263.564) 
524.370 1457.280* 
(871.109) 
t=3     717.044 717.044* 
(462.315) 
-292.578 497.059 
(1178.491) 
t=4       429.150 429.150 
(1591.532) 
Note: ***, ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Evidently, conventional parametric impact assessments that compare ‘ever participants’ to 
‘never participants’ without considering the timing of the decision to participate and the 
different potential future pathways an individual household might have followed in the 
absence of the program would yield biased estimates. 
 Finally, given the relatively longer period the data set covers, including two drought 
years (1999/2000 and 2003) in between, it is interesting to see the implications of the effects 
of these differences in timings of participation on household consumption and hence relative 
capacity to cope with vulnerability during and after the drought years. Composite effects of 
participation in the first three periods i.e., at t = 1, 2, and 3, on annual consumption during the 
last three outcome measurement periods, i.e., v = 2, 3, and 4, are of interest here. Compared to 
controls, results suggest that the average annual consumption of the earliest (t=1) participants 
has increased steadily, including during and post drought years. Intuitively, sufficient time is 
needed for the cumulative impact of credit to take effect (King and Behrman, 2009). This is 
however not the case for later (t=2 and t=3) participants. In fact, although both participant 
groups have seen increased average consumption in the year they participated (which 
happened to be the drought years for both), in both cases, it has declined a year after 
participation (post drought years). A possible explanation for this is that households might 
have diverted loans to smooth consumption in the drought years, a common phenomenon 
despite DECSI’s claims of ‘productive’ use of credit. A study on the same MFI by 
Borchgrevink et al., (2005:68-69) finds indications of use of credit given for production 
purposes diverted to consumption during drought periods. This is also inline with the claim in 
chapter three that for households that are borrowing risk constrained, credit might be only 
useful as a last resort in times of distress. Moreover, the fact that loans are repaid after one 
year seems to explain the relative decline in participant households’ consumption in the post 
drought periods. Nevertheless, for the t = 2 participants, the result suggests this decline has 
been reversed in 20061. It can therefore be concluded that relative to non-participants, earlier 
participants gained better capacities to cope with shocks and the earlier the better. This 
conclusion has to be taken with caution though because the results explicitly compare 
variations of average consumption due to credit and not overall consumption variability due to 
shocks. 
 
 
6.4.3 Effects of changes in the composition of treatment and control groups in 
time- varying treatments  
 
In sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 interest centered on the effect of timing of first-time participation 
in MFI borrowing on annual household consumption in subsequent years. Thus, the analysis 
                                                 
1 For t = 3 participants, the effect in subsequent years is not known because the observation period does not 
allow for this. 
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was mainly based on entry, considering borrowing as an irreversible regime, i.e., once 
households participate, they remain members thereafter. However, there are borrowing 
dynamics after this entry event took place. Particularly, once in the borrowing regime, some 
households participated repeatedly, and others participated occasionally or never repeated at 
all. Details about these dynamics are given in Figure 6.1. This section presents effects of such 
borrowing dynamics, mainly effects of dropping out and repeat-borrowing in a particular year. 
Due to the complexity of applying composite counterfactuals, effects are analyzed pair wise. 
However, comparative results are provided such that the biases in handling dropouts 
discussed in section 6.2.2 are also evaluated. 
Table 6.4 presents comparative results of (i) including dropouts in control groups but 
not in treatment groups (comparison 1) in contrast to including them in treatment groups but 
excluding them from the control groups (comparison 2). This comparison shows the bias in 
using the standard fixed-effects method that would naively include dropouts in control groups; 
(ii) excluding dropouts from both and excluding new participants from treatment groups 
(comparison 3). 
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Table 6.4 Effects of repeat-participation and changes in the composition of participants: matched and unmatched pair wise 
Comparisons  
Average participation effects (ATT)  on yearly household consumption expenditure  
1997 
(v=1) 
2000 
(v=2) 
2003 
(v=3) 
2006 
(v=4) 
Composition of 
treatment & control 
groups 
 
 
periods Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched 
t=1 398.05*** 
(109.12) 
475.67*** 
(112.67) 
529.72* 
(281.95) 
506.30* 
(282.55) 
371.16** 
(146.65) 
268.15* 
(1.82) 
1487.97*** 
(546.15) 
1663.48*** 
(540.30) 
t=2   443.19 
(371.22) 
590.50* 
(363.09) 
-191.69 
(223.45) 
-240.76 
(179.72) 
2350.14*** 
(695.20) 
2382.83*** 
(694.10) 
t=3     -32.79 
(294.99) 
492.15** 
(211.20) 
2113.53*** 
(708.53) 
2886.44*** 
(722.82) 
Comparison 1:  
Treatment group: 
Repeat and new 
participants at t 
Control group: 
Non-participants at 
t (dropouts 
excluded) 
t=4       1058.21 
(970.11) 
1656.06 
(1347.41) 
t=1 398.05*** 
(109.12) 
475.67*** 
(112.67) 
529.72* 
(281.95) 
506.30* 
(282.55) 
371.16** 
(146.65) 
268.15* 
(1.82) 
1487.97*** 
(546.15) 
1663.48*** 
(540.30) 
t=2   388.84 
(307.48) 
305.73 
(285.22) 
-235.22 
(143.11) 
-326.40 
(148.14) 
1371.13*** 
(591.65) 
1548.64*** 
(544.88) 
t=3     301.20** 
(150.61) 
386.78*** 
(149.85) 
1177.21** 
(581.24) 
1620.21*** 
(552.19) 
Comparison 2:  
Treatment group: 
Repeat and new 
participants at t  
Control group: 
Non-participants at 
t (dropouts 
included) 
t=4       1129.25* 
(771.02) 
1311.09* 
(756.86) 
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(Table 6.4 continued) 
t =1 398.05*** 
(109.12) 
475.67*** 
(112.67) 
529.72* 
(281.95) 
506.30* 
(282.55) 
371.16** 
(146.65) 
268.15* 
(1.82) 
1487.97*** 
(546.15) 
1663.48*** 
(540.30) 
t=2   790.60* 
(488.71) 
804.85* 
(426.08) 
-130.69 
(240.56) 
-112.56 
(215.60) 
3148.09*** 
(838.37) 
3189.09*** 
(776.01) 
t=3     -208.26 
(318.01) 
348.36* 
(208.59) 
2193.49*** 
(752.78) 
3273.24*** 
(733.31) 
Comparison 3: 
Treatment group: 
Only repeat 
participants at t 
 
Control group: 
Non-participants at t 
(dropouts excluded) 
t=4       1190.91 
(2177.47) 
1837.33 
(1410.30) 
 
Note: ***, ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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In comparison 3, only repeated participants are compared to their periodical non-participant 
counterparts. This can be used as reference for comparisons 1 and 2. Besides, this last 
comparison provides the effect of repeated participation on outcomes measured in different 
periods. 
Comparing comparison (1) and (2) in table 6.4, shows that including dropouts in control 
(but not in treatment) groups biases impact even after adjusting for initial conditions using 
matching. However, the direction of the bias depends on the relative condition of dropouts in 
each year, which in turn may depend on the economic conditions in the year before. That is, 
in years when dropouts are those that have became worse off after participation, excluding 
them from the treatment group overstates impact. On the other hand, in years when dropouts 
are better off households, excluding them from treatment groups overstate impact both due to 
attrition and contamination effects. For participants in 2000, result shows that excluding 
dropouts from the treated groups and including them in the control group understates impact 
in all outcome measurement periods (see matched columns, table 6.4). On the contrary, 
excluding dropouts from the treatment group (including them in the control group) overstates 
impact because not only were relatively worse off participants selectively dropped out in the 
bad year 2003, but also the new participants in the same year were relatively better off. The 
latter can be seen by comparing the average participation effect of ETB 717 for matched new 
participants (table 6.3) and ETB 301 for matched new and repeat participants (table 6.4) in 
2003. The same is true to participants in 2006. This means, there is not only a strong selection 
processes at work but also the direction of selection depends on the underlying economic 
conditions households face in each period. Note that in the unmatched case, the same 
comparison provides a different picture, concealing the selection processes. 
 Lastly, the last part of table 6.4 (comparison 3) provides the effect of repeated 
participation, excluding dropouts and new participants. Once again, comparing the veteran 
participants to their non-participant counterparts by excluding dropout overstates impact even 
when new participants are excluded, e.g. for participants in 2000, because only worse off 
participants dropped out systematically. Thus, for the most part, results in comparison 3 are 
higher than in comparison 1, which are in turn, for the most part higher than results in 
comparison 2, reflecting the consistency of the results obtained.  
 
 
6.5. Conclusions  
 
This chapter dealt with the methodologically challenging question of assessing the impact of 
differences in the timing of participation in microfinance credit using a four-wave panel data 
covering ten years that comes from a rural microfinance in Ethiopia. Specifically, main 
questions addressed include (a) whether or not early participation, as opposed to late 
participation, matters in terms of increases in average annual household consumption, (b) a 
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methodological issue of consideration of potential future path ways of control groups when 
the timing of participation and outcome measurement are different, and (c) overcoming 
impact estimation biases due to the dynamics of borrowing, mainly dropouts and new entrants.  
 In the empirical methodology the chapter argued that parametric impact assessment 
methods such as the fixed-effects method may yield biased estimates when the treatment 
variable is dichotomous and units are observed more often than in the classic two-period 
panel data case because such methods exploit on individuals being “on” and “off” the 
treatment over time, which contaminates the impact estimate. An alternative method is used 
that treats participation in credit as an irreversible regime and identify impact from the timing 
of onset of participation. As such, only non-participant households up to the time of entry of 
participants are considered as candidates for control. The propensity score matching is used to 
balance potential initial heterogeneities among participants and non-participant controls. 
 The results of the propensity score matching indicate that matching participants and 
non-participants on some basic pre-treatment characteristics reduces substantial amount of 
selection bias. Comparisons between matched and unmatched average treatment effects 
suggests that over the years ‘better off’ households tend to participate. The results from the 
main analysis indicate that early than late participants enjoyed higher average annual 
consumption over time. Comparing the composite effects against simple pair wise effects, the 
composite effects provide conservative results because they take future counterfactuals into 
account. Thus, not accounting for potential future path ways overstates impact. The results 
also suggest that compared to their respective control groups, credit has had better shock 
cushioning effect for earlier than later participants.  
The analysis has also considered effects of the dynamics of borrowing once in the 
borrowing relationship. Particularly, pair wise effects of repeat-borrowing and dropping out 
are considered in a comparative way. Results suggest including dropouts in control (but not in 
treatment), as in fixed-effects, biases impact even after adjusting for initial conditions using 
matching. However, the direction of the bias depends on the relative condition of dropouts in 
each year. Further, the comparative analysis indicates that because of the selection processes 
at work when individuals dropout or repeat, impact assessments that compare participants and 
non-participants, covering longer periods but only adjusting for initial conditions but not for 
dynamics in mean time are likely to be biased. 
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Appendix 6A. Calculating ATT based on composite counterfactuals: 
1) t=1 and v=1 
 
045398
31815623631960
1
1
1
11
.
..
)()()(
=
−=
−=Δ= >== XCEXCEXCEATE ddtdv
 
2) t=1 and v=2 
 
( ){ ( )}
733388
682251062083726433800142950
22 22
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
22
.
).)(.().)(.{().(
)()()(
)()()(
=
+−=
⋅+⋅−=
−=Δ=
>==
>==
XCEqXCEpXCE
XCEXCEXCEATT
ddd
ddtd
v
 
3) t=1 and v=3 
 
( ){ ( )
( )}
674859
3472243700620
391296030062058818893809192383
32
322
3
3
3
3
2
3
1
3
3
.
)}.)(.)(.(
).)(.)(.().)(.{().(
)()(
)()()()(
)()()(
=
+
+−=
⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅−=
−=Δ=
>
===
>==
XCEqq
XCEpqXCEpXCE
XCEXCEXCEATT
d
ddd
td
v
td
v
td
v
 
4) t=1 and v=4 
( ){ ( )
( ) ( )}
{
}
7041238
55461086607006207046537340700620
886596130062006266913806577604
432432
322
4
4
4
4
3
4
2
4
1
4
1
4
1
44
.
).)(.)(.)(.().)(.)(.)(.(
)).)(.)(.().)(.().(
)()()()()()(
)()()()(
)()()(
=
++
+−=
⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅−=
−=Δ=
>=
===
>==
XCEqqqXCEpqq
XCEpqXCEpXCE
XCEXCEXCEATT
dd
ddd
ddtd
v
 
5) t=2 and v=2 
156133
68225108372643
2
2
2
25
.
..
)()()(
=
−=
−=Δ= >== XCEXCEXCEATT ddtdv
 
6) t=2 and v=3 
                                                                                                                                 Chapter 6  
 113
( ){ ( )}
872568
347224370039129603005881889
33 33
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
36
.
).)(.().)(.{().(
).().()(
)()()(
−=
+−=
+−=
−=Δ=
>==
>==
XCEqXCEpXCE
XCEXCEXCEATT
ddd
ddtd
v
 
7) t=2 and v=4 
( ){ ( )
( )}
370524
5546108660700
704653734070088659613000626691
43
433
4
4
4
4
3
4
2
4
2
4
2
47
.
).)(.)(.(
).)(.)(.().)(.().(
)()(
)()()()(
)()()(
=
+
+−=
⋅⋅+
⋅⋅+⋅−=
−=Δ=
>
===
>==
XCEqq
XCEpqXCEpXCE
XCEXCEXCEATT
d
ddd
ddtd
v
 
8) t=3 and v=3 
044717
34722433912960
3
3
3
3
3
38
.
..
)()()(
=
−=
−=Δ= >== XCEXCEXCEATT ddd
 
9) t=3 and v=4 
 
( ){ ( )}
578292
554610866070465373408865961
44 44
4
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
49
.
)}.).(.().).(.{().(
)()()(
)()()(
=
+−=
⋅+⋅−=
−=Δ=
>==
>==
XCEqXCEpXCE
XCEXCEXCEATT
ddd
ddd
 
10) t=4 and v=4 
  
 
150429
55461087046537
4
4
4
4
4
410
.
..
)()()(
=
−=
−=Δ= >== XCEXCEXCEATT ddd
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Assessing long-term credit impacts from the timing of participation in m
 114
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The general objective of this thesis is to examine the mechanisms of providing credit through 
microfinance and assess the long-run borrowing effects on household welfare in Ethiopia. 
This general objective is broken down into four specific objectives that were dealt within 
separate chapters. This chapter presents a summary of the main conclusions from these 
chapters. It also outlines how these different issues integrate each other and contribute to the 
general discussion on improving the provision of financial services in risky rural 
environments of developing countries, such as Ethiopia. This chapter proceeds as follows. 
Section 7.2 summarizes the main conclusions and presents the lessons from chapter three to 
six. Section 7.3 integrates and places the main issues in this thesis into the general body of the 
literature on microfinance. Section 7.4 provides some suggestions for future research.  
 
 
7.2 Summary of main conclusions 
 
The first specific objective of this thesis was to investigate if risks involved in joint liability 
lending contracts, viz. risk of partner failure and the threat of being denied future access to 
credit in case of group repayment failure, impede participation of potential borrowers. This is 
analyzed in chapter three in a dynamic stochastic theoretical framework where, as opposed to 
previous related studies, household borrowing is considered within overall household 
production and consumption decisions given available endowments to the household. The 
theory developed in this chapter shows that households’ decisions to participate in borrowing 
consider the relative riskiness of MFI borrowings by evaluating the sum of present and 
discounted stochastic future benefits with and without borrowing. Empirical results show that 
these risk elements embedded in the joint liability lending contract reduce the probability of 
participation in borrowing. Moreover, risk of losing future access to credit as proxied by inter-
household differentials in major sources of future liquidity (e.g., livestock endowment) and 
insurance (e.g., access to government food safety nets) determine the probability to participate. 
It is also found that systemic shocks such as rainfall, an indicator for the recurring draughts in 
the area, influence the decision to participate in borrowing negatively. However, there is also 
evidence that participation is state dependent: those that happened to participate once are 
more likely to repeat it, implying that these risks are perceived higher by non-participants than 
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participants. In general, it can be concluded that while the contractual methods used in 
microfinance are innovative approaches to deal with information and cost problems, 
perceived risks of such methods raise a hurdle for participation such that potential borrowers 
might stay away from borrowing. It should be noted that in this specific study, this effect is 
exacerbated by (a) the volatile economic conditions (e.g., covariant rainfall risks) in which 
households in the study area operate, and (b) the fact that the ‘limited liability’ waiver 
routinely assumed in theory, which provides insurance in case the whole group announces 
inability to repay is diminished or does not exist totally in practice. This latter effect makes 
the shift in borrowing risks from the lender to borrowers complete.  
These findings have important lessons for MFIs operating in the Ethiopian as well as 
similar contexts. The group lending methods in microfinance, although seemingly helpful, do 
not fit everywhere. Particularly, there is a clear trade-off between providing credit access 
through methods that induce borrowers to behave responsibly and the additional (perceived) 
contractual risks these methods involve. These methods limit MFIs’ outreach to poor but 
potential entrepreneurs to the extent that the disincentive effect of the additional risks 
outweighs the benefit. This is more so for the poorest households operating in risky economic 
environments (as in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia) where insuring the very survival of 
the household is at stake and no additional credit is expected after a shock simply because 
additional credit is tied with repayment of previous group loans. Similar conditions were 
reflected in the discussion with key informants during the survey. Households face difficult 
borrowing decisions, which involve running the risk of selling assets or consumption 
shortages to repay for partners in drought years or give up all access to future loans. Recent 
theoretical extensions show that some of the innovative methods in microfinance (e.g., 
dynamic incentives) can be effectively used even with individual lending without having to 
depend on groups and associated partner risks (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000; 
Tedeschi, 2006). There is also some evidence of recent shifts to individual loans with similar 
contractual arrangements (Xavier and Karlan, 2006). It is therefore time for MFIs to go out of 
the one-size-fits-all box and look for alternative methods that can work in their specific 
conditions. In DECSI’s case, reducing contractual risks (e.g., guaranteeing rescheduling or 
not obliging to repay in bad years) and providing full-fledged financial services, including 
consumption credit may help farmers to access production credit. 
 Given the contractual risks involved in group lending discussed in chapter three, an 
interesting issue to investigate was who borrowers choose as their partners. This was the 
subject of chapter four. It focused on the empirical analysis of the risk matching behavior of 
borrowers in microfinance group formation, and investigated the reasons behind this group 
behavior and its implications for repayment in the Ethiopian context. Specifically, the aim 
was to test if the groups that arise are homogeneous or heterogeneous and why. Instrumenting 
for potential endogeneity problems, results show strong statistical evidence that rejects the 
homogeneity hypothesis in favor of heterogeneity, even after controlling for problems in 
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matching (e.g., inability to find a preferred match). Results are consistent with similar 
previous empirical results from urban (Sadoulet and Carpenter, 2001) and semi-urban 
(Lensink and Habteab, 2003) environments. However, this study brings new evidence on the 
synchronization of joint liability groups with community-based networks and religious 
gatherings. It is found that joint liability groups can be heterogeneous because, in this specific 
context, they are synchronized with these networks that do not necessarily need to be 
homogenous themselves but rely on trust, reputation, and reciprocity developed over the years. 
As such, neither is the group formation outcome ought to be homogeneous to promote 
repayments. In fact, in some instances ROSCA savings are deliberately synchronized with 
joint liability repayments. Again, the lesson is that when designing their products, MFIs need 
to consider such complex contexts and exploit them to their advantage.  
 While most economists are fascinated with the theoretical explanations of how 
microfinance can be successful in overcoming the well known banking problems and promote 
repayment rates, little is known yet about the actual impacts of microfinance on poverty. 
Chapter five and six of this thesis aim at contributing to the ‘impact evaluation gap’ in 
microfinance both methodologically and by evaluating the long-run benefits of participation 
in MFI credit from two important dimensions, namely, the degree or intensity of participation 
over the years and timing of entry or participation. Chapter five assesses impact from the 
degree or intensity of participation, regardless of the timing of participation. By using 
individual trends, the fixed-effects approach which traditionally mitigates only time-invariant 
unobservables is innovatively expanded to account for time-varying individual specific 
unobservables. This model is further specified to explicitly account for level of participation 
over the years. Credit impact is measured on two important household welfare indicators: per 
capita household consumption and housing improvements. Results show that having 
participated in credit at least once raises per capita household consumption and probability of 
housing improvements significantly. The flexible specification shows that one-time 
participation has no impact on housing improvements but does lead to a significant 
improvement in per capita consumption. Impact increased with length of participation in both 
cases however. The general conclusion is that not only is participation in credit useful to raise 
household welfare in the short term but also the effect lasts longer beyond the participation 
periods. There are three implications from these conclusions. First, estimates based on one or 
two period snapshots are likely to underestimate credit impact. Second, since the time needed 
for borrowing effect to materialize differs among welfare indicators and evaluating effect 
based on a single indicator measured in one-shot may therefore provide a partial picture of 
credit impact. Research aiming at rigorously evaluating the potentials of MFI credit must 
therefore take both its multidimensional and temporal effects into account. Third, since 
realizing the full benefits of borrowing in marginal environments such as the study area 
require longer periods, MFIs in those areas should be equipped to provide continuous loans 
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rather than focusing on ambitious plans of reaching wider clients but with shorter graduation 
periods. 
Chapter six assesses impact from the timing of first-time participation and outcome 
measured during participation thereafter. Specifically, annual consumption expenditure of 
participant households is compared to non-participant controls adjusting for initial differences 
using matching method and accounting for future potential participation paths of participants 
had they not participated. Two important conclusions are drawn from this approach. First, the 
pair wise versus composite counterfactual comparative analysis suggests that not accounting 
for initial differences and future potential paths yields biased estimates. The implication is 
that in long surveys with repeated outcome observations, standard parametric methods that 
only account for sources of bias due to differences in pre-participation characteristics are still 
subject to biases due to dynamics between participation and outcome measurement period. 
Second, considering the timing of participation, results suggest that in general early 
participants fared better than later participants. Moreover, although average consumption 
declined for both participants and non-participants after the shock in 2003, the very early 
participants among the early participants have seen increases in average consumption even 
after the shock due to the cumulative effects of borrowing. This again suggests that beyond 
the benefits reaped immediately, borrowing plays an important role in building resilience 
which would not be easily observed in studies that consider simple before and after 
comparisons.  
 
 
7.3 Discussion 
 
This section presents a brief discussion on how the different issues dealt in separate chapters 
of this thesis and the contributions in each of them relate to each other and to the larger body 
of literature on microfinance. Where necessary, innovative methodological approaches 
introduced to tackle specific empirical issues in this thesis are also discussed.  
Understanding the genesis of MFIs helps to mirror on their present day performances as 
well as to visualize where they are heading today. Chapter one sets the general background 
for the analyses in this thesis. It briefly synthesizes the historical developments in rural 
financial markets and practical experimentations therein that eventually led to the emergence 
of present day MFIs. Two important historical backgrounds that shaped development thinking 
regarding rural finance are worth mentioning for the discussion here. First, donors’ increased 
focus towards assisting the development of ‘informal sector’ micro enterprises (Dichter, 2007: 
3) in the 1970s in one hand, and the overwhelming critique over subsidized, state-run, rural 
financial institutions (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005: 8-11) on the other, 
challenged the way rural finance was channeled. Second, on theoretical grounds, 
developments in information economics and agency theories that helped explain why 
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conventional banks fail to reach the poor stimulated academics to shift attention to parallel 
experimentations in micro financing. The intersection of these two developments boosted the 
microfinance momentum to reach its unprecedented peak in recent years. Marking such a 
peak, the UN declared 2005 a ‘Microcredit’ year and Mohamed Yunus and his Grameen Bank 
won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. Microfinance has become a development catch word since. 
It is being spreading around the world. Nevertheless, many practical as well as theoretical 
questions remain. 
Four specific objectives of this thesis within the framework discussed above are 
introduced in chapter one. The relatively long microfinance practices in rural areas of 
Ethiopia present a suitable context to examine these issues. Chapter two presents the 
operations of one of largest MFIs in Ethiopia in which the objectives of this thesis are 
empirically examined. This chapter also laid the ground for the rest of the chapters by 
describing the specific institutional and socioeconomic environment in which this MFI 
operates. 
The theoretical and empirical analysis in this thesis begun by raising an important issue 
in microfinance discussed in chapter three. A core issue in microfinance credit is that it 
systematically exploits elements of social capital that inherently exist in poor areas into an 
incentive contract that substitutes collateral- a conventional requirement of lending that is 
virtually unavailable to the poor. This is a ‘good intention’ that gives the opportunity to 
provide millions of households access to credit that would otherwise remain unbankable. 
Unfortunately creating access to credit is not synonmous with actual use of credit, particularly 
when the ‘good intentions’ in microfinance go awry. Chapter three examines whether or not 
the well-intended contractual elements in microfinance can also deter realizing access to 
credit. How effective the collateral substitutes in microfinance are to achieve the intended 
goal of providing access to credit, particularly in risky environments as in the semi-arid areas 
of Ethiopia, is theoretically and empirically less clear (see e.g., Karlan and Goldberg, 2007). 
The theoretical and empirical analyses in this chapter provide fresh insights into how the 
specific risks of lending to groups combined with the ultra punishment threats can limit credit 
use.  
Closest to the contributions of this chapter are theoretical work by Madajewicz (1997) 
who emphasized “the incentives used in microfinance are quite extreme” and Tedeschi 
(2006), who proposed improvements on contracts currently used in microfinance and 
underlined that “default punishment threats need not be lifetime”. The fundamental point here 
is that as long as repayment is strictly enforced even when rains and harvests fail, these 
contractual risks simply add up to the overall risk households manage including by forgoing 
profitable but risky opportunities. This is inline with a recent empirical finding by Dercon and 
Christiaensen (2007) from Ethiopia that concluded adoption of modern inputs is reduced due 
to ‘downside risk’ related to strictly enforced input loans that disregard harvest outcomes. 
More specifically, since most input loans in rural Ethiopia are provided by MFIs using the 
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same contractual mechanisms discussed in this thesis, it follows that part of the ‘downside 
risk’ of these loans is contractual. Broadly speaking, to the extent that such contractual risks 
are perceived important, poor households are forced to forgo opportunities to move out of 
poverty so as to avoid further distitution. The main conclusion from this chapter therefore 
runs consistent with Fafchamps’ (2003: 30-31) general conclusion that says “for credit to 
exist, credit contracts must allow for conditional default, that is, must mix an element of 
insurance with pure credit”. The challenge remains of course how to design a credit contract 
that insures the borrower in case of harvest failure while providing the lender a guarantee to 
circumvent free-riding behavior of the borrower.     
 Chapter four discusses the group formation process and its effects on the resulting 
pool of borrowers. This issue is at the center of the joint liability theory in microfinance. 
Many theoretical studies (e.g., Ghatak 2000) show that joint liability induces borrowers to the 
extent they can, to form groups of homogenous (similar) risk types. Some recent studies (e.g., 
Sadoulet, 1999) however show in contexts where insurance is missing, that groups maybe 
formed with the purpose of intra-group risk-sharing and as a result can be heterogeneous. This 
alternative hypothesis is also supported by another recent theoretical work that considers 
behavioral effects of repeated interactions among group members (Guttman, 2008). This is an 
active research area for which the Ethiopian context is used as a natural experiment. This 
chapter brings additional evidence to this existing knowledge on group formation. As in the 
two other previously studied cases, Guatemala (Sadoulet and Carpenter, 2001) and Eritrea 
(Lensink and Habteab, 2003), the studied Ethiopian case reveals the formation of groups of 
heterogeneous risk types as opposed to the standard homogeneity assumption in the 
theoretical microfinance literature. But this chapter also brings empirical evidence that does 
not necessarily overlap with the previous findings. Specifically, previous studies sought to 
relate heterogeneity with insurance motivated by direct side-payments from risky to safe 
borrowers (Sadoulet, 1999). This chapter finds indications of links between microfinance 
credit groups and traditional networks, particularly rotating credit and saving associations 
(ROSCAs) and long standing religious gatherings that are common in Ethiopia. Even if there 
was no sufficient evidence of side-payment among groups in the sample, intuitively, trust and 
reputation developed within these traditional groups appears to be used as a foundation to 
formal credit groups in some of the study areas. This is basically in line with the original 
‘social capital’ premise with which group lending is justified to function (e.g., Varian, 1990; 
Stiglitz, 1990; Banerjee et al., 1994; Besley and Coate, 1995). 
Chapter five and six contribute to the largely missing long-term microfinance impact 
evidence. Existing studies show impact of credit on poverty is marginal, including in famous 
MFIs with the highest repayment rates such as the Grameen Bank (e.g., Morduch, 1998). 
However, most of these studies measure impact over a short time frame, which may 
undermine dynamic effects over time. Previous chapters (three and four) have indicated that 
most of the mechanisms in group lending work with dynamics; particularly borrowing is state 
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dependent (chapter three) and group formation exploits reputation that is built on repeated 
interactions over many years (chapter four). Besides, donors and governments may also want 
to know what happened to microfinance clients in the long-run and also to those that accessed 
credit more than once. The existing microfinance evaluation literature has yet concentrated on 
determining the short-run marginal effects of MFI loans (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998; 
Coleman, 1999) or on effects of observations between two points in time (e.g., Khandker, 
2005, Copestake, 2001; Tedeschi, 2008), all of them on a single poverty indicator. As 
suggested by Copestake et al (2001), chapter five has taken this effort one step further by 
measuring effects of repeated borrowing over a relatively longer period as well as measuring 
it on two key welfare indicators in the study area. This chapter identifies impact from the 
degree or number of participation times in borrowing, regardless of timing of participation. 
Here, the comparison is not just, as it is often done, between borrowers and non-borrowers but 
also considers differences in the degree of participation among borrowers themselves. A data 
set covering a relatively long period (i.e., ten years) in which households are observed four 
times enables to identify long-term impact from variations in the degree of participation 
among households. Recent developments in econometric panel data techniques, namely the 
trend model along with standard fixed-effects are also employed to control for selection bias 
common in identifying credit impact.  
Chapter six, on the other hand, identifies impact from timing of participation relative to 
potential outcomes of non-participants. This chapter builds on chapter five. Instead of 
depending on number of times the household has participated, this chapter assesses impact 
from first-time entry (or participation) where outcome is measured at several points thereafter, 
and compared to non-participants (control) at each entry time. Insights from chapter three 
indicate that participation or entry depends not only on initial household heterogeneities but 
also their dynamics over time. A recent method innovatively implemented in chapter six helps 
to attain comparability among participants and controls by accounting for initial 
characteristics as well as changes between the time of entry and outcome measurement. The 
propensity score matching method is used to attain initial comparability between participants 
and non-participants. The draw back in this modeling is that it does not reveal the separate 
effects of repeat-borrowing over time. However, an advantage in this approach is that it 
appropriately accounts for heterogeneities due to dynamics in borrowing, mainly timing of 
decision and dropping out that are often challenging to control in standard parametric methods 
(Karlan, 2001, Tedeschi and Karlan, 2006). To our knowledge, these two last chapters 
presented the first impact evidences from two distinct dimensions of such a long span of 
participation in microfinance. Besides, the empirical methods implemented in these two 
chapters are recent econometric methods rarely exploited to mitigate selection bias that is 
inherent in microfinance impact assessments.  
To wind up, in a nutshell, this thesis has touched upon three core steps in the 
microeconomics of the provision of credit services to rural households of developing 
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countries, i.e., the decision to participate, the process of participation (group formation), and 
welfare effects of participation.  
Finally, it would be unfair to close this discussion without providing some pragmatic 
reflections about microfinance in the study area. First, although to a limited extent mostly due 
to the methodological limitations discussed in chapter three, microfinance has been usefully 
integrated into households’ life in the region. DECSI has successfully internalized its presence 
as an alternative source of finance in rural areas of Tigray. Most importantly, it has succeeded 
to portray itself as a business-oriented financial institution as opposed to previous confusions 
towards it (e.g., confusions such as seeing it as an institution that distributes public or NGO 
finance). However, such a presence is just a potential far from required level of realization. As 
such, to many, DECSI’s joint liability based credit is just as a ‘ripe grape’ in the garden that is 
not easy to reach. The conclusions from chapter three indicate that not all ‘potential’ 
households benefited from the presence of credit in their villages. Some (e.g., those with less 
asset endowments) have refrained from it, just to avoid indebtedness and potential future debt 
traps. Others have however afforded what it takes to borrow and the conclusions in chapter 
five and six indicate that those that accessed it have benefited, albeit to a limited extent (see 
results in table 5.5 and 6.2 in the context of three years interval between observations). 
Second, other than credit, DECSI has managed to promote a vibrant banking culture (e.g., 
saving, money transfer, pension payments) among villagers. These are remarkable 
developments that defy some of the ‘pessimistic views’ about the viability of rural 
microfinance. However, a lot remains to be done, particularly, with regard to sustaining these 
successes as well as reaching the poorest potential borrowers. As a last word, DECSI has to 
reconsider not just its joint liability lending method but all its one-size-fits-all policy and 
pragmatically look into specific client niches and adapt its methods to each niche (e.g., the 
emerging interest in micro-irrigation and water diversion is one niche). It is also time for 
DECSI to revise its simplistic approach of ‘productive credit’ and focus on holistic banking 
services including for consumption. We believe, transforming the existing ‘sub-branches’ into 
decentralized semi-banks with full-fledged services is a step in the right direction. The 
findings and lessons from this thesis can be taken as starting points towards this direction. 
 
 
7.4 Future research 
 
As has been emphasized throughout this thesis and elsewhere in the literature (e.g., 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Karlan and Goldberg, 2007; Hermes and Lensink, 
2007)1, empirical research on microfinance lags far behind the theoretical fine-tunings. This 
                                                 
1 Hermes and Lensink (2007) provide a survey of the most recent empirical research on microfinance. 
Karlan and Goldberg, (2007) discuss recent microfinance impact evaluations. 
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section outlines a future research agenda related to the specific analyses as well as 
conclusions of this thesis.  
The analysis in chapter three concentrated on how contractual risks ration out potential 
microfinance borrowers. There are two important issues that follow from the analysis in this 
chapter. First, empirically, the focus has been on whether potential borrowers decide to 
participate or stay away from group borrowings in a given borrowing year. This however 
assumes the extreme situation where potential borrowers decide not to borrow. It may well be 
that households react to uncertainty by reducing the amount of borrowing rather than avoiding 
it altogether. Investigating such an ‘amount rationing’ effect of contractual risks is an 
interesting future research agenda. If information on amount borrowed is available, this can be 
done using a standard Heckman selection procedure. 
Secondly, in order to separately analyze effects of contractual risks on potential 
borrowers that would like to use loans responsibly and remain committed to the MFI if they 
are able to repay (as opposed to those that would strategically default), the theoretical analysis 
in chapter three assumes no strategic group interactions among group partners. This avoids 
the analytical complications of intra-group interactions and simplifies the analysis to 
interactions between individual borrowers and the MFI. The inclusion of group interactions 
into the analysis may or may not exacerbate contractual risks and hence effects on individual 
participation. The empirical analysis has however attempted to capture this element by 
including indicators for intra-group interactions. Nevertheless, incorporating such intra-group 
strategic interactions in a unified theoretical analysis within the dynamic framework where 
risks are correlated and the household is considered as a single decision making unit helps to 
get further insights on the overall effects of contractual risks. This is an interesting exercise 
where theoretically motivated future empirical research can focus on. 
Empirical insights from chapter four indicate that joint liability groups in microfinance 
might be formed based on other local groups established for other purposes long before 
microfinance. In the Ethiopian context, these include ROSCAs (e.g., farmers that engage in 
off-farm activities) and religious and cultural gatherings. A considerable theoretical literature 
on rotating credit and saving associations (ROSCAs) explains what holds them not to fall 
apart for many years (e.g., Besley et al., 1993). There is some evidence suggesting that some 
of the reasons that help ROSCAs to exist are also those same social factors that are expected 
to help MFIs to succeed. One common explanation is the enforcement mechanism both use. 
Both involve groups and use informal understandings among friends and acquaintances 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005: 57-67). However, each of them has a distinct 
contractual and financial arrangement. It is therefore not clear how both ROSCAs and formal 
credit groups can co-exist in a synchronized way, given these differences in arrangements as 
well as incentives for individual members. Varian (1989) and Besley (1995:2187) provide 
interesting introductory discussions to this issue but still has received insufficient attention in 
the literature. An important issue to investigate is the incentive mechanisms that link joint 
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liability groups to ROSCAs, particularly with regard to the risk heterogeneity result in joint 
liability. This may help to redesign the provision of financial services in risky environments 
without relying on mechanisms that involve additional group risks.  
Empirical research on the impact of microfinance, particularly of credit and its potential 
to eventually extricate households out of poverty in the face of high covariant risks in poor 
semi-arid agricultural environments is yet limited. Much of empirical research in 
microfinance credit impact comes from urban and semi-urban, non-agricultural, borrowers. 
This thesis has brought some insights into this missing knowledge. It also contributes on how 
to deal with the challenges of assessing credit impact from panel data covering long periods. 
Further research is required to determine if the empirical findings, particularly of long-run 
credit impacts, in this thesis can be established using similar approaches from other similar 
biophysical and socioeconomic environments. Moreover, impact analysis in this thesis has 
focused on participation or intensity of participation based on whether or not a household has 
participated in a particular loan period. Future research may however concentrate on amount 
of loans or cumulative receipt of loans over time rather than depend on dichotomous 
participation information.  
Finally, applied research that can be of high practical value to MFIs in Ethiopia include 
1) designing a localized, and client-niche based loan contracts (e.g., credit for irrigation motor 
pumps) that may exploit existing mechanisms in microfinance (e.g., dynamic incentives) but 
without necessarily depending on groups, 2) exploring and designing a more localized and 
simple screening mechanisms based on lessons learned from this thesis (e.g., ROSCA 
members often engaged in petty trading) or exploring the potentials of household assets (e.g., 
user-rights of land) as collateral are some of the outstanding issues to consider.  
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SUMMARY 
 
The poor’s lack of access to credit is one major obstacle to economic development in poor 
countries. Providing credit access to the poor is however challenging and requires managing 
small and fragmented loan transactions cost-effectively as well as ensuring repayments. At the 
center of these challenges are two fundamental problems: lenders’ lack of information about 
poor borrowers and poor borrowers’ lack of collateral to pledge as security to lenders. 
Information problems are common to all lenders, including to conventional banks for which 
they use collateral. Understandably, since both problems – lack of information and lack of 
collateral – coexist in poverty, poor borrowers are unattractive to conventional lenders. The 
challenge of providing credit access to the poor therefore boils down to the poor’s lack of 
collateral due to poverty itself.  
In recent years, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have come up with the hope of meeting 
the credit access - collateral poverty deadlock by using innovative mechanisms that overcome 
information problems. Many MFIs use the group lending method where borrowers are 
required to form small groups in which they are jointly liable for each other’s loans. Joint 
liability introduces group (social) pressure into the borrowing contract that induces borrowers 
to behave in the interest of the MFI. Specifically, group pressure encourages borrowers to 
self-select each other (peer selection), monitor each other’s loan use (peer monitoring) and 
enforce repayments. In addition, lenders use the threat of banning the entire group (in some 
cases the entire village) from future loans if one or more of the group members fail to repay. 
This is an additional leverage for MFIs to enforce group loans. In effect, losses due to 
unsuccessful projects are greatly reduced because successful entrepreneurs within each group 
will cover part of these losses. As such, a significant part of the costs and risks involved in 
lending are transferred from the lender to borrower. Several theoretical papers argue that such 
reduction in cost and risk gives MFIs way to provide credit access to poor borrowers at 
relatively lower average interest rates, a hope that has been coined as a ‘win-win’ solution to 
the old problem.  
This hope has received considerable attention internationally and generated immense 
support from global donors and enthusiast individuals. Partly driven by this global support, 
MFIs are now at the center of many poor countries’ poverty reduction and development 
strategies. In most countries, the objective of MFIs is twofold: reducing the risk of income 
shocks to help reduce poverty, and raising asset accumulation to encourage private activity. 
According to the 2009 Microcredit Summit Campaign report, as of December 2007, the 
number of MFIs globally has jumped to 3,552  (from only 618 in 1997) serving over 150 
million clients worldwide of which 106 million are in the poorest (with less than one dollar a 
day) category. According to this report, MFIs have now reached roughly over a third of the 
1.3 billion poorest people globally. However, this figure may only tell part of the story (i.e. 
access) and despite some progress in access, evidence regarding the success of borrowers and 
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individual MFIs around the world is mixed. In many circumstances, potential borrowers are 
not attracted to group loans as expected. Little is known as to why many potential borrowers 
stay away from loan products offered. The extent of benefits gained by those that accessed 
these loans, particularly, for several years is also unknown. Generally, empirical research in 
microfinance lags far behind the theoretical fine-tunings. Particularly, whether and to what 
extent the innovative mechanisms of providing credit are successful in view of the diverse 
socioeconomic and biophysical settings in which MFIs operate is yet unclear.  
The objective of this thesis is to examine the mechanisms of providing credit through 
microfinance and assess the long-run borrowing effects on household welfare in Ethiopia. The 
focus is on understanding and empirically investigating the behavioral responses of borrowers 
to some of the building blocks of the innovative methods in microfinance as well as 
evaluating observed household welfare effects of accessing these loans over a relatively 
longer period. From this general objective, four specific objectives are defined and analyzed 
in separate chapters.  
The Ethiopian situation provides an interesting environment to meet these objectives. 
Two unique data sets – a panel and a cross-sectional - that come from a rural microfinance in 
Ethiopia are used in this study. Chapter two describes these data sets and the specific 
biophysical and socioeconomic context of the study area. Building on previous studies, a five-
wave panel data set on 400 borrower and non-borrower households that spans ten years 
(1997-2006) with intervals of almost three years is used. These households are randomly 
selected from sixteen villages in Tigray state of Ethiopia, all of them covered with 
microfinance. This data set is used to meet the first, third and fourth objectives. For the 
second objective, a specialized group-based cross-sectional data is collected in 2003 on 201 
borrower households from the same zones.   
In chapter three a dynamic stochastic theoretical framework that takes two types of risks 
involved in joint liability lending, i.e., risk of partner failure and risk of losing future access to 
credit, explicitly into account is used to analyze if these contractual risks impede participation 
of households in MFI borrowing. Results from a dynamic panel probit model show that these 
risks reduce the probability of participation in borrowing. Other systemic risks (e.g., 
recurrence of droughts) in the area, level of endowments, and access to government safety 
nets also determine participation. Most importantly, it is found that the probability of repeat-
borrowing is higher than the probability of new participation, which implies that these risks 
are perceived higher and hence more stringent to non-participants than participants. It is 
concluded that there is a clear trade-off between providing credit access through mechanisms 
that induce borrowers to behave responsibly and the additional (perceived) contractual risks 
that these mechanisms involve, particularly in risky environments such as the drought prone 
areas in northern Ethiopia. 
Given the joint liability contractual risks, the type of groups that arise when households 
decide to participate in group loans is empirically analyzed in chapter four. Specifically, the 
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hypothesis that groups formed are of homogenous rather than heterogeneous risk profiles is 
tested. The empirical analysis takes potential endogeneity between choice of own and partner 
risks as well as difficulties to find a preferred partner into account. Results from the cross-
section of borrower households show strong statistical evidence rejecting the homogeneity 
hypothesis in favor of heterogeneity. This chapter further investigated if heterogeneity is the 
result of missing insurance as suggested in the literature and if this result has implications for 
repayment performance of group members. There is no sufficient evidence supporting the link 
between risk heterogeneity and side-payments among group members. Instead, other trust 
based social networks, and already existing traditional saving and credit groups seem to 
underlie group formation in these areas. Such social networks are often synchronized with 
credit groups and influence the probability of repayment positively. 
Chapter five and six of this thesis focus on evaluating the impact of long-term 
participation in MFI credit, considering the duration and timing dimensions of participation. 
In chapter five impact is evaluated from the intensity of participation over the ten years on 
household welfare indictors, namely, per capita annual household consumption expenditure 
and housing improvements. The latter is an important local welfare indicator in Tigray. By 
using individual trends, the fixed effects approach which traditionally mitigates only selection 
bias due to time-invariant unobservables is innovatively expanded to also account for time-
varying individual specific unobservables. It is also further specified to explicitly account for 
the number of times the household has been in a borrowing relationship. Controlling for 
potential sources of selection bias common in microfinance impact evaluations, results 
indicate that participation increased household consumption and the probability of housing 
improvements significantly. The flexible specification further uncovers that one time 
participation has no impact on housing improvements but does increase per capita 
consumption significantly. Impact increased with increases in the length (intensity) of 
participation in both cases though. It is concluded that participation in credit improves not 
only in the short-term but also effect lasts longer beyond participation periods and that impact 
estimates that do not account for periods beyond duration of exposure to programs may 
underestimate impacts.  
In chapter six impact is evaluated from the timing of first-time participation (i.e., timing 
of participation), regardless of intensity or number of times of participation, on household 
consumption measured at different years thereafter. A new method based on a forward-
looking sequential counterfactual that enables to account for selection bias due to timing of 
participation as well as potential counterfactuals between timing of participation and outcome 
measurement period is used. This method combines panel data techniques with the semi-
parametric method of propensity score matching to address selection biases due to initial as 
well as future heterogeneities. Results show that the timing of participation matters, even 
accounting for selection and timing effects. That is, early than later participants fared better, 
particularly in the face of droughts, partly because effects last longer than the period for 
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which credit is used. It is concluded that borrowing plays an important role in terms of 
building resilience which would not be easily observed in studies that consider simple before 
and after comparisons. 
Finally, the last chapter of this thesis, chapter seven gives a summary and an integrated 
discussion of these findings. Moreover, it gives a brief synthesis of the findings in this thesis 
and their contributions to overall microfinance literature. A brief discussion on further 
research directions that come out of this thesis is also given at the end of this chapter. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Het ontbreken van kredietmogelijkheden voor mensen met zeer lage inkomens is een van de 
obstakels voor ontwikkeling van arme landen. Het is een enorme uidaging om 
kredietmogelijkheden te creëren waarbij kleine en versnipperde leningen op een kosten 
effectieve manier worden georganiseerd en waarbij tevens terugbetaling kan worden 
gegarandeerd. Centraal hierin zijn twee fundamentele problemen: gebrek bij 
kredietverschaffers aan informatie over arme cliënten, en het ontbreken van onderpand bij 
dergelijke cliënten. Nu zijn informatieproblemen gemeengoed voor alle kredietverschaffers, 
inclusief reguliere banken die dat compenseren door onderpand te vragen. Omdat gebrek aan 
informatie zich tegelijk voordoet met gebrek aan onderpand in een omgeving van armoede, 
zijn arme cliënten niet aantrekkelijk voor reguliere kredietverschaffers. De uitdaging van 
kredietverschaffing voor armen zit dus in het ontbreken van onderpand veroorzaakt door 
armoede. 
In de afgelopen jaren hebben microkrediet instituten echter de hoop gevoed dat het 
probleem van beperkte of geen toegang tot krediet door gebrek aan onderpand kan worden 
opgelost door het toepassen van innovatieve mechanismen die het informatieprobleem te 
boven komen. Veel microkrediet instituten gebruiken de methode van groepsleningen, 
waarbij kredietnemers verplicht zijn kleine groepen te vormen waarin men gezamenlijk 
aansprakelijk is voor elkaars leningen. Gezamenlijke aansprakelijkheid introduceert sociale 
druk in het leningcontract wat er voor zorgt dat leners zich gedragen overeenkomstig de 
belangen van het microkrediet instituut. Meer specifiek stimuleert groepsdruk leners in het 
zorgvuldig kiezen van partners (peer selection), in het controleren van elkaars omgang met de 
lening (peer monitoring), en in de terugbetaling. Daarbij komt dat kredietverschaffers vaak 
dreigen om de hele groep (in sommige gevallen zelfs het hele dorp) van toekomstige leningen 
uit te sluiten, indien een of meerdere groepsleden hun lening niet terugbetalen. Dit is een extra 
drukmiddel van microkrediet instituten om terugbetaling af te dwingen. Het gevolg is dat 
verliezen in geval van mislukte projecten zeer beperkt zijn omdat succesvolle ondernemers 
binnen de groep (een deel van) deze verliezen op zich nemen. Daardoor zijn een aanzienlijk 
deel van de kosten en risico’s overgeheveld van kredietverschaffer naar leners. Enkele 
theoretisch-economische artikelen stellen dat dergelijke reducties in kosten en risico’s het 
mogelijk maken dat microkrediet instituten krediet verschaffen aan armen tegen redelijk lage 
rente tarieven, iets wat als een win-win oplossing voor een oud probleem wordt aangeduid.  
Microkrediet heeft internationaal aanzienlijke aandacht getrokken en heeft geleid tot 
aanzienlijke ondersteuning van wereldwijde donoren en enthousiaste individuen. Deels 
gedreven door wereldbrede ondersteuning zijn microkrediet instituten nu een centraal 
onderdeel in armoede bestrijding- en ontwikkelingsstrategieën van ontwikkelingslanden. In de 
meeste landen is de doelstelling van microkrediet instituten tweeledig: het terugbrengen van 
inkomensschok risico’s om zo armoede tegen te gaan, en het stimuleren van opbouw van 
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eigen vermogen om ondernemerschap aan te moedigen. Volgens een rapport van de 2009 
Microkrediet Top is het aantal microkrediet instituten wereldwijd toegenomen tot 3552 per 
December 2007 (terwijl het er in 1997 nog maar 618 waren). Gezamenlijk bedienen zij 
wereldwijd meer dan 150 miljoen cliënten, waarvan 106 in de laagste inkomensgroepen 
(minder dan een dollar per dag). Volgens dit rapport zijn microkrediet instituten nu bereikbaar 
voor 1,3 miljard van de armsten wereldwijd. Deze cijfers vertellen echter maar een deel van 
het verhaal. Ondanks de toegenomen toegang tot microkrediet, is het bewijs omtrent succes 
van leners en individuele microkrediet instituten gemengd. In veel gevallen nemen in 
tegenstelling tot wat men verwacht potentiële leners niet deel aan groepsleningen. Er is 
weinig bekend waarom deze potentiële cliënten wegblijven bij de aangeboden microkrediet 
leningen. De inkomensverbetering door microkrediet, vooral gemeten over meerdere jaren, is 
vaak ook niet bekend. In het algemeen kan worden gesteld dat empirisch onderzoek naar 
microkrediet achterblijft bij de theoretische bijdragen. In het bijzonder blijft het onduidelijk of 
en in welke mate de innovatieve microkrediet mechanismen succesvol zijn, gegeven de 
diverse socio-economische en biofysische omstandigheden waarin microkrediet instituten 
werkzaam zijn.  
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om mechanismen van kredietverschaffing door 
microkrediet instituten te onderzoeken en om de lange termijn effecten van microkrediet 
leningen op de welvaart van Ethiopische huishoudens vast te stellen. De nadruk ligt op het 
begrijpen en empirisch onderzoeken van het gedrag van microkrediet cliënten, in het 
bijzonder met betrekking tot sommige cruciale bouwstenen van microkrediet, en op het 
evalueren van waargenomen welvaartseffecten door microkrediet leningen over een langere 
periode. Vanuit deze algemene doelstelling zijn vier meer specifieke doelstellingen 
geformuleerd die in afzonderlijke hoofdstukken worden uitgewerkt.  
De Ethiopische context biedt een interessante omgeving voor deze onderzoeksdoelstellingen. 
Twee unieke datasets, een panel dataset en een cross-sectie dataset, die afkomstig zijn van een 
ruraal microkrediet instituut in Ethiopië zijn gebruikt in deze studie. Hoofdstuk twee 
beschrijft deze datasets en de specifieke biofysische en socio-economische context of het 
studiegebied. Voortbouwend op voorgaande studies, is een panel dataset van vijf rondes over 
de periode 1997-2006 gebruikt die gegevens bevat van 400 huishoudens (leners en niet-
leners). Deze huishoudens zijn willekeurig geselecteerd uit zestien dorpen in de Tigray regio 
in Ethiopië, die alle toegang hadden tot microkrediet. Deze dataset is gebruikt om de eerste, 
derde en vierde subdoelstelling waar te maken. Voor doelstelling twee is een specifieke cross-
sectie dataset verzameld die individuele en groepsgegevens bevat van 201 deelnemers aan 
groepsleningen in 2003 in deze regio. 
In hoofdstuk drie wordt een dynamisch stochastisch theoretisch model gebruikt dat twee 
verschillende soorten risico onderscheidt, namelijk risico van mislukte projecten van partners 
en risico van het verliezen van toegang tot toekomstige kredieten. Dit raamwerk is gebruikt 
om te analyseren of dergelijke risico’s deelname aan microkrediet door huishoudens 
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belemmeren. Schattingsresultaten van een dynamisch panel probit model laten zien dat deze 
risico’s de kans op deelname aan microkrediet verkleinen. Andere risico’s in het gebied (zoals 
droogte), maar ook de hoeveelheid eigen vermogen en toegang tot sociale 
overheidsprogramma’s bepalen deelname. Een ander belangrijk resultaat is dat de kans op 
herhaalde deelname aan microkrediet groter is dan de kans op deelname voor de eerste keer, 
wat impliceert dat risico’s van leningen hoger worden ingeschat door niet-deelnemers dan 
door deelnemers. Een conclusie is dat er een uitruil is tussen het aanbieden van krediet 
middels mechanismes die deelnemers aansporen te handelen overeenkomstig de belangen van 
het microkrediet instituut, en de contractrisico’s die deze mechanismen met zich mee brengen, 
vooral in een risicovolle omgeving zoals de droogte gevoelige gebieden in het noorden van 
Ethiopië. 
Gegeven de contractrisico’s van groepsaansprakelijkheid, wordt in hoofdstuk vier 
empirisch onderzocht welk soort groepen ontstaan wanneer huishoudens deelnemen aan 
groepscontracten. De hypothese dat homogene groepen met dezelfde risico types worden 
gevormd is getest. De empirische analyse houdt rekening met potentiële endogeniteit tussen 
eigen risico’s en risico’s van partner, en de moeite van het vinden van de juiste partners. 
Resultaten op basis van een cross-sectie dataset laten zien dat er sterk statistisch bewijs is 
voor het verwerpen van de homogeniteit hypothese ten gunste van heterogeniteit. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt verder onderzocht of heterogeniteit het gevolg is van ontbreken van 
verzekeringsmogelijkheden, zoals wel wordt gesuggereerd in de literatuur en of heterogeniteit 
gevolgen heeft voor terugbetaling van groepsleningen. Er is niet genoeg bewijs die de relatie 
tussen heterogeniteit in risico’s en het betalen van risicopremies door groepsleden aan elkaar 
ondersteunt. Daarentegen blijkt dat andere op vertrouwen gebaseerde sociale netwerken en 
bestaande traditionele krediet groepen vaak ten grondslag liggen aan het 
groepsformatieproces in deze regio. Dergelijke bestaande sociale netwerken lopen vaak 
synchroon met krediet groepen en deze beïnvloeden terugbetaling op een positieve manier.  
Hoofdstuk vijf en zes van dit proefschrift richten zich op de lange termijn impact van 
deelname aan microkrediet, rekening houdend met tijdstip en duur van deelname. In 
hoofdstuk vijf wordt over een periode van tien jaar de invloed van intensiteit van deelname op 
twee huishoud welvaartsmaatstaven onderzocht. Deze maatstaven zijn jaarlijkse consumptie 
per hoofd en woningverbetering. Deze laatste is een belangrijke lokale welvaartsmaatstaf in 
Tigray. Door gebruik te maken van individuele trends, wordt het traditionele panel fixed 
effects model, dat doorgaans alleen robuust is tegen selectie bias door tijdsinvariante 
variabelen, op een innovatieve manier uitgebreid zodat het ook rekening houdt met selectie op 
basis van niet waargenomen tijdsvariante variabelen. Het model houdt expliciet rekening met 
het aantal keren dat een huishouden heeft deelgenomen aan microkrediet. Rekening houdend 
met mogelijke oorzaken van selectie bias die gebruikelijk zijn in microkrediet studies, wijzen 
de resultaten erop dat deelname aan microkrediet leidt tot significante stijgingen in de 
huishoud consumptie en de kans op woningverbetering verhoogt. De flexibele 
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modelspecificatie laat verder zien dat eenmalige deelname aan microkrediet niet leidt tot 
woningverbetering maar wel een significante stijging van de consumptie tot gevolg heeft. De 
impact neemt echter toe met de duur van deelname. De conclusie is dat deelname in 
microkrediet niet alleen leidt tot een verbetering op korte termijn, maar de effecten gaan ook 
verder dan alleen de periode van deelname. Impact studies die geen rekening houden met deze 
lange termijn effecten, onderschatten daarmee het effect van microkrediet programma’s. 
In hoofdstuk zes wordt impact gemeten aan de hand van het moment van eerste 
deelname, ongeacht het aantal daaropvolgende keren van deelname. Impact wordt gemeten op 
basis van consumptie in verschillende jaren na deelname. Een nieuwe methode van ‘forward-
looking sequential counterfactuals’ wordt gebruikt, die het mogelijk maakt om rekening te 
houden met selectie bias op basis van tijdstip van deelname en mogelijke alternatieve situaties 
tussen moment van deelname en waarneming van impact. Deze methode combineert panel 
data technieken met de semi-parametrische ‘propensity score matching’ methode om zo 
selectie bias door oorspronkelijke en toekomstige heterogeniteit heet hoofd te bieden. De 
resultaten laten zien dat moment van deelname er toe doet, rekening  houdend met selectie en 
timing effecten. Dat wil zeggen dat vroege deelnemers beter af waren dan latere deelnemers, 
deels omdat effecten van krediet langer doorwerken dan de periode waarin geleend is. Een 
conclusie is dat krediet een belangrijke rol speelt in het opbouwen van buffers, iets wat niet 
gemakkelijk gevonden wordt in geval van een simpele vergelijking van de situatie voor en na 
krediet. 
Hoofdstuk zeven van het proefschrift geeft een samenvatting van de belangrijkste 
conclusies en een geïntegreerde discussie van de gevonden resultaten. In dit hoofdstuk wordt 
ook een synthese van de resultaten van dit proefschrift met bestaande literatuur gegeven. Dit 
laat ook de bijdrage van dit proefschrift aan de wetenschappelijk literatuur op het gebied van 
microkrediet zien. Een korte bespreking van mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek wordt 
aan het eind van dit hoofdstuk gegeven.    
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